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EDITOR’S NOTE 
The ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law publishes three 
issues every year.  The Fall issue is typically a compilation of articles 
concerning emerging topics in international law.  In the first issue published 
this year, Volume 23 Issue 1, calls for the promotion and development of 
international law in varying global challenges. 
This Issue begins with “Post-Brexit: A Continuum for State 
Sovereignty” authored by Morad Eghbal and Dr. K.C. O’Rourke.  The vote 
for the United Kingdom (U.K.) to leave the European Union (E.U.) reflected 
a deep sense of national sovereignty and pride, and a public suspicion of the 
costs of a E.U. partnership.  In 2016, British citizens voted to exit the E.U.  
This has impacted global markets, including the British pound.  In this piece, 
Eghbal and Dr. O’Rourke propose a typology that reflects a transition as the 
U.K. confronts its role as a sovereign State in the twenty-first century. 
Student author, Christina Strompf, discusses the origins of organized 
crime and its impact on the global economy in the second piece—“Guilty 
Until Proven Innocent: A Comparative Analysis of Organized Crime Laws 
in the United States, Italy, Japan, and Ecuador”.  Ms. Strompf examines each 
country’s laws to combat organized crime while noting the differences in the 
legislation, and makes an intriguing suggestion that could benefit each nation 
and its citizens’ wellbeing. 
“The Correlation Between Wiretapping and Terrorism: A Comparative 
Analysis of American and European Societal Views on Government 
Surveillance” authored by fellow student Lora Plemondon comments on 
wiretapping techniques and popularity as a result of terrorism prevention in 
the United States, Russia, Italy, and France. 
Next, Professor Yuri Mantilla, urges for action to stop terrorist 
organizations like ISIS from further committing any more crimes against 
humanity.  “ISIS Crimes Against Humanity and the Assyrian People:  
Religious Totalitarianism and the Protection of Fundamental Human 
Rights,” is a powerful call to the global community to become involved and 
contribute in preventing and punishing these acts of horror against the human 
people. 
International law is as necessary in domestic courts as it is in 
international courts.  Author—Emeralda Colombo, stresses the need for 
international law in adjudicating environmental concerns affecting the 
Alaskan people of the Kivalina island in her award winning piece “Enforcing 
International Law in U.S. Courts:  The Law of the Sea Convention at Play in 
Kivalina.” 
On behalf of the Journal I want to thank the authors for providing us 
with such great material, our Junior Staff and Senior Staff’s work, the 
Editorial Board for its diligence, Professor Donoho for his great supervision, 
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and Marissa Doctrove for all her help and guidance through every obstacle 
we encountered.  
Finally, I want to thank the 2016–2017 Executive Board for its hard 
work and commitment to the Journal.  I am lucky to have worked with such 
intelligent and dedicated individuals.  To my dear friends, my two sisters and 
my parents, thank you for your patience and support, I love you all very 
much. 
 
Paola Palma  
Editor-in-Chief 2016-2017 
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POST-BREXIT:  A CONTINUUM FOR STATE 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Both sides of the Brexit campaign were very nationalist in their 
outlook suggesting that profitable preservation of a capitalist economy was 
paramount based on a conservative sense of nationalism and sovereignty.1  
                                                          
* Morad Eghbal, is a principal researcher at The Riess Institute and consultant in private 
praxis.  In his previous academic career he served as Deputy Director of the Center for International and 
Comparative Law at the University of Baltimore and also as the inaugural director of the law school’s 
graduate law program, the L.L.M. in the Law of the United States (L.L.M.-LOTUS); taught legal, 
ethical and historical studies, international management, organizational behavior, and principles of 
marketing, and international business transactions, international finance, comparative and comparative 
constitutional law at several universities and Trial Advocacy at Howard University School of Law.  He 
holds BA and MA degrees from George Washington University, a Juris Doctorate from Howard 
University, an LL.M. in Transnational Business Practice from McGeorge School of Law and a number 
of graduate certificates from Inns of Court School of Law (U.K.), Paris-Lodron University in Salzburg 
(Austria) and Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest (Hungary). 
**  Dr. K.C. O’Rourke, JD, M. Div., LL.M.; holds a Doctorate of Juridical Science [SJD; The 
Crossroads of Globalization and Rule of Law] with dual Masters of Law [LL.M.; International Law and 
Business; Government Law & Regulation] from Washington College of Law, American University, 
Washington, DC., USA; O’Rourke has taught as adjunct faculty at Washington College of Law; holds a 
Juris Doctorate from Drake University Law School; and serves in the core executive leadership circle at 
The Bridging Institute in Maryland; Interdisciplinary comments are welcome and encouraged at e-mail:  
GeoNOMOS777@gmail.com. 
1. John Browne, U.K.’s Minister Commits to Successful Brexit, TOWNHALL FINANCE (Aug. 
5, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://finance.townhall.com/columnists/johnbrowne/2016/08/05/U.K.s-prime-
minister-commits-to-successful-brexit-n2201876; see also Danica Kirka, U.K. Central Bank Tries to 
Soften Brexit Shock on Economy, AP:  THE BIG STORY (Aug. 4, 2016, 1:24 PM), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1f1f6bc759e945f0b366f5c7e4b74cdc/U.K.-central-bank-help-economy-
through-brexit-stimulus. 
While cheaper money will help households and companies, the cost of loans is 
already very low and is not their primary concern right now, economists say.  
Businesses in particular are worried about whether to make investments or hire in 
2 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 23:1 
 
The ongoing debates concerning the United Kingdom’s (U.K.) future 
relationship with the European Union (EU) continue amidst the rapid 
cabinet changes and the political rhetoric of newly appointed U.K. public 
officials.2  The post-Brexit campaign analysis shows that both the Leave 
(Brexit) and Remain campaign relied on widespread publicly disseminated 
negative scare tactics rather than on positive arguments for solidarity or for 
sharing in support of each respective side on the actual issues.  Both sides 
were rigidly nationalistic in their outlook, relentless in their agnosticism of 
the facts, and persistent in demonizing the opposition. 
Analysis of voters’ demographics and news-consuming habits offer 
potential clues as to why Brexit passed:3  Those who supported Brexit were 
                                                                                                                                      
Britain without knowing what the country’s trade relationship with the EU will 
be.  
Nives Dolsak & Aseem Prakash, Here’s What Many Journalists Missed When Covering the 
Brexit Vote, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/08/04/heres-what-many-journalists-missed-when-covering-the-brexit-vote/ (Welfare 
states have policies that help free trade’s losers.  The political scientist John Ruggie called this system 
for cushioning blows from the international economic system “embedded liberalism” arguing that the 
interventionist domestic welfare state made possible today’s liberal trade order.  But these kind of 
policies are eroding.  Winners aren’t compensating losers.  In fact, firms like Apple that have gained 
enormously from globalization are using complex financial arrangements to escape taxes.  Wealthy 
individuals are doing the same.  Economic inequality is increasing dramatically in a “winner-take-all” 
society.  Mainstream media coverage that focuses on racism and xenophobia rather than economic loss 
and inequality may not be taking these shifts adequately into account.  Larry Summers famously insisted 
in 2005 that financial markets cannot fail.  Yet more recently he noted the Brexit vote should be a 
‘wake-up call for elites everywhere’ on the need to ‘design an approach, approaches to economic policy 
that hear the anger that’s being expressed in this vote.’”  The real issue in BREXIT was “what did the 
British average voter get, when and how from EU integration?”). 
2. See United Kingdom, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA (last updated July 28, 2016) 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/United_Kingdom (explaining that the United Kingdom is 
constituted, or composed of four constituent governmental entities, England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland which together make up the United Kingdom of Great Britain.  With the Brexit vote 
now, this governance arrangement would continue as one nation State or if the arrangement would be 
discontinued for the U.K., internally as several sovereigns.  This article presupposes this arrangement 
will continue.  If it were discontinued, then it must be presumed that the United Kingdom would, as a 
unit of governance, have to dissolve into these constituent governmental entities which then, in turn, 
would either become independent nation-states in their own right and elect to join the EU, or else 
reconfigure a different and perhaps new arrangement with “Mother Britannia.”). 
3. Will Youmans, The Brexit Vote and the Crisis of Sovereignty, GULF NEWS (June 25, 2016, 
5:19 PM), http://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/the-brexit-vote-and-the-crisis-of-sovereignty-1.1852328  
(Brexit is a sort of martyrdom in the name of a restored state sovereignty.  This is 
of course a matter of perception.  How much sovereignty did Great Britain 
actually sacrifice?  Euro-sceptics trotted out a litany of grievances, often to mock 
the over-specificity of EU regulations.  It would be hard to accept that the U.K.’s 
fate was actually much worse or unable to navigate the global economy as a result 
of its belonging.  Those mystified by the vote show contempt for the Brexit 
2016] Eghbal & O’Rourke 3 
 
 
older and as a general observation, less educated formally.  Brexit voters 
tended to earn less money and where significant numbers appeared to work 
in non-skilled trades, many lacked formal job qualifications.  In other 
words, these voters were not able to compete in a global economy that had 
“trickled down into” the U.K. over the last forty years.4  According to some 
reports, these voters appeared to be reluctant to adapt to rapid social 
changes that integration into the global economy often requires as domestic 
markets shift rapidly.5  Domestic labor markets and work opportunities 
                                                                                                                                      
decision.  Some deride it as a demonstration of one of the major shortcomings of 
democracy, namely when uninformed electorates make crucial decisions which 
affect those to be governed.  Referenda are among the most democratic means of 
direct, collective decision-making.  There are rightful concerns that public 
deliberation beforehand was confused, media coverage was agnostic to facts, and 
mistrust of expertise was absent.  Either way, Brexit produced a confused desire 
by the majority of Brits for fortifying state sovereignty.  It will not fix the 
underlying problems of economic stratification, withered public safety nets and a 
national pride injured by its lost investments in imperialism and colonization.  
The State model in general has failed to address the increasingly transnational 
problems of the world today, including a growing global economic inequality, 
mass migration, climate change and the whimsical destruction wrought by the 
transnational finance networks.  It is easy to pin these on the institutions like the 
EU, but many border-defying problems are the direct result of past State 
actions—the same powers of national sovereignty Brexit supporters seek to 
bolster.”).   
4. Id. 
(the neoliberal premise of free trade bringing about wealth creation for all did not 
manifest.  Ordinary working people are left to feel they paid the cost of U.K. 
national honor—of which the State is the protector—for questionable, partial, 
material benefits, which were disproportionately distributed to those who were 
already well-off.  The riches of Brussels went to those who profit the most from 
trade, banking, finance and so on.  Social and economic stratification has such 
reproductive tendencies, and only further cement resentment.  The rising sense of 
national pride, one ridden by angst about the state of the changing world, might 
appear irrational.  But it betrays the underlying reason.  An observer might miss it 
if they value the outcome in economic terms and political outcomes alone). 
5. S.A. Ramirez, Taking Economic Rights Seriously After the Debt Crisis, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L. 
REV. 713 (2011); see generally DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX:  DEMOCRACY AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2011); MURRAY MILGATE & SHANNON 
C. STIMSON, AFTER ADAM SMITH:  A CENTURY OF TRANSFORMATION IN POLITICS AND POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY (Princeton Univ. Press 2009); PAUL KRUGMAN, TRADE AND WAGES RECONSIDERED 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2008); PHILLIP MCMICHAELS, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE (Sage Pub. 
2008); PETER NOLAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM:  THE CONTRADICTORY CHARACTER OF 
GLOBALIZATION (Anthem Press 2008); INO ROSSI, FRONTIERS OF GLOBALIZATION RESEARCH:  
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES (Springer Pub. 2008); RAWI ABDELAL, CAPITAL 
RULES:  THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL FINANCE (Harvard Univ. Press 2009); RONALD FINDLAY & 
KEVIN O’ROURKE, POWER AND PLENTY:  TRADE, WAR AND THE WORLD ECONOMY IN THE SECOND 
MILLENNIUM (Princeton Univ. Press 2009); BARRY K. GILLS & W. R. THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION 
4 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 23:1 
 
change because of decisions made in corporate boardrooms rather than by 
national legislatures and in parliament through a democratic and public 
debate process.  Brexit voters had concluded they were being left behind by 
both the economic pressures and the social ramifications (e.g., immigration 
mandates) of U.K.’s European Union membership.6  Adding up these 
interconnected demographics, it is not difficult to understand that Brexit 
reflected a larger, more deep-seated citizen angst about the fragile state and 
legitimacy of U.K. sovereignty.  
The public perceptions that influenced the urban Brexit voting patterns 
carried with it some immediate and interesting mandates, not the least of 
which will be substantive in terms of addressing U.K. security followed 
shortly thereafter by significant internal planning and parliamentary review 
of the U.K.’s sovereign obligations that accompany its global contractual 
partnerships, Common Market participation, international trade agreements, 
and international treaties on human rights.7  Transition in how exactly the 
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Books 2001); MOHAMMED A. BAMYEH, THE ENDS OF GLOBALIZATION (Univ. of Minnesota Press 
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6. Youmans, supra note 3. 
(sovereignty is the passionate almost personal concern of nationalists, patriots and 
ordinary citizens everywhere.  The notoriously irresponsible British tabloids 
agitated for such sentiments over the past four decades.  Sovereignty, as the 
highest political authority, was a key word in the Brexit debate, especially for 
those calling for Leave votes.  This is odd.  What does national sovereignty mean 
for average people who have no command of the state’s instruments and are not 
of an economic class to determine how the state works?  This presumes a rational 
basis). 
7. Id.  
(the bargain underpinning the EU is that compromises in national sovereignty 
through accession to regulatory compliance will bring economic and social 
benefits.  Creating a common economic market that could rival the American 
economy would be a boost to lift all boats.  Yet while greater access to markets 
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U.K. plans to meet these global mandates will simultaneously raise 
considerable domestic pressure by U.K. citizens for more elected official 
transparency as the State reviews how it proposes to integrate its available 
capital resources (both public and private) once the U.K. begins to function 
outside its EU partnership.8 
After almost a half-century of being part of a different vision, the U.K. 
now plunges into a new period of political transition, uncertainty, and 
public contestation.  But now, the necessity of securing legitimacy with its 
own citizens, U.K. lawmakers and public officials are confronted with 
somehow redefining the operation of U.K.’s sovereignty while they 
simultaneously negotiate an amicable EU separation and divorce settlement 
under Article 50.9  The operative mandates for this “re-legitimization” 
                                                                                                                                      
and labor migration accelerated within the EU, public austerity measures 
produced cutbacks in domestic-level social programs, education and health.  
These public austerity measures are now at the forefront of domestic political 
review.  For many working people, the benefits of EU membership did not appear 
to outweigh the stagnation in quality of life they experienced, combined with the 
loss of security). 
8. Steven Swinford, Theresa May Pledges to Fight Injustice and Make Britain ‘A Country 
That Works For Everyone’ In Her First Speech as Prime Minister, THE TELEGRAPH (July 13, 2016, 8:53 
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.U.K./news/2016/07/13/theresa-mays-pledges-to-fight-injustice-and-make-
britain-a-count/.  
(BREXIT supporters continually cited a number of reasons for leaving the EU 
including independence and injuries to British national pride that Brussels 
routinely imposed on the U.K. so much so that this over-regulation from outside 
the borders of Great Britain appeared to prioritize foreign corporate interests 
while forcing Britain to take particular refugees, especially from Syria and 
Eastern Europe, that created a general fear about cultural and religious 
disharmony). 
(note that these essential capital resources are currently available to the U.K. as its rights and 
benefits of EU membership but will need to be analyzed and carefully discussed precisely because the 
public spectrum of Brexit citizen political demands are significant and dominantly focused on creating 
measurable and concrete domestic-based solutions that address access to education, employment and 
healthcare). 
9. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, http://www.lisbon-
treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/ 
title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon] (noting that any Member State 
may decide to withdraw from the Union (EU) in accordance with its own constitutional requirements so 
long as the Member State notifies the European Council of its intention.  This notice triggers a set of 
guidelines from the European Council to negotiate an agreement with that State for arrangements of the 
withdrawal and is to also take into account the framework for the future relationships of that State with 
the EU.  The final agreement must have majority approval of the European Council members and the 
consent of the European Parliament.  The Treaties between the parties cease from the date of entry of 
the negotiated agreement (Article 218(3) or failing an agreement, two years after Article 50 notification 
is given by the State, unless the European Council unanimously decides to extend this time period.); see 
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process is reflected in the Brexit vote by U.K. citizens who somehow felt 
that British sovereignty was manipulated, bruised, or perhaps even 
surrendered unnecessarily. 
A brief glimpse into the political enormity of this transition for the 
U.K. appeared in the early statements by the new Prime Minister Theresa 
May.  May essentially provided reassurances that she would heal the 
nation’s divisions and build bridges to help the least privileged.  She 
publicly stated that her government would deliver Brexit and refocus its 
priorities on people whose needs were greatest:  “[w]hen we make the big 
calls we will think not of the powerful but you,” she said.  “When we pass 
new laws, we will listen not to the mighty but to you.  When it comes to 
taxes, we will prioritize not the wealthy but you.  When it comes to 
opportunity, we won’t entrench the advantages of the fortunate few—we 
will do everything we can to help anybody, whatever your background, to 
go as far as your talents will take you.”10  Obviously, with the Brexit vote 
                                                                                                                                      
also Nick Barber, ET AL., Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’:  Parliament’s Indispensable Role, U.K. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ASSOC. (June 27, 2016), https://U.K.constitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-
barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/ 
(arguing that the Prime Minister alone is unable to trigger withdrawal from the EU under TEU; Prime 
Minister must be authorized to do so by statute in order that the declaration is legally effective under 
domestic law and complies with the preconditions of triggering Article 50); Miranda Butler, The 
Implications of Brexit: Who Is Sovereign Now?, SOLICITORS JOURNAL (July 26, 2016), 
http://www.3harecourt.com/assets/asset-store/file//MBBrexitSJ.pdf (discussing what Brexit vote entails 
for U.K. parliamentary sovereignty and for U.K. influence in international issues; considers whether 
U.K. constitutional law requires not only government’s use of ‘crown prerogative’ but also a 
parliamentary vote in favor of leaving EU; looks like increased participation of Scotland and Northern 
Ireland in U.K. decision making and future of U.K. as sovereign  State in international law; citing case 
R. v Secretary for the Home Department EX.P Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 A.C.513, Independent 
[April 6, 1995]). 
10. Toby Helm, Theresa May’s First Pledge as PM Was for A “One-Nation Britain.”  Can 
She Deliver?, THE GUARDIAN (July 16, 2016, 6:45 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/ 
jul/16/theresa-may-one-nation-britain-prime-minister (suggesting that the core problem is that, as yet, no 
one in it (new British cabinet) knows what Brexit means, and what it will entail.  May’s cabinet is split 
between the likes of Hammond, who insists that whatever happens the U.K. must retain as much access 
to the single market as possible, and others, such as Davis and Johnson, who seem to believe the U.K. 
can thrive outside the single market if it has to, and this is the price the country has to pay to extricate 
itself from the EU’s commitment to free movement of labor in order to control immigration); see 
Swinford, supra note 8 (noting that Theresa May has directly addressed working-class Britons who are 
"just managing" to cope with life as she vowed that her Government will not "entrench the advantages 
of the privileged few."  In a searing speech outside Downing Street May pledged to "fight against the 
burning injustices" of poverty, race, class and health and give people back "control" of their lives; she 
vowed to "prioritise" tax cuts and legislation for working-class voters rather than the "mighty"; her 
speech, setting out her vision as a "One Nation conservative”, marked a clear attempt to distance herself 
from David Cameron's premiership and appeal directly to disenchanted Labour voters.  She said that for 
an "ordinary working class family" life is "much harder than many people in Westminster realise" as she 
sought to heal the national divide after the EU referendum.  Her speech highlighted her clear intention to 
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behind her government, Theresa May will be in a unique position to foster a 
more structured plan that intentionally re-defines the role and function of 
State government within its overall domestic operation.11 
Her early comments suggest there will be a quasi-public debate that 
takes a long view and will be framed by widespread domestic program 
development.  May speaks of marshalling various capital resources and 
domestic programs around economic marketplace issues, social safety 
networks, labor issues, job creations, and individual capability development 
as the country strives to fight against burning social injustices.  The balance 
espoused by Ms. May points to a much more deliberate approach in the 
State’s development and utilization of economic capital,12 social capital,13 
                                                                                                                                      
reach out to Labour voters who feel alienated by Jeremy Corbyn in a move which could put the Tories 
in power for a decade.  After arriving in Downing Street, May said that her "mission" as Prime Minister 
will be to make Britain "a country that works for everyone."  She also vowed to “forge a bold new 
positive role” for Britain outside the European Union). 
11. See Karen A. Cecilia O’Rourke, The Crossroads of Globalization, Human Rights, and 
Rule of Law:  Creating A Legal Culture of Human Rights Designing A Geonomos Model for the State 
(2012) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Washing College of Law, American University) (on file with 
the American University Library system) (the irony of Brexit as a historical event, is that contrary to 
public anecdotal comments that Theresa May is a “new Thatcher”, Prime Minister May is thankfully not 
Margaret Thatcher, and hopefully does not feel compelled to bear the Thatcher political standard.  
Recall that it was Margaret Thatcher (U.K.) and Ronald Reagan (U.S.A.) who created, embraced and 
implemented the neoliberal paradigm [c.1980-2010] for global capitalism [better known as “trickle-
down economics” or The Washington Consensus] which has proven to be disastrous to State 
sovereignty, domestic program funding, and State oversight of the private sector capital movement both 
in domestic markets and in the global economy). 
12. See Glyn Holton, Economic Capital, GLYN HOLTON (Aug. 11, 2016), 
https://www.glynholton.com/notes/economic_capital/.  (economic capital is the quantum of risk capital, 
assessed on a real basis, which an enterprise requires to cover the risks that it is running or collecting as 
a going concern, such as market risk, credit risk, legal risk, and operational risk) (it is the amount of 
money which is needed to secure survival in a worst-case scenario.  Firms and financial services 
regulators, i.e., representing the nation-state should then aim to hold risk capital of an amount equal at 
least to economic capital.  Typically, economic capital can be calculated by determining the amount of 
capital that a firm needs to ensure that its realistic balance sheet stays solvent over a certain time period 
with a pre-specified probability.  Therefore, economic capital is often calculated as value at risk.  The 
balance sheet, in this case, would be prepared showing market value (rather than book value) of assets 
and liabilities and thus economic capital is distinguished in relation to other types of capital which may 
not necessarily reflect a monetary or exchange-value.  These forms of capital include natural capital, 
cultural capital and social capital, the latter two represent a type of power or status that an individual can 
attain in capitalist society via a formal education or through social ties.  O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 
278–79). 
13. See Paul S. Adler et al., Social Capital:  Prospects for a New Concept, 27 THE ACAD. OF 
MGMT. REV., 17–40 (2002), http://www.csee.wvu.edu/~xinl/library/papers/social/social_capital.pdf (the 
term Social Capital generally refers to (a) resources, and the value of these resources, both tangible 
(public spaces, private property) and intangible ("actors," "human capital," persons and people) but is in 
the GeoNOMOS© to be distinguished from human capital, (b) the relationships among these resources, 
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and human capital14—three essential resources that every nation State 
including the U.K. already possesses.  The post-Brexit appeal made by May 
seeks to shape a different foundation for the twenty-first century U.K. as 
she speaks about a social contract between government and those it seeks to 
govern that represents a more flexible continuum for State sovereignty—
one that secures public decision-making, individual liberty, citizen 
opportunity and economic stability.  Every one of these espoused efforts 
moves the public debate for defining the operative scope of British 
sovereignty on to a twenty-first century continuum—a continuum that is 
more relational in the domestic sector and more actively functional in the 
international sector.  It is an effort that strives to meet the modern demands 
of the nation State without a retrenchment to an older view of an absolute 
sovereign autonomy of the Westphalian model of the nation State that 
prevailed before and after World War II.  As a recognized global leader, the 
U.K. is in an unusual position in the next few years to design this new 
                                                                                                                                      
and (c) the impact that these relationships have on the resources involved in each relationship, and on 
larger groups.  The focus of social capital is generally as a form of capital that produces public goods for 
a common good); see also P. BOURDIEAU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRAC. (Cambridge University 
Press, 1972); L.J. Hanifan, The Rural School Community Center, 67 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF 
POL. AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 130–138 (Sage Publications, Inc., 1916); L.J. HANIFAN, THE COMMUNITY 
CENTER (Boston:  Silver Burdett & Company, 1920); JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT 
AM. CITIES 138 (Random House Inc.,1961) (stating that “If self-government in the place is to work, 
underlying any float of population must be a continuity of people who have forged neighborhood 
networks.  These networks are a city's irreplaceable social capital.  Whenever the capital is lost, from 
whatever cause, the income from it disappears, never to return until and unless new capital is slowly and 
chancily accumulated.”); James Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. 
OF SOCIOLOGY SUPPLEMENT S95–S120 (1988), http://courseweb.ischool.illinois.edu/~katewill/for-
china/readings/coleman 1988 social capital.pdf; Barry Wellman & Scott Worley, Different Strokes from 
Different Folks:  Community Ties and Social Support, 96 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 558–88 (1990), 
http://www.bebr.ufl.edu/sites/default/files/Wellman%20and%20Wortley%20-%201990%20-
%20Different%20Strokes%20from%20Different%20Folks%20Community%20.pdf; Samuel Bowles & 
Herbert Gintis, Social Capital and Community Governance, 112 THE ECON. J. 419–36, 
http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~bowles/SocialCapital.pdf. 
14. See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87(3) Q.  J. OF ECON. 355–74 (1973), 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirkb/teach/pdf/spence/1973%20job%20market%20signalling.pdf (human 
capital is a term popularized by Gary Becker, an economist from the University of Chicago, and Jacob 
Mincer that refers to the stock of knowledge, habits, social and personality attributes, including 
creativity, embodied in the ability to perform labor so as to produce economic value.  In the alternative, 
human capital is understood as a collection of resources—all the knowledge, talents, skills, abilities, 
experience, intelligence, training, judgment, and wisdom possessed individually and collectively by 
individuals in a particular and defined population.  Such resources are the total capacity of the people 
that represents a form of wealth which can be directed to accomplish the goals of the nation or state or a 
portion thereof); see also Michael Spence, Signaling in retrospect and the Information Structure of 
Markets, 92  AM. ECON. REV. 434–59 (2002), http://classes.maxwell.syr.edu/ecn611/spencenobel.pdf; 
Gary Becker, Human Capital, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON. (Sept. 29, 2016), 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/HumanCapital.html. 
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continuum of sovereignty and to model its operation both domestically for 
its citizens and internationally with a more effective set of economic 
organizing principles that balance the ongoing global expansion of 
capitalism. 
II.  WHY A NEW TYPOLOGY FOR STATE SOVEREIGNTY? 
The world in relation to the operation of sovereign States has changed 
dramatically in the last half of the twentieth century as demonstrated by the 
end of traditional colonialism—de jure, if not also de facto—and the sheer 
number of newly emerging nation States claiming and being accorded 
sovereignty.15  Traditional notions of sovereignty established by the Treaty 
of Westphalia (1648)16 are simply no longer fully applicable or realistic as 
the State legitimizes its function in the twenty-first century.  States, 
including the U.K., have voluntarily agreed to cooperate in the interests of 
global capitalism, human rights, and world peace across a variety of global 
partnerships by signing charters, private and public sector investment 
contracts, and a wide variety of public treaty agreements.17  As a result, a 
recognizable and functional international “community of States” has been 
established and the U.K. is fundamentally a part of that community in 
addition to its membership in the EU regional configuration of States; a 
community which it cannot “leave,” no matter what, but a community 
which it may be able to influence and re-shape more productively and going 
forward in time through more active and engaged participation. 
Furthermore, as global economic organizing principles have also 
changed over time, the ongoing function of State sovereignty was altered 
even into the early twenty-first century.18  As part of this dynamic process, 
dominant States such as the U.K., continued to give up parts of the 
traditional scope of State sovereignty in exchange for what was perceived 
as the ongoing mutual benefits of these economic market partnerships in 
both the public and private international arena.19 
                                                          
15. See generally O’Rourke, supra note 11. 
16. See Treaty of Westphalia, YALE L. SCH. (Aug. 15, 2016),  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
17th_century/westphal.asp (the Treaty of Westphalia originally was signed in 1648 to stop the religious 
wars of the seventeenth century by securing a domestic jurisdiction and a defined geographic boundary 
for emerging nations, thus offering protection for nation States); O’Rourke, supra note 12, at 236; Aloun 
A. Preece, The Rise and Fall of National Sovereignty, 8 INT’L TRADE AND BUSINESS L. REV. 229 
(2003),http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/IntTBLawRw/2003/9.html. 
17. See O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 9, 11. 
18. See generally O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 2. 
19. See Understanding the WTO Basics, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept. 29, 2016), 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (the basis of a “common law of 
humanity” emerged after the end of the Cold War in the 1980s followed the emergence of independent 
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The idea that how sovereign States conduct themselves is a dynamic 
phenomenon in constant flux requires a parallel consideration that there will 
be another set of transitions required in this century as the defined role, 
legitimacy, responsibility and operational function of a sovereign State 
continues to change.  The changing global realities of the last forty years 
point to the evolution of a continuum of State sovereignty for this century, 
one that coordinates cooperation both in addressing the legitimacy of its 
citizen’s concerns and in designing a new global market paradigm. 
As nation States entered the early twenty-first century, two 
predominant debates ensued.  The first debate included a cadre of global 
politicians and world order scholars arguing that the dominance of 
international organizations and their scope of authority meant the nation 
State was “dead.”  World governance would soon become inevitable in a 
cosmopolitan sense of global political and legal evolution.20  Traditional 
notions about State sovereignty would simply merge into a world 
governance model.  Others suggested that State was not dead but would 
remain a viable architect of world order well into the twenty-first century.21  
The second debate presented new typologies for State sovereignty 
suggesting an evolution in the expression of State sovereignty was 
emerging.  This second debate relied on State collaboration and 
interdependence that would require a more interactive and relational 
definition of how States expressed their sovereignty.  New functional 
                                                                                                                                      
States in Eastern Europe who were active in the United Nations and demanded equity and fair access 
into the global marketplace and international finance as well.  The World Trade Organization was 
created in 1995 as an evolution of the multilateral General Agreement on Tariff and Trade of 1948.  
These global trading contractual agreements between States coupled with many regional trade 
agreements in the late twentieth century continued to erode the Westphalian notion of an absolute form 
and unilateral expression of State sovereignty.  However, while cooperative behavior increased between 
sovereign States and seemingly eroded the authoritarian and more traditional Westphalian model of 
sovereignty, the endorsement of equality among sovereign States is also foundational to the United 
Nations Charter and other global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
and the World Trade Organization); see O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 82, 237. 
20. See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (Harvard University Press, 2000); see 
also Peter Hay, Supranational Organizations and United States Contract Law, 6 VA. J. INT’L L. 195 
(1996); Patrick Tangrey, The New Internationalism:  The Cessation of Sovereign Competency to Super-
national Organizations and Constitution Changes in U.S. and Germany, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 395 (1996); 
HAROLD JONES, INT’L MONETARY COOPERATION SINCE BRETTON WOODS (2000) (explaining how IMF 
as one international organization has loan terms requiring a country engage in trade liberalization under 
neoliberal paradigm as well as in various domestic budget and credit restraints); JEREMY RABKIN, LAW 
WITHOUT NATIONS?:  WHY CONS. GOV’T REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (Princeton University Press, 
2005).  
21. See O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 343, 410–11. 
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typologies for the State could no longer simply be based on a traditional 
Westphalian authoritarian exercise of unilateral power.22 
In the last decades of the twentieth century, numerous 
recommendations for a new sovereign State typology were presented.  Jack 
Donnelly proposed a new typology (a four sectioned rectangular box) that 
balanced State authority and State capabilities with sovereign rule and the 
State’s scope of domination as it intersected effective components of formal 
sovereignty and material/normative weaknesses.23  Francis Deng and Helen 
Stacey suggested two different typology arrangements for sovereignty as 
responsibility24 and relational sovereignty.25  Deng’s typology analyzed a 
range of both internal and external State factors and then, correlated these 
factors with a new international standard of responsible sovereignty as an 
irreversible process.26  Helen Stacey suggested that a new typology of 
relational sovereignty was emerging where the sovereign would be judged 
by how well and by what means the State concretely and continuously 
“cares” for its people.27  A fourth typology by Julian Ku and John Yoo 
discussed a popular sovereignty based on the idea that people in a sovereign 
State govern themselves through Constitutional structures and institutions.28  
                                                          
22. GIANLUIGI PALOMBELLA & N. WALKER, RELOCATING THE RULE OF L. (Hart, 2009); see 
Rebecca Bratspies, Perspectives on the New Regulatory Era, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 575 (2009); see also Eric 
Engles, Transformation of the International Legal Order, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 23 (2007); James 
Rosenau, Three Steps Toward a Viable Theory for Globalization, in FRONTIERS OF GLOBALIZATION 
RESEARCH:  THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES 307–15 (Inno Rossi ed., 2007); Elke 
Krahmann, National Regional and Global Governance:  One Phenomenon or Many?, 9 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 323 (2003), https://stackofideas.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/national-regional-and-
global-governance-one-phenomenon-or-many-elke-krahmann.pdf; Brad Roth, The Enduring 
Significance of State Sovereignty, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1017 (2004); Paul Kahn, The Question of 
Sovereignty, 40 STAN J. INT’L L. 259, 260–68 (2004); PAUL KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE 
(Princeton University Press 2005); Clair A. Cutler, Critical Reflctions on the Westphalian Assumptions 
of International Law and Organization:  A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT’L STUD. 133 (2001); 
MICHAEL FOWLER & JULIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER AND THE SOVEREIGN (Routledge 1995) (for historical 
notions of sovereignty); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN:  PARTS ONE AND TWO (Bobbs Merill Co., 18th 
ed. 1958); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Penguin Books, 1st ed. 1968); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND 
TREATISE OF GOV’T (Prentice-Hall, 1st ed. 1953). 
23. Jack Donnelly, State Sovereignty and Human Rights 3–4 (June 2004) (forthcoming paper 
prepared for working papers). 
24. Francis Deng, Frontiers of Sovereignty, 8 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 249 (1995). 
25. Helen Stacey, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STANFORD L. REV. 210 (2009). 
26. Deng, supra note 24, at 250–77. 
27. Stacey, supra note 25, at 218–22. 
28. Julian Ku & John Yoo, Globalization and Sovereignty, 31 Bᴇʀᴋᴇʟᴇʏ J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 210, 211 
(2013) (noting that sovereignty is in decline but the decline in national sovereignty is not desirable since 
State maintains decision-making and individual liberties.  Suggesting a new form of popular sovereignty 
with shift away from Westphalian models to the right for people to govern themselves through 
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In this construct, the State can legitimately share sovereign power with its 
citizens without compromising the whole system.29 
The typology presented in this article builds on concepts noted above 
and points to yet another evolution in how sovereign States function in this 
century.  It is an interactive typology called a continuum for sovereignty, 
one that is based on a framework of liberty and ensures the State remains 
the primary architect of world order.30  The GeoNOMOS© operates 
interactively on two levels as a State secures its legitimacy within a 
geographic boundary for the very people it is trying to govern and then, 
shapes the global market partnerships that it intentionally seeks to 
undertake.  (See diagram below).  This typology offers sovereign stability, 
operational flexibility and addresses the two primary functional components 
of any twenty-first century State, including the U.K.:  (i) one component 
redefines how the sovereign State functions to create and sustain a civil 
society within its own domestic sphere (vertical axis) by addressing the 
specific needs of its populations who will live and work most of their lives 
within the geographic boundary of that State, and (ii) one component that 
seeks to redefine how the sovereign State functions and engages within its 
own international sphere (horizontal axis) by engaging with the public and 
private sector global marketplace and foreign investment sector, public 
sector international institutions, and an international community of States.31   
                                                                                                                                      
institutions of the Constitution and its structures.  Popular sovereignty is flexible to maintain national 
sovereignty and assumes State can share sovereign power without giving up entire system; popular 
sovereignty can co-exist with globalization and governance issues in ways that the rigidity of 
Westphalian system could not.  State turning automatically to international organizations inconsistent 
with reliance and continued power of nation States; by referring to structural provisions of Constitution, 
e.g, separation of powers, promotes state level democratic governance and incorporates the gains of 
international cooperation). 
29. Id. at 218. 
30. O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 212 (noting a continuum is referenced as the basis of this new 
typology for sovereignty because it represents a more flexible set of options given the range of 
possibilities in terms of how an individual State interacts with some sense of legitimacy on behalf of the 
people it is governing and interacts as a member of the international community of States; there is no 
limit to the possibilities offered as part of this proposal for a continuum of State sovereignty so long as it 
operates within a framework of liberty.  See diagram and discussion detailed in this commentary.  See 
definition of continuum at http://merriam-webster.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2016)). 
31. Id. at 15 (stating without a doubt, the rapid and uncontrolled movement of private sector 
global capital and public sector capital and domestic finances in and out a State’s legal boundaries also 
bear witness to these relational components of State sovereignty within the international sphere of the 
equation.  The same flexibility of global movement never seemed to occur on the side of development or 
utilization of social and human capital.  While economic capital was and remains highly mobile and 
unregulated, most human labor (human capital) is bound by State geographic boundaries and people’s 
life circumstances and citizenship rights are dictated by those State boundaries.  This is the domestic re-
balancing that appears to be in demand as a result of Brexit vote in the U.K. and that is espoused by 
Theresa May’s ideal of “one Nation conservative.”  There is an imbalance expressed and experienced by 
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Often the functional role and legitimacy of State sovereignty lies 
dormant until a conflict like Brexit emerges.  Then the sovereign powers as 
well as State legitimacy or State authority arise, are challenged, and need to 
be redefined.  As with the Brexit vote, these demands are now made not 
upon a set of elected individuals but upon the U.K. in toto and acting as a 
sovereign nation State.  This legitimacy crisis cannot be ignored.  In fact, 
given the charged atmosphere around the Brexit vote, there appears to be a 
growing sense of citizen entitlement just as the U.K. strives to determine the 
proper balance of sovereign accountability for building a different kind of 
civil society that May defines as “one Nation conservative” apart from the 
European Union.  An expanded level of U.K. legitimacy will need to secure 
a new set of global market organizing principles that move beyond the 
neoliberal paradigm (c.1980–2010) notion of “trickle-down” global 
economics. 
The typology for a continuum of State sovereignty presented here 
contributes to support this ongoing conversation concerning the post-Brexit 
dialogue and the U.K. secession process by suggesting the premise that the 
U.K. as a nation State must remain a primary architect in shaping not only 
its own civil society but also in modeling a new world order for this 
century.  A civil society inspired by Prime Minister May will be more 
economically inclusive, one hopefully based on a new paradigm for global 
capitalism that does not leave large groups of U.K. citizens out of its 
intended benefits; one that supports a sense of equity in sharing tax burdens 
from all sectors within the State; and one that provides opportunity, access 
to education and advancement in jobs for all.32 
Rodrik argues that the blind spot of the capitalist globalization process 
in the neoliberal era (c.1980–2010) consisted of deep and rapid integration 
                                                                                                                                      
the U.K. citizenry active in the Brexit campaign that the benefits of economic capital development have 
not trickled down to the social settings and human capital development in places where most U.K. 
citizens live every day). 
32. Id. at 74–75 (this neoliberal paradigm (c.1980–2010) of global capitalism routinely 
required tremendous State reductions in domestic program development, public services, and public 
sector program funding as a calculated cost for continued access to global market development, foreign 
direct investment programs, and participation in world financial institutions that provide necessary 
access to public and private economic capital.  Ms. May will be in a unique position to soften some of 
the past structural damage done domestically in the U.K. by this neoliberal paradigm (c.1980–2010) and 
has a citizen mandate to do so now as evidenced by the Brexit vote—by her own statements, May 
appears willing to address damages that have accumulated over time from the neoliberal economic 
paradigm of the 1980s, the benefits from which apparently have not “trickled down” to regular U.K 
citizens who in Brexit challenged State legitimacy and demanded broader State commitments to 
domestic concerns, programs, and citizen quality of life issues.  The balance that needs to be struck 
between U.K.’s domestic program design and U.K.’s international obligations and global market 
participation is daunting but possible to address if the underlying basis of U.K. sovereignty can be re-
configured prior to the completion of Article 50 negotiations on a transition agreement). 
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in the world economy coupled with the idea that the required institutional 
underpinnings could catch up later at the domestic level of the State.33  
With respect to how (in what manner) the U.K. might develop and utilize 
its considerable economic capital which is part of the proposed continuum 
of State sovereignty, Rodrik supports a basic principle that markets always 
require other social institutions (domestic level) to support legal 
arrangements and global market stabilizing functions so there can be fair 
redistribution, taxation, safety nets, and social insurance.34  As the U.K. 
adjusts its legal arrangements and market functions in the post-Brexit 
period, careful review of several basic principles could be beneficial in 
several ways. 
First, the singular neoliberal focus of the past era that relied on global 
market development to support concentrated economic growth and/or to 
secure private sector foreign direct investment inside the State should raise 
caution in the U.K. as well given the widespread documentation of the 
uneven implementation and results of the neoliberal paradigm (c.1980–
2010) within the capitalist globalization process.35  This issue is evidenced 
in the general dissatisfaction with notions of “trickle down” benefits to 
U.K. citizens that have not predictably or consistently occurred and is 
certainly one of the problems underlying the Brexit vote. 
 Second, Rodrik concludes a State has the right to protect its own 
institutions, social arrangements, and regulations so that globalization 
becomes an instrument for achieving the goals that a society seeks:  
prosperity, stability, freedom and quality of life.36  It has been the uneven 
                                                          
33. Rᴏᴅʀɪᴋ, supra note 5, at 231–42, 245 (discussing a dominant role for the nation State in 
relation to the principles of democratic decision-making which is the foundation for the international 
economic architecture; noting that when States are not democratic this scaffolding collapses and one 
cannot presume a country’s institutional arrangements reflect the preference of its citizens); see 
generally Mɪʟɢᴀᴛᴇ, supra note 5. 
34. Rᴏᴅʀɪᴋ, supra note 5, at 240 (setting out a series of statements in support of a State’s right 
to protect their own social arrangements, regulations and institutions; and suggesting that trade is a 
means to an end, not an end in itself so that globalization should be an instrument for achieving the 
goals that a society seeks:  prosperity, stability, freedom and quality of life). 
35. O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 1 (The legitimacy of the neoliberal paradigm (c.1980-2010) 
for the globalization process has increasingly been challenged as the 2008 global recession continues 
and as global financial institutions are still forced to wrestle with the regulatory boundaries of a global 
market, the growing/ongoing financial and political instability of State governments (Greece, Italy, 
Spain, Egypt, Ireland, Portugal and more), equity issues in the global political economy, and the 
growing demands to create a more humane paradigm for capitalist globalization.).  
36. Rᴏᴅʀɪᴋ, supra note 5, at 241 (setting out a series of statements in support of a State’s right 
to protect their own social arrangements, regulations and institutions; and suggesting that trade is a 
means to an end, not an end in itself so that globalization should be an instrument for achieving the 
goals that a society seeks:  prosperity, stability, freedom and quality of life); O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 
279 (noting that when States are not democratic this scaffolding collapses and one cannot presume a 
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application of the neoliberal paradigm (c. 1980–2010) that has tragically 
limited State sovereignty in a variety of contexts as reflected in the U.K. 
Brexit vote, and now will require a re-balancing process in terms of global 
trade as a means to an end and not an end in and of itself.37  This re-
balancing process within the U.K. points directly to a debate on its domestic 
social arrangements and its use of globalization as a blunt tool to achieve 
prosperity, stability, freedom and quality of life.  A structured but more 
transparent internal U.K. functional review could witness a major nation 
State prioritizing a new definition and role for State sovereignty in the 
twenty-first century—a continuum for sovereignty operating within a 
framework of liberty. 
Third, the proposed GeoNOMOS© typology designs a single core 
function for the State both in relationship:  a) to its citizens (vertical axis) 
from whom it seeks legitimacy in order to govern, and, b) to its engagement 
in the global marketplace (horizontal axis) from an intentionally crafted 
long term strategic and sustainability perspective.  Applying the new 
typology proposed here suggests that the U.K. would be better positioned to 
develop a flexible Article 50 transition strategy and a new set of economic 
organizing principles that consistently balance all the three capital resources 
(economic, social and human capital) needed for the sustainability of the 
State’s institutions, social arrangements, and State regulations.38 
From the opening statements of Theresa May, it appears there will be 
significant future emphasis on “one nation for all” and not just the rich and 
                                                                                                                                      
country’s institutional arrangements reflect the preference of its citizens; concluding that non-
democratic States must play by a different, less permissive set of rules in the global marketplace). 
37. Rᴏᴅʀɪᴋ, supra note 5, at 241; see generally JOHN GRAY, FALSE Dᴀᴡɴ: THE DELUSIONS 
OF CAPITALISM (1998) (providing a detailed step-by-step review and analysis from the State’s 
perspective outlining how a neoliberal set of global economic organizing principles functioned to 
destroy domestic level public sector budgets by transferring assets wholesale to the private sector as a 
pre-condition for market access, locked out democratic legislative oversight through private sector 
contracts, and more.  These dramatic restructuring to align neoliberal constructs shifted priorities for 
short term economic wealth not long term legal arrangements and market regulations that would support 
nation States goals of fair distributions, taxation, safety nets and social insurance.  In other words, 
globalization was not a means to an end as Rodrik has suggested it should be, it was the end game—rule 
of law chased after globalization instead of the other way around—A new emphasis re-balancing 
process could design State level rule of law legal arrangements first, and out of that process, then 
position the State to design a new set of economic organizing principles). 
38. Holton, supra note 12; Adler, supra note 13, at 17–40; BOURDIEAU, supra note 13; 
HANIFAN, supra note 13, at 138; JACOBS, supra note 13, at 138; Coleman, supra note 13, at S95–S120; 
Wellman, supra note 13, at 558–88; Bowles, supra note 13, at 419–36; Spence, supra note 14, at 355–
74, 434–59 (forms of Capital, in this commentary for references and very brief definitions of three 
forms of capital noted in this new typology; this commentary suggests that every State has these three 
forms of capital and the differences in how States define their function is directly related to the amount 
of each form of capital that the State manages and oversees as a sovereignty entity). 
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powerful.39  There will be public and private resources and opportunity to 
redefine how the State relates to its citizens in more concrete and practical 
ways.40  It is the hypothesis of this article that all this, when and if it occurs, 
can only occur and be successful within that which the GeoNOMOS© seeks 
to describe below more fully and to define schematically.  Embracing a 
continuum of sovereignty based on a framework of liberty while working to 
secure a single core function as the diagram outlines prior to completing 
Article 50 negotiations, would provide the U.K. with the flexibility to 
manage its political and economic risks within both its domestic sphere and 
international sphere where the U.K. must continue to operate in this 
century.  This typology could embrace both the best of U.K. history and the 
challenges of a workable EU exit strategy.41 
                                                          
39. Theresa May’s Tory leadership launch statement:  full text, INDEPENDENT (June 30, 
2016), http://www.independent.co.U.K./news/U.K./politics/theresa-mays-tory-leadership-launch-
statement-full-text-a7111026.html. 
40. Id.; see generally O’Rourke, supra note 11 (in the tradition of political thought 
sovereignty is conceived as a social contract.  In democratic states both parties, the state on the one side 
and its citizens on the other, are bound to this bargain.  In return for giving up power to the State, as 
citizens, we are conferred rights, which prevent States from abusing this power that we have given them.  
This social contract, then, involves two parties—people the State seeks to govern and the State). 
41. See generally ANATOLE KALETSKY, CAPITALISM 4.0:  THE BIRTH OF A NEW ECON. IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF CRISIS (Public Affairs, 2010) (an extensive literature review has informed the 
development of the proposed continuum of State sovereignty including the State’s single core functions 
as outlined and its direct partnership with its people as part of the radical transformation of the twenty-
first century State.  This cumulative literature search to support the creation of a continuum for State 
sovereignty includes but is not limited to the following work); see Steven Menashi, Ethno-nationalism 
and Liberal Democracy,  32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 57 (2012); GIANLUIGI PALOMBELLA & NEIL WALKER, 
RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW (Oxford Hart Publishing, 2009); Timothy William Waters, The 
Momentous Gravity of the State of Things Now Obtaining:  Annoying Westphalian Objections to the 
Idea of Global Governance, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 25 (2009); Peer Zumbansen, Law After the 
Welfare State Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn of Relexive Law 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 796 
(2008); IVAN MANOKHA, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT (Palgrave 
2008); James Rosenau, Three Steps Toward a Viable Theory for Globalization, in FRONTIERS OF 
GLOBALIZATION RESEARCH:  THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES (Inno Rossi ed., 
2007); SASKIA SASSEN, A SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION (W.W. NORTON, 2007); Eric Engles, The 
Transformation of the International Legal Order, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 23 (2007); John Alan Coahan, 
Sovereignty in a Postmodern World, 218 FLA. J. INT’L L., 907–08, 913 (2006); Tanja A. Borzel & 
Thomas Risse, Public-Private Partnerships:  Effective and Legitimate Tools of International 
Governance, in EDGAR GRANDE & LOUIS W. PAULY, COMPLEX SOVEREIGNTY:  RECONSTITUTING 
POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (University of Toronto, 2005); Paul Kahn, The 
Question of Sovereignty, 40  STANFORD J. INT’L L. 259, 260–68 (2004); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A 
NEW WORLD ORDER (Princeton University Press, 2004); Brad R. Roth, The Enduring Significance of 
State Sovereignty, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1017 (2004); Eric A. Engle, The Transformation of the International 
Legal System:  The Post-Westphalian World Order, 23 W. L. R. 23 (2004); Krahmann, supra note 19, at 
323; see Richard Falk, Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia, 6 J. ETHICS 311, 320–45 
(2002); A. Clair Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and 
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III.  A CONTINUUM OF SOVEREIGNTY BASED ON LIBERTY 
The GeoNOMOS© represents a graphic schematic depicting the next 
evolution for State sovereignty because it differentiates three important 
principles.  One, it posits conceptually that for all human activity, enterprise 
and undertakings at the level of the State, liberty represents the outer 
boundary (dotted line box) of any and all such endeavors.42  Beyond this 
framework of liberty nothing can, nor does exist, and all activity with the 
State falls within the four corners of this frame defined by liberty as the 
State’s outer boundary.  Two, the GeoNOMOS© distinguishes, in contrast 
to other models which seek to develop an economic/legal model, or some 
other models for nation States from times long past, that the nation State 
and the nation State alone can function as a legal guarantor.  It alone can 
vouchsafe liberty both toward the individual and also toward other nation 
States and supranational organizations who operate with semi-
governmental character.  The nation State alone can hold supranational 
organizations accountable to some form of law and legal process.  It is the 
nation State alone that can protect individual human rights against the 
onslaught of global commerce and the overreach of global international and 
inter-governmental networks.  It is the nation State alone that can exercise 
jurisdiction legitimately.  Three, the GeoNOMOS© remains dynamic and 
ever evolving through the intense interaction of three forms of capital (e.g., 
social capital, human capital and economic capital) as the single core 
function and purpose of the nation State.  It is the State consistently 
functioning at the center of these three forms of capital that will secure a 
balance between these three essential resources to the benefit of the 
individual (those persons the State seeks to govern) as it stabilizes its 
domestic function (vertical axis) and its international function (horizontal 
axis).  All of this activity occurs and is grounded within the framework of 
liberty.43 
                                                                                                                                      
Organization:  A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT’L LAW STUD. 133 (2001); STEPHEN KRASNER, 
COMPROMISING WESTPHALIA IN D. HELD & A MCGREW, THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION READER 
(Polity Press, 2000); Eric M. Ulsner, Producing and Consuming Trust, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 569 (2000); 
MICHAEL FOWLER & J.M. BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN (Routledge, 1995); LESTER 
THUROW, THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM (Brealey Pub, 1996); James S. Coleman, Social Capital and the 
Creation of Human Capital, AM. J. SOC. S. 95 (1988); Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 42 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 20 (1948); JEAN BODIN, THE SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (1932). 
42. O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 312 (to be distinguished as “freedom from” factors like 
oppression, slavery, prejudice and racism, and from “Liberty” as the quintessential element which 
enables where freedom does not). 
43. Id. at 107 (in this typology, a failed nation-State can be described as a nation-station where 
the boundaries of the three forms of capital have become disconnected, i.e., the nation-state has been 
forced into one or the other circle, but cannot be in all three circles.  More importantly, such a State has 
become unable to keep and preserve the necessary areas of overlap between these three forms of capital.  
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Liberty is that quintessential element necessary in human existence 
which is the fertile ground to allow the most productive, creative and 
mutually beneficial human endeavors and interactions to flourish and to 
bring benefits to all, and the absence of which tends to dampen the 
manifold expressions of all those truths people collectively hold to be self-
evident.  It is grounded in the rule of law, to be distinguished from 
freedom,44 and requires a steadfast juxtaposition and weighing of individual 
and communal rights, benefits, obligations and privileges without which no 
human civil society can function.  In the GeoNOMOS©, the existence of 
liberty further forms a steel-belt of support and reassurance to all of human 
community and its guarantor can only be the nation State, for both 
individuals and supra-national entities (international institutions and 
transnational corporations) lack the necessary legitimacy to guarantee 
liberty’s existence. 
There is no doubt that liberty in this framework will be a highly 
contested topic and hotly debated not unlike rule of law is, and it should be 
so both nationally, regionally and transnationally.45  T.H. Green defines 
liberty as the capacity to do things, not the mere absence of restraint and, 
thus, liberty actively includes a moral value and certain social elements that 
are enjoyed in common with others.46  While there is no agreement even 
among the many schools of republican legal thought, liberty here is defined 
primarily as non-domination by the State, and includes human rights, civic 
virtue and the creation of a common good.47  These basic characteristics of 
a liberal republican theory are incorporated within the GeoNOMOS© as part 
of the participatory government, supported by an interventionist State 
whose single core function continuously reflects and balances the 
development and utilization of all its essential capital resources.  This 
participatory function at the core of the State includes a rule of law that 
reflects the principles of mutual benefit, liberty and human dignity. 
                                                                                                                                      
An exemplification of a more successful nation State would be reflected by a highly dynamic and ever 
evolving tri-circular area where the State exists at the core of these three overlap areas which it times 
grow and at times shrink, but always remain connected throughout the passage of time based on other 
socio-political and legal developments). 
44. Id. at 312 (to be distinguished as “freedom from” factors like oppression, slavery, 
prejudice and racism, and from “Liberty” as the quintessential element which enables where freedom 
does not). 
45. Id. at 365. 
46. DAVID MILLER ET AL, THE LIBERTY READER, 23 (2006). 
47. SAMANTHA BESSON & JOSE LUIS MARTI, LEGAL REPUBLICANISM, NATINAL & INT’L 
PERSPECTIVES 3 (2009); NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW, AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY 
(Oxford 2007); DAVID MILLER ET AL, THE LIBERTY READER, 224–25 (2006); ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO 
CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, 121–22 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2002). 
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The proposed continuum of sovereignty reflects a social and highly 
interactional process based in part on the Law Merchant in a society of 
economic traders, and espouses that the ‘rule of law’ will have meaning 
only from within the social context reflected by the interaction of 
institutions, procedures, and values depicted at the core of the 
GeoNOMOS© where the single core function of the State is secured and 
secure.48  The social context of a liberty framework is intentionally created 
to protect the continuum of sovereignty since there can be no State 
legitimacy and no State-related activity conducted outside the framework of 
liberty. 
The manifestations or functioning of liberty are influenced by four 
cornerstones:  choice, capability and resource development, justice, and 
equity, and by the constant and continuing interaction of three forms of 
capital:  economic, social, and human capital.  These forms of capital are 
found to exist in every form of human society, or human association, albeit 
to differing degrees and at different levels of development, but can be 
discerned and even measured to be present and functioning in a state of 
association and in a state of flux. 
From within this global framework of liberty and moving along this 
continuum of State sovereignty, each State secures its single core function 
(sovereign capacity) to manage a wide range of possibilities because all 
domestic and international actors must also function within the State’s 
framework of liberty.49  The framework of liberty is anchored by four 
corners, two on the lower end of the diagram depicting equity and justice 
and two on the upper end of the diagram depicting elements that support the 
principle of human dignity—individual autonomy/choice and individual 
capability/resource development (see diagram).  It depicts an actual 
relationship that can be measured along the continuum between the State 
and the people it seeks to govern.  This exists because quantitative 
measurable outcomes for the qualitative work the State undertakes at its 
single core function designs a more accountable and transparent expression 
of its State sovereignty. 
The continuum for sovereignty depicted systematically as the 
GeoNOMOS© shows the U.K. at its single core function of the State 
consistently balancing the essential three capital resources.  The U.K. 
already has possession of all these capital resources and it has the authority 
and stability to engage with the integrated vision espoused by Prime 
Minister May.  The operational components of a continuum of sovereignty 
align with the driving force behind the Brexit vote and point to a public 
                                                          
48. See generally O’Rourke, supra note 11. 
49. Id. at 331. 
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citizen mandate for the U.K. to secure “one Nation conservative” as 
Theresa May has proposed. 
The U.K. initiates this dynamic process with a thorough, hard-nosed, 
and unvarnished review of all of its capital resources and the various stages 
of development and utilization.  It begins to secure an integrated single core 
function for the State by subsequently combining with the principles of 
liberty and human dignity to form a new typology which the GeoNOMOS© 
represents.  The continuum for sovereignty is designed to reflect more 
accurately the nature, needed flexibility and new functionality for the U.K. 
as it seeks to balance consistently its domestic role and its international role 
within its Article 50 transition.  The opportunity for the U.K. in modeling 
this continuum of State sovereignty places emphasis on upholding the rule 
of law so that economic and global market participation follow the law and 
not the other way around where law chases after and reacts to economic 
organizing principles. 
The continuum for sovereignty proposed above also follows Rodrik’s 
insight by suggesting that the State must simultaneously integrate and 
balance all three forms of its essential capital resources as its single core 
function as a matter of legitimacy.50  Functioning from within a framework 
of liberty, the State operates along a vertical axis (representing U.K.’s 
domestic function) and along a horizontal axis (representing U.K.s 
international function) (see diagram).  The U.K. is in a position to design 
and implement a strategy for the post-neoliberalism era that supports its 
domestic stability (vertical function) and its international market 
participation (horizontal function). 
In this manner, the U.K.’s single core function engages at the center of 
three overlapping circles (three forms of capital) and the center of the 
intersection of a vertical axis and a horizontal axis inside the GeoNOMOS© 
Model.51  (See diagram attached).  This single core function incorporates 
three essential building blocks that belong to every nation State—economic 
capital, social capital, and human capital—all of which must remain inter-
connected and continuously balanced in order for the State to maintain 
legitimacy as sovereign as to its function. 
A very brief explanation follows on these three essential building 
blocks that form the State single core function.  Economic capital can be 
defined as the amount of risk capital assessed on a realistic basis which a 
nation State requires in order to remain solvent over a period of time.  
Economic capital can be calculated.52  It is an open question whether 
rigorous risk analysis is or can be a necessary and required function of 
                                                          
50. Rᴏᴅʀɪᴋ, supra note 5, at 242. 
51. Jᴜʟɪᴀɴ Kᴜ & Jᴏʜɴ Yᴏᴏ, supra note 28, at 210–11. 
52 . Id. at 278. 
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government.  Yet, it can be reasonably presumed that it is part and parcel of 
any and all economic and commercial enterprise.52  Governments have no 
business to function and act as commercial enterprises just as much as 
business and commercial enterprises lack and perhaps should lack the 
legitimacy and authority to act and function as a government (quasi-
government). 
Social capital is understood as a stock of resources that an individual 
can control by how they invest their time in community organizations, 
educational institutions, religious organizations and neighborhood 
networks.53  It represents a form of trust and reciprocity that is developed 
within social networks in any given culture.  Economic capital and human 
capital are also forms of capital but they are generally more fungible in the 
sense that these two forms of capital are linked to private goods.  Social 
capital which has an individual characteristic tends to aggregate and 
represents a collective or public good as part of a civil society.  Human 
capital is a hybrid consisting of both quantitative and qualitative aspects.  
Human capital in this schematic focuses first and foremost on the individual 
and, then, on how that individual reaches maximum levels of 
capabilities/resource development and individual autonomy in order to 
contribute to society in ways that the individual actually can choose to 
develop his or her human capital. 
If a State disconnects the economic capital function from the core 
function of the development and utilization of human capital or social 
capital, the State essentially implodes; it fails.54  Likewise, if a State 
concentrates only on human capital development without a balanced 
program for economic capital development and utilization, it is out of 
balance and more likely than not, will also fail.  The key parameter here is 
balancing the forms of capital within the framework of liberty because the 
four corners of the liberty framework as described anchor the State in 
perpetuity. 
                                                          
52. See generally O’Rourke supra note 11. 
53. See generally Bratspies, supra note 22; RICHARD SANDBROOK ET AL., SOCIAL 
DEMOCRACY IN THE GLOBAL PERIPHERY: ORIGINS, CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS (Cambridge University 
Press 2006); PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION, WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT, 52–61(Oxford University Press 2007); James Q. Wilson, Bowling with 
Others, Commentary Magazine (last visited Oct. 15, 2016), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/ 
articles/bowling-with-others/; Janos Berok, Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Public Sector, 64–70 
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD] (2005); ERIC M. 
USLANER, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST (Cambridge University Press 2002); Joel Sobel, Can 
We Trust Social Capital, 15 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 139, 139–45 (2002); ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING 
ALONE:  THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (Simon & Schuster 2000); PIERRE 
BOURDIEU, THE FORMS OF CAPITAL, 47 (W.W. Norton, 1986). 
54. O’Rourke supra note 11, at 283. 
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What might take place in conditions when all the three forms of capital 
become disjointed and lose connection, instead of remaining interconnected 
as the GeoNOMOS© model suggests that they are?  In essence, we are 
describing failure of a nation-State, although it is conceivable that, at times, 
one form of capital may separate from the other two forms (even if 
temporarily, and for a short or extended period of time). 
When social capital dis-associates, the nation State ceases to function 
as nation State, waste and attrition in every form tend to increase because of 
a decrease in a common and shared consciousness for a collective or public 
good.  Such conditions tend to push human existence and with it the human 
condition to the very fringes of human association (or, in this case, 
disassociation) and all human activities whether driven by Individual 
Choice, Capability and Resources, Justice, or Equity (all four corners which 
are proposed as anchors for the framework of liberty) of the GeoNOMOS© 
tend to be severely challenged and strained. 
When economic capital disassociates, such disassociation usually 
occurs at costs which can be quantified and measured, and the metrics 
compared.  Economic capital tends to be risk averse, but also risk-
dependent.  When stress and strain bring about conditions of risk such that a 
disassociation of economic capital occurs, we tend to speak of capital flight, 
and because the entire global market place has evolved financially in a 
global network also, money quietly can move at a blink of the eye and with 
relative ease.55  The absence of money and economic capital tends to cause 
markets to contract and the impact of heightened, unsustainable risk tends 
to cause unrest, shortages and deprivation of every kind within a nation 
State—such developments push the nation-State rather quickly to the brink 
of complete, societal collapse beyond the framework designed to protect 
liberty, choice, capability/resource development, justice, and equity.   
Human capital is the realm where disassociation is perhaps felt the 
most as the decline and absence of both quantitative and qualitative aspects 
of this form of capital tend to cause humans to flee from strife, war, and 
civil unrest to seek a chance at opportunity.  It also affects citizens in States 
who seek to re-define liberty and to re-establish a measure of functional 
stability, to find job opportunities or new job skills through education, and 
to re-build and sustain communities and social networks. 
By definition, all three forms of capital as understood against the 
backdrop of liberty are co-equal in value which can result in communal 
activities from an aggregation of distinct individual pursuits.  But without 
community and social networks, the context for such activity fails and such 
activity tends to become fragmented, opportunistic and focused inward at a 
time when its focus ought to be outward, directed toward community and to 
                                                          
55. See O’Rourke, supra note 11. 
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giving shape to such community for the benefit of protecting individual 
rights. 
The intentional and consistent integration and balance between all 
forms of capital is required so State level public sector institutional 
development and utilization reflects strong economic capital but also 
simultaneously addresses aspects of social capital such as trust, mutual 
benefit and reciprocity.  This integration creates the continuum for State 
sovereignty.  The integration at the single core function of the State 
operates in tandem with human capital and with mandates for individual 
choice as well as individual capability/resource development, e.g., 
employment, education, human rights, and opportunity.  All these 
interrelated factors are functionally and politically tied to the four anchors 
of the framework of liberty.56 
As noted earlier in this text, the neoliberal paradigm (c. 1980–2010) 
developed so rapidly that it left many domestic level institutions unable to 
maintain their functioning much less adapt to the rapid and crushing 
changes that occurred in the global marketplace and in their domestic 
economy.  The continuum for sovereignty secures the operational role of the 
State and from within its single core function, all capital resources remain 
interrelated and interactive as well.  Ongoing decision-making processes 
made from within the core function of the State reflect issues from within 
the domestic and international spheres (intersecting axis) of State activity 
but are also secured within the framework of liberty in support of a rule of 
law that secures justice, equity, and the principles of human dignity 
[individual choice as well as capability/resource development]—the very 
principles that Prime Minister May espouses in the Brexit transition. 
The four anchors on the framework of liberty reflect a standard of 
conduct that together support the principles of human dignity, reciprocity, 
and mutual benefit.  (See diagram attached).  Finally, since it is axiomatic 
in this Model that nothing can exist outside the framework of liberty, the 
U.K. is in a very unique position in history to redefine how actors from 
private and public sectors intersect with its national interests.  In this 
continuum of sovereignty, all actors, whether domestic or international, 
private or public, must function from within the framework of liberty, and 
all State and non-State actors must function in accordance with the conduct 
standards that support the framework of liberty. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Now that Pandora’s Box has been opened, two dominant questions 
have surfaced related to the post- Brexit aftermath:57  (i) What new form of 
                                                          
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
24 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 23:1 
 
British sovereignty will be redefined, recreated, resurrected under its 
negotiated Article 50 transition; and, (ii) What market form of economic 
organizing principles for global capitalism will be advanced under the 
banner of U.K.’s new form of sovereignty?  In the U.K., where a nation 
State seeks to address new levels of citizen frustration, public disapproval, 
and civic engagement, the operational definitions from the 1940–1990s 
regarding the legitimacy and the expression of national sovereignty are 
outdated and perhaps no longer adequate for how the State must function in 
the twenty-first century. 
The complexity of U.K. inaugurating the actual secession process 
through the invocation of Article 50 would hopefully reflect matters of best 
practices and follow a structured period where a more transparent but 
internal dialogue process, cost-benefit analysis, and necessary political 
contestation had already occurred.  The Brexit campaign itself cannot alone 
fulfill this domestic-level dialogue process and planning obligation since it 
was conducted mostly on the perceptions of people with a general 
agnosticism of the facts.  This interim transition period cannot merely be 
about the shift in political parties at Downing Street either.  It will need to 
be a well-reasoned and detailed fleshing out of a political-legal and socio-
economic vision, one that is mapped out long before the secession 
agreement package is negotiated by the U.K. and presented to the European 
Council and European Parliament for approval. 
If there is a positive light at the end of this tunnel for U.K. transition 
under Article 50, it is the realization that the post-Brexit context is ripe for 
the creation of a new twenty-first century continuum for State sovereignty.  
The U.K. could choose not to fall back on the out-dated, but persistent 
Westphalian notions of how a nation State “ought” to organize and operate 
in the world today and step onto a continuum for State sovereignty based on 
using all of its core capital resources to secure liberty.  The U.K. could 
intentionally move beyond the neoliberal paradigm (c.1980–2010) of global 
capitalism by defining a more “humanizing” paradigm based on a new set 
of economic organizing principles akin to those proposed by Rodrik and 
others.  In doing so, the U.K. steps forward as a world leader espousing a 
framework of liberty that redefines and secures the single core function of 
the nation State in the twenty-first century:  to ensure participatory 
democracy and individual rights. 
 
2016] Eghbal & O’Rourke 25 
 
 
 
 
 
GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT:  A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZED 
CRIME LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES, ITALY, 
JAPAN, AND ECUADOR 
Christina M. Strompf* 
I.  INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 28 
A.  The Historic Roots of Organized Crime and the Mafia .................... 29 
1.  Japan .............................................................................................. 29 
2.  Italy ............................................................................................... 30 
3.  The United States .......................................................................... 30 
4.  Ecuador ......................................................................................... 31 
B.  Relevance of Organized Crime Today .............................................. 31 
II.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT ORGANIZED CRIME LAWS  .................... 34 
A.  The United States .............................................................................. 34 
1. Government .................................................................................... 34 
2. Organized Crime Groups ............................................................... 34 
3. Law and its Changes ...................................................................... 35 
4. Impact of the Law .......................................................................... 39 
B.  Italy ................................................................................................... 39 
1. Government .................................................................................... 39 
2. Organized Crime Groups ............................................................... 40 
3.  Law and its Changes ..................................................................... 40 
4. Impact of the Law .......................................................................... 42 
C.  Japan ................................................................................................. 42 
1. Government .................................................................................... 42 
2. Organized Crime Group ................................................................. 43 
3. Law and its Changes ...................................................................... 44 
4. Impact of the Law .......................................................................... 46 
D.  Ecuador ............................................................................................ 46 
1. Government .................................................................................... 46 
2. Organized Crime Group ................................................................. 47 
3. Law and its Changes ...................................................................... 48 
                                                        
* Christina Strompf is a Juris Doctor Candidate for May 2017 at Nova Southeastern 
University Shepard Broad College of Law.  She received a Bachelor’s Degree in Sociology and 
Business Studies from Drew University. Christina would like to thank her colleagues at the ILSA 
Journal of International & Comparative Law for their hard work and dedication on this article.  She 
would also like to extend a heartfelt thank you to Professor Mark Dobson for his time, comments and 
guidance throughout the writing of this article. Lastly, Christina would like to thank her friends and 
family, specifically her parents, for their unending support and encouragement throughout her law 
school career.  
28 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 23: 1 
 
 
4. Impact of the Law .......................................................................... 49 
III.  GLOBAL ECONOMY & TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIMES ........... 24 
IV.  COMPARISONS ...................................................................................... 52 
V.  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 53 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he ‘relative power’ of criminal networks will continue to rise, and 
some countries could even be taken over and run by these networks.”1  The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines “organized crime” as “any 
group having some manner of formalized structure and whose primary 
objective is to obtain money through illegal activities.”2  The FBI believes 
that even if key individuals within these organizations are removed, “the 
depth and financial strength of the[se] organization[s] often allow it to 
continue.”3 
When people think of organized crime, usually, they have an image of 
Marlon Brando sitting in a dark room at a large desk portraying Vito 
Corleone in the movie “The Godfather.”4  In “The Godfather”, Corleone is 
a notorious mob boss who orders “hits” on people and the members of his 
“family” participate in carrying out these hits as well as various other illegal 
activities.5  Throughout the film, Corleone speaks at length about family, 
friendship, business, and loyalty and shows the true influence the mafia has 
on society and the stigma that is associated with mafia affiliations.6  One of 
Corleone’s famous quotes illustrates this point:  “[i]t’s true I have a lot of 
friends in politics, but they wouldn’t be so friendly if they knew my 
business was drugs instead of gambling which they consider a harmless 
vice.  But drugs, that’s a dirty business.”7  This image, although not far 
from the truth, portrays a problem that society has faced since the 
                                                        
1. KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONG. RES. SERV., R40525, ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  TRENDS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 15 (2010). 
2. Organized Crime, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/ 
organized-crime (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) [hereinafter FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION]. 
3. Id. 
4. Biography for Don Vito, INT’L MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/character/ 
ch0000791/bio (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
5. The Godfather Plot Summary, INT’L MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/ 
tt0068646/plotsummary?ref_=tt_stry_pl (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
6. Id. 
7. The Godfather Quotes, ROTTEN TOMATOES, https://www.rottentomatoes.com/m 
/godfather/quotes/ (last visited Oct 15, 2016). 
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nineteenth century.8  Organized crime groups have both a local and global 
presence through use of the Internet and other technology.9 
When analyzing different countries around the world, it is important to 
note that although the United States, Italy, Japan, and Ecuador have 
similarly structured governments, the laws that are in place to combat 
organized crime vary greatly. 10   Interestingly, only Italy, Japan, and 
Ecuador have recently codified changes to their organized crime laws while 
the United States has simply broadened the scope of existing laws. 11  
Nevertheless, these laws have a major impact on the citizens that call each 
country “home.” 
A.  The Roots of Organized Crime and the Mafia  
1.  Japan 
The origins of the Mafia date as far back as 1612.12  Surprisingly, 
these roots are not from Italy but rather Japan.13  The Japanese Mafia, today 
known as the “Yakuza”, trace its origin to the “Kabuki-mono.” 14   The 
Kabuki-mono was a group of rogue samurai who would terrorize citizens 
for fun.15  Although the Kabuki-mono was the first formalized organized 
crime group in Japan, the Yakuza drew its direct ancestry from the Machi-
                                                        
8. Origins of the Mafia, HISTORY (2009), http://www.history.com/topics/origins-of-the-
mafia. 
9. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 2. 
10. See generally North America:  United States, The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Oct. 15, 
2016); See generally South America:  Ecuador, The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ec.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2016); 
see generally Europe:  Italy, The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/it.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2016); See generally East & 
Southeast Asia:  Japan, The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
11. See William L. Anderson & Candice E. Jackson, Law as a Weapon:  How RICO Subverts 
Liberty and the True Purpose of Law, THE INDEP. REV. (2004), http://www.independent.org/ 
publications/tir/article.asp?a=215. 
12. Adam Johnson, Yakuza:  Past and Present, ORGANIZED CRIME REGISTRY (1998),  
http://orgcrime.tripod.com/yakuzahistory.htm. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
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yokko.16  The Machi-yokko, skilled gamblers and Japanese citizens, took up 
arms to defend their villages against the Kabuki-mono.17 
“Yakuza” is a blanket term used to describe “Japanese gangsters.”18  
Within the Yakuza there are approximately 3,200 organized crime groups.19  
Approximately 1,400 of those groups are affiliated with one of the three 
main organized crime groups in Japan.20  Today’s Yakuza have undergone 
periods of restoration, occupation, and modernization and are still the 
predominant organized crime group in Japan.21 
2.  Italy 
Until the mid-nineteenth century, numerous foreign invaders 
controlled Sicily, a Region of Italy.22  After years of foreign rulers, Sicilians 
joined together to form the “Mafioso” to protect themselves from another 
foreign invasion.23  During its original formation, there was no criminal 
intent associated with being a member of the “Mafioso.”24  It was not until 
the end of the nineteenth-century that the “mafie” [sic] emerged.25  This 
“mafie” is synonymous with the criminal organization people are familiar 
with today, the Sicilian Mafia.26 
 3.  The United States 
Stemming from these Italian roots, the American Mafia rose to power 
in the 1920s due to Prohibition and mass immigration into the United States 
from Italy.27  Small criminal organizations existed before Prohibition, but 
the enforcement of Prohibition legislation “facilitated the consolidation of 
                                                        
16. Id. 
17. Johnson, supra note 12. 
18. Ben Bullock, What is the Origin of Yakuza, SCI.LANG.JAPAN, http://www.sljfaq.org/ 
afaq/yakuza.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
19. JAPAN SUBCULTURE RESEARCH CTR., http://www.japansubculture.com/resources/yakuza-
organisations/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
20. Id. 
21. Johnson, supra note 12. 
22. Origins of the Mafia, supra note 8. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Organized Crime, UNITED STATES HISTORY, http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/ 
h1596.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
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the power of criminal organizations.” 28   With the rise of federal 
enforcement of Prohibition laws, the American Mafia organized 
bootlegging operations both nationally and internationally. 29   These 
organizations were typically found in neighborhoods that were specifically 
ethnically dense.30  This occurred because immigrant populations tended to 
settle in neighborhoods with fellow immigrants from the same place since 
they all spoke the same or similar language.31 
4.  Ecuador 
Unlike Japan, Italy, and the United States, Ecuador’s plight with 
organized crime is fairly new.32  Due to political instability and porous 
borders, Ecuador has become vulnerable to the influence of organized 
crime networks primarily from Peru and Colombia. 33   This influence 
impacts Ecuador’s economy nationally as well as globally due to the import 
and export of drugs.34 
B.  Relevance of Organized Crime Today 
The topic of organized crime laws is particularly important because 
the FBI reports that the global economic impact of organized crime’s 
influence in all sectors of the economy is around one trillion dollars 
annually.35  In 2009 alone, it was estimated that organized crime generated 
$870 billion in profits.36  In order to make money, the mafia participates in 
various illegal activities.37 
                                                        
28. Organized Crime—History, LAW LIBR. AM. L. & LEGAL INFO., http://law.jrank.org/ 
pages/1624/Organized-Crime-History.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
29. Organized Crime, supra note 27. 
30. Organized Crime—History, supra note 28. 
31. Id. 
32. Cristina Chuquimarca Mosquera & Bertha García Gallegos, Ecuador, INT’L INST. FOR 
DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, ILLICIT NETWORKS AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 161 
(2014). 
33. Id. 
34. Id.; U. N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, Transnational Organized Crime:  The Globalized 
Illegal Economy, UNODC, https://www.unodc.org/toc/en/crimes/organized-crime.html (last visited Oct. 
15, 2016) [hereinafter UNODC]. 
35. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 2. 
36. UNODC, supra note 34. 
37. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 2. 
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Organized crime rings manipulate and monopolize financial 
markets, traditional institutions like labor unions, and legitimate 
industries like construction and trash hauling.  They bring drugs 
into our cities and raise the level of violence in our communities 
by buying off corrupt officials and using graft, extortion, 
intimidation, and murder to maintain their operations.  Their 
underground businessesincluding prostitution and human 
traffickingsow misery nationally and globally.38  
Contrary to media depictions and stigma associated with mafia 
participation, it can be argued that if used correctly, the mafia could work in 
conjunction with the government to shut down underground terrorist cells.39  
Organized crime groups are seemingly the right individuals to defeat 
terrorist groups because they show no reverence for laws and can 
financially afford to hire well-trained soldiers.40  These groups can do what 
the government cannot because “[d]emocracies are trammeled by too many 
laws and rules safeguarding individual rights.”41 
The idea of using the mafia to aid governmental forces is not far 
fetched.  There have been instances, both past and present, of the United 
States Government using the Italian-American Mafia for assistance in 
combating foreign and domestic terror.42  For example, during World War 
II, the United States government worked with Charles “Lucky” Luciano, an 
infamous Italian-born American mobster based in New York who is 
credited for engineering the structure of modern organized crime in the 
United States.43   During his incarceration for extortion and prostitution, 
Luciano offered to help in the war effort by using his criminal connections 
in Italy to advance the Allies’ cause.44   
The head of the Counter Intelligence Section, Captain Wallace S. 
Wharton, asked for members of the New York mafia with ties to Italy so 
the government could use formal connections that mafia members 
established in Italy to ensure that the United States military would not be 
                                                        
38. Id. 
39. Ross Hinds, The One-Eyed Mafia Boss who could Help Defeat ISIS, GRINBERG NEWS, 
(Nov. 2015), http://www.grinbergnews.com/the-one-eyed-mafia-boss-who-can-help-us-crush-islamic-
state/. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Lucky Luciano Biography, BIO. http://www.biography.com/people/lucky-luciano-
9388350#criminal-exploits (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
44. Id. 
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met with violence.45  Luciano suggested that the government send him to 
Sicily to speak with the natives in the event that the Allies decided to 
invade Sicily.46  The goal with sending Luciano to Sicily was to win over 
the support of the Sicilian natives so that instead of fighting the United 
States, they would support U.S. war efforts.47   
Not only did Luciano travel to Sicily to calm the natives, he also 
helped the United States military leaders with developing the most effective 
attack plan.48  By using Luciano’s plan, the United States casualty rate was 
far lower than that of the British who did not follow Luciano’s attack 
plan.49 
Another example of cooperation between the United States 
government and the mafia occurred when ISIS threatened New York City. 
Giovanni Gambino, the son of John Gambino a prominent Mafia figure 
from “La Cosa Nostra”, fired back by stating that the mafia was ready to 
fight ISIS.50  Gambino stated, “the rise of global terrorism gives the Mafia a 
chance to show its good side.”51  Gambino goes further to state that “[t]he 
Mafia has a bad reputation, but much of that’s undeserved.”52  Sources 
within the mafia stated that they are “better-positioned to provide security 
than federal agencies like the FBI and [the] Department of Homeland 
Security.”53 
The purpose of this article is to discuss the different laws in place in 
the United States, Italy, Japan, and Ecuador to combat organized crime and 
how organized crime impacts the national and global economy.  This article 
will be broken down and analyzed by country.  It will first discuss the type 
of government each county has in place.  It will then discuss the specific 
types of both legal and illegal activities that each country’s organized crime 
group participates in.  There will then be a discussion of the laws in place to 
combat organized crime and how these laws have changed over time to 
                                                        
45. Tim Newark, Lucky Luciano and WWII’s Operation Husky, ST. MARTIN’S PRESS (July 9, 
2011), http://www.thehistoryreader.com/modern-history/lucky-luciano-wwiis-operation-husky/. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Clark Mindock, NYC Islamic State Plot:  Italian Mafia Warns ISIS to Stay Away from 
New York, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/nyc-islamic-state-plot-italian-
mafia-warns-isis-stay-away-new-york-2196169. 
51. Joe Tacopino, Mobster’s son:  Tell us Where ISIS is and fuhgeddaboutit, N.Y. POST (Nov. 
23, 2015), http://nypost.com/2015/11/23/the-mafia-is-prepared-to-protect-new-york-city-from-isis/.  
52. Mindock, supra note 50. 
53. Id. 
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adapt to the growing number of people involved in organized crime.  Often 
times, the type of organized crime a country’s people participate in dictates 
the laws that are in place.  Then, there will be a discussion of the overall 
impact that the laws are having on participation in organized crime.  Due to 
the underground nature of organized crime, determining the impact of a law 
is often difficult to measure because the number of individuals actively 
participating in organized crime is not publicized.  There will then be a 
brief discussion of the impact organized crime has on the global economy 
and its implications on international business.  Lastly, there will be a brief 
conclusion and opinion about what steps countries should take to remedy 
this issue. 
II.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT ORGANIZED CRIME LAWS 
A.  The United States  
1.  Government  
The United States has a federal presidential republic form of 
government with a President at the helm.54  The President is up for election 
every four years and cannot hold office for more than two consecutive 
terms.55  The government is made up of three branches: the Executive, 
Legislative, and Judicial.56  The Executive Branch is administered by the 
President where (s)he enforces the laws that Congress makes. 57   The 
Legislative Branch consists of members of Congress who make the laws.58  
The Judicial Branch, headed by nine Supreme Court Justices, interprets the 
laws according to the United States Constitution.59 
2.  Organized Crime Groups 
Because the United States has become so diverse, there are different 
organized crime groups from around the world carrying out illegal activities 
there.60  Each group participates in different types of organized crime.61  
                                                        
54. North America:  United States, supra note 10; South America:  Ecuador, supra note 10; 
Europe:  Italy, supra note 10; East & Southeast Asia:  Japan, supra note 10. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBR. & MUSEUM, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/ 
teacher_lessons/3branches/1.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) [hereinafter TRUMAN LIBR.]. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. FINKLEA, supra note 1, at 15–16. 
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The primary groups are:  Eurasian/Russian, Asian, Italian, and Balkan.62  
The less popular groups include Middle Eastern and African.63 
Eurasian and Russian groups participate in extortion, abduction, 
human smuggling, prostitution, drug trafficking, theft, money laundering 
and various types of fraud.64   
Asian groups participate in drug trafficking (heroin) and human 
trafficking.65  They are also involved in:  money laundering; counterfeiting; 
fraud; kidnapping; automobile, software, and clothing theft.66   
Italian groups primarily deal in gambling, loan sharking, drug 
trafficking, and money laundering.67   
The Balkans participate in gambling, extortion, robbery, counterfeiting 
currency, drug trafficking, human smuggling, real estate fraud, money 
laundering, witness intimidation, and murder.68 
Although they are less prominent, the Middle Eastern and African 
groups are still participants in organized crime in the United States.69  The 
Middle Eastern group participates in organized theft, financial fraud, money 
laundering, and cigarette smuggling.70   
The African group, particularly people of Nigerian decent who 
participate in organized crime, participate in heroin trafficking, money 
laundering, and various types of fraud, including:  insurance; bank; auto; 
healthcare; identity; and document fraud.71 
3.  Law and its Changes 
In 1978, the United States Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO statute.72 
                                                                                                                                
61. See id. at 17–20. 
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RICO focuses on:   
[P]rohibit[ing] conducting the affairs of any ‘enterprise’ (defined 
broadly to include just about any form of human endeavor) 
through ‘a pattern of racketeering activity’ (defined as two or 
more criminal acts from an extremely broad list, that are related 
to each other, that [persist] or threaten to persist over a period of 
time).73 
The RICO statute has a procedural effect rather than a deterrent effect 
because the statute was not put into place to deter organized crime activity 
but rather to assist prosecutors in charging individuals with RICO 
violations.74  By defining the commission of a series of distinct crimes as a 
single offense, RICO avoids “a variety of traditional, procedural, 
evidentiary, and jurisdictional rules that tend to discourage prosecuting 
separate offenses together.”75   
An example of RICO’s procedural effect is how the statute “includes 
as ‘predicate acts’ . . . such crimes as murder, robbery, bribery, and arson, 
which normally are violations only of state law, thus permitting them to be 
investigated and prosecuted by federal officials in federal court.” 76  
Wording the statute this way also impacts organized crime groups that 
operate in multiple states.77  Normally, these offenses would have to be 
prosecuted separately in the state that they occurred.78  However, because 
the RICO statute defines these offenses as “‘part of a single pattern’ the 
entire pattern can be prosecuted together as a single crime in any federal 
district where one of the predicate acts occurred.”79 
The penalties for violation of the RICO statute are fairly harsh.  There 
is both a fine and imprisonment if an individual is found guilty of a RICO 
violation.80  The maximum punishment that a person can be sentenced for 
on a single RICO charge is “imprisonment for twenty years (life if any of 
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the predicate acts charged, such as murder, would permit such punishment), 
and a fine of $250,000.00 or twice the proceeds of the offense.”81 
In addition to a fine and imprisonment, there is also a punishment of 
“forfeiture of property.”82  This means that there is a “mandatory penalty . . 
. of not only any proceeds or property derived from the proceeds of the 
crime but also of any interest the defendant holds in the enterprise or any 
property of any kind that provides a source of influence over the 
enterprise.” 83   The mandatory forfeiture has a significant impact on a 
defendant’s case because RICO allows the government to get a restraining 
order before trial begins to freeze the defendant’s assets that are subject to 
the forfeiture.84 
Title 18 Section 1963 of the United States Code Annotated states:   
A temporary restraining order under this subsection [18 U.S.C.A. 
§1963 (2)] may be entered upon application of the United States 
without notice or opportunity for a hearing when an information 
or indictment has not yet been filed with respect to the property, 
if the United States demonstrates that there is probable cause to 
believe that the property with respect to which the order is sought 
would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under 
this subsection and that provision of notice will jeopardize the 
availability of the property for forfeiture. . . .85 
Mandatory forfeiture causes issues for defendants because it could 
hamper the defendant’s use of property to obtain adequate legal counsel.86  
In a 2003 case, U.S. v. Saccoccia, Saccoccia’s criminal defense attorneys 
were required to turn over the attorney’s fees Saccoccia paid them because 
“the fees [were] property subject to forfeiture.”87  The district court granted 
the United States’ motion to compel to retain the attorney’s fees and the 
attorneys appealed.88 
The Court of Appeals vacated the forfeiture award against the 
attorneys and remanded the case because defendants must forfeit “tainted” 
property defined as property that is “(i) acquired by committing the 
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offense, and (ii) constituting, or derived from, any proceeds obtained, 
directly or indirectly from its commission.”89  “In the event that tainted 
property is unavailable for forfeiture (as when it has been transferred to a 
third party), the government may recover ‘substitute’ property.”90 
Because the language of the statute is worded as such, it “does not 
afford an avenue through which the government may reach a third party’s 
untainted assets as a substitute for tainted assets which the third party has 
already transferred prior to the date of forfeiture.” 91   The forfeiture, 
however, “relates back” to the time that the property was obtained by the 
violation and is not only recoverable from the defendant but also from 
anyone else that the defendant gave that property to even if it was a bona 
fide payment for legitimate goods or services.92 
Unlike Italy, Japan and Ecuador, the United States is the only country 
that has not codified any changes to the law since it was passed in the 
1970s.93  The only aspect of the law that has changed, in practice, is the 
statute’s expanded use to include not only organized crime participants but 
also business owners.94  “For every John Gotti who is brought down by 
RICO, many obscure business owners and managers are also successfully 
prosecuted under this law.”95 
Business owners can be charged with a RICO violation if the federal 
government decides to target them and charge them under RICO.96  This 
expanded use began with former mayor of New York, Rudy Guiliani’s 
prosecution of Michael Milken and other Wall Street figures in the 1980s.97  
Because of this, today, federal prosecutors use RICO to win “easy 
convictions and prison terms” for people who “run afoul of federal 
regulations” during the ordinary course of business.98 
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4.  Impact of the Law 
Critics of RICO argue that the statute has “little to no effect on 
stopping or inhibiting crimes” but rather allows federal prosecutors to 
“circumvent the constitutional separation of powers between the national 
and the state governments.” 99   Some critics also call for RICO to be 
repealed because it is not “serv[ing] as a shield for the innocent . . . [and] . . 
. adds nothing of value in terms of new prohibitions of truly criminal 
behavior, [but rather] . . . adds powerful weapons to the prosecutors’ 
arsenal.”100 
A.  Italy 
1.  Government 
Italy’s government is a Democratic Republic that is headed by a 
President who is independent from all three branches of the government.101  
The President is elected every seven years by a college comprised of the 
parliament and three representatives from each region of Italy. 102   The 
President serves as a “focal point between the three branches of 
government:  he is elected by the lawmakers, he appoints the executive, and 
is the President of the Judiciary.” 103   The President is responsible for 
appointing a Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers. 104  The Prime 
Minister and the Council of Ministers hold all executive power.105  Italy’s 
Parliament is made up of two houses:  the Senate of the Republic and the 
Chamber of Deputies.106  These two houses perform identical functions due 
to “full bicameralism.”107  The houses make the laws of the country and 
establish the political guidelines that the Executive has to follow.108 
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2.  Organized Crime Groups 
Italy has a number of crime families.109  A study done in 2013 by 
Università Cattolica and the Joint Research Centre [sic] on Transnational 
Crime “estimated that mafia activities generate revenue of $33 billion, 
mostly divided among Italy’s four major mafia gangs.”110  These families 
participate primarily in sex exploitation; firearms trafficking; drug sales; 
counterfeiting; gambling; usury (loansharking); and extortion. 111   The 
Camorra, one of Italy’s wealthiest organized crime families, has been in 
existence since the nineteenth-century.112  It is estimated that its revenue is 
around $4.9 billion.113 
The ‘Ndrangheta mafia is also one of Italy’s prominent organized 
crime groups. 114   According to a study by the Demoskopika Research 
Institute, in 2013, the ‘Ndrangheta made more than $48 billion through 
drug trafficking and illegal garbage disposal.115  This is more money than 
Deutsche Bank and McDonald’s combined and 3.5 percent of Italy’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).116  The issue of organized crime is becoming so 
severe in Italy that Pope Francis, the leader of the Catholic Church, called 
on Italy’s mafia groups to “stop doing evil . . . [and] relinquish their blood-
stained money . . ..”117 
3.  Law and its Changes  
In response to recommendations from international organizations as well as 
the high number of corruption scandals in recent years, Italy has devoted 
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significant efforts to deal with its rampant corruption issues.118  In 2014, 
Italy codified Law No. 114 of 11 August 2014.119  This law  
[i]ntroduced, in the context of contracts for certain listed services 
particularly exposed to the risk of mafia infiltration . . . a general 
duty for public administrations and public entities to obtain from 
the service providers a declaration of non-involvement in 
criminal proceedings for serious violations, including the crime 
of mafia organization.120 
In 2015, Italy again codified changes to its Criminal Code.121  On June 
14, 2015, Italy enacted “Provisions on Crimes Against the Public 
Administration, MafiaType Associations and False Accounting” 
otherwise known as Law No. 69 of May 6, 2015.122  Italy’s major change 
was to increase the scope of the statute that was already in place rather than 
crafting an entirely new statute.123  The changes apply to “criminal conduct 
against the state, organized crime activities, and false accounting 
reporting.”124 
This change increased the prison terms upon conviction for crimes 
against the “public administration.” 125   These crimes include:  
“embezzlement; corruption in the exercise of a public function; corruption 
constituting an act contrary to official duty; corruption associated with 
judicial acts; and undue inducement to give or promise a profit.”126  The 
change also increased prison sentences for individuals found guilty of 
participating in organized crime.127 
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There was also a major change in the way courts grant parole.128  Now, 
in order for a criminal defendant to qualify for parole, the criminal 
defendant must:  “deposit with the court an amount equivalent to the profit 
generated by the crime or the amount unduly received by the public official 
charged with the crime, without prejudice to the payment of further 
compensation for damage caused to the public administration.”129 
Additionally, the new law enforces a monetary fine against defendants 
that is equivalent to the amount improperly obtained to the benefit of the 
aggrieved public entity. 130   Lastly, the changed law increased prison 
sentences for “organized crime activities carried out by three or more 
persons when, among other situations, force or intimidation or weapons or 
explosive materials are used.”131 
4.  Impact of the Law 
It is too soon to determine if the changes in the law have impacted 
Italy’s rate of participation in organized crime activities. According to the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 
Economic Survey on Italy, “reducing corruption and improving trust must 
remain a priority.” 132   It further reported that “Italy’s Prosecutors and 
Judges are doing their best to prosecute bribery offenses, including those of 
legal entities.”133  Because of this, it is believed that although there are still 
obstacles facing Italy when dealing with organized crime, they can be 
overcome.134 
A.  Japan 
1.  Government  
Japan’s government is made up of three branches:  the Cabinet 
(executive), the Diet (legislative), and the Courts (judicial).135  The Prime 
Minister is the head of the Japanese government and (s)he is appointed by 
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the Emperor, who is the ceremonial head of state, through nomination by 
the Diet. 136   The Diet is bicameral, consisting of the House of 
Representatives and the House of Councillors [sic], which are responsible 
for all legislative matters. 137   The Supreme Court of Japan consists of 
fourteen judges that determine the constitutionality of laws.138  Most of the 
money in organized crime comes from drug trafficking. 139   The second 
most lucrative source comes from gambling and extortion. 140   Last, is 
“dispute resolution.”141 
2.  Organized Crime Group 
 Japan’s “mafia” is known as the “Yakuza.”142   In Japan, there are 
twenty-one major Yakuza groups that comprise more than 53,000 
members.143  The three largest groups are:  the “Yamaguchi-gumi”, the 
“Inagawa-kai”, and the “Sumiyoshi-kai.” 144   These groups make their 
money through both illegal activities as well as legitimate businesses.145  
The Yakuza groups claim that they are humanitarian groups because they 
keep order in Japan.146  These groups are so well known and revered in 
Japan that they have office buildings, business cards, fan magazines, and 
comic books that detail their exploits.147 
The Yakuza has control over Japan’s entertainment industry as well as 
influence in construction, real estate, currency exchange, labor dispatch, 
Internet technology, and financial industry.148  They are also involved in 
blackmailing company executives, politicians, and bureaucrats to maximize 
                                                        
136. Asian for Educators, The Government of Modern Japan:  The Branches and Their 
Functions, COLUMBIA UNIV., http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1950_govt.htm. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Matthews, supra note 109. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Jake Adelstein, The yakuza:  Inside Japan's murky criminal underworld, CNN (Dec. 16, 
2015, 3:46 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/15/asia/yakuza-yamaguchi-gumi-explainer/ [hereinafter 
CNN]. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Adelstein, supra note 142. 
148. Id. 
44 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 23: 1 
 
 
profits in their interest areas.149  “The United States Treasury Department 
has labeled the Yamaguchi-gumi a transcontinental organized crime group 
and even placed sanction on the second tier group that rules them” because 
“[i]n order to conduct its criminal activities, the Yakuza has relationships 
with criminal affiliates in Asia, Europe, and the Americas.”150 
 The Yakuza however, is not all bad.151  Examples of the Yakuza’s 
humanitarian side came after the 1995 Kobe earthquake and the 2011 
Tohoku tsunami.152  After these natural disasters, the Yakuza were the first 
to provide aid by using their “gang connections and efficiency to move 
supplies to unaffected areas to the people in need of food, blankets, and 
medicine.”153  They also opened up offices and facilities to people affected 
and rented a helicopter for faster relief.154 
3.  Law and its Changes 
Japan first enacted a law in 1991 to combat organized crime known as 
the “Anti-Boryokudan Law.” 155   In Japanese, “Boryokudan” means 
“violence groups.” 156   This law was put in place to regulate Yakuza 
activity.157   The Diet stated that in order for a group to be considered 
“Boryokudan”, the group needed to meet three criteria.158   The first is 
“regardless of the group’s purpose, it must allow members to take 
advantage of the gang’s influence in order to maintain their daily lives, 
accumulate wealth or execute their business.”159  The second is “a certain 
percentage of the gang members must have criminal records.”160  Lastly, 
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“the gang must be hierarchically organized under the control of an 
individual representing the gang.”161 
Even if all three of these criteria are met, the Commission that reviews 
each group must hold a hearing so that members of the group, as well as a 
“panel of witnesses” (lawyers), can make statements on the group’s behalf 
before officially designating a group “Boryokudan.” 162   The initial 
enactment of this law had minimal impact on the Yakuza or its 
membership.163  In fact, it may have done more harm than good because 
instead of the Yakuza operating in plain sight, this pushed the Yakuza 
operations underground.164 
In 2007, the Diet again made changes to the law.165  The 2007 changes 
addressed “Yakuza rituals and the hierarchal nature of the Yakuza 
organization.” 166   This change criminalized certain Yakuza recruitment 
methods such as “finger-cutting” and “coerced tattooing” as well as 
providing governmental support for individuals who were attempting to 
leave the Yakuza.167  During this revision, the government did not revise 
any of the penal provisions.168  The government believes that because of 
this change in the law, Yakuza membership has decreased.169  It appears 
however, that the Yakuza may have just made themselves less visible and 
only reveal their Yakuza status when it is advantageous to do so.170 
The most notable change occurred on July 26, 2012 when Japan 
codified “Revisions of the Organized Crime Group Countermeasures 
Law.”171  This revision allows police to designate organized crime groups 
as “extremely dangerous” and then arrest any member of that group without 
issuing a cease and desist order, if he (or she) makes unreasonable or illegal 
demands towards an ordinary citizen.172  The changes in the law also allow 
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the Prefectural Centers under the Elimination of Organized Crime to start 
legal procedures to forbid the Yakuza from using business offices if they 
are deemed to be “extremely dangerous.”173 
This change in the law comes as no surprise to the Japanese populous.  
In addition to changes in the law, the Japanese Diet set up these 
“Prefectural Centers” in order to “eliminate” the Yakuza.174  This reaction 
was a direct result of a public outcry to rid Japan of the Yakuza after an 
escalation of gang wars between various Yakuza factions.175 
4.  Impact of the Law 
 Although changes to the law were codified to make participation in 
Yakuza more challenging, in 2015, the largest group of Yakuza, the 
Yamaguchi-gumi, split into two main factions:  the “Yamaguchi-gumi” and 
the “Kobe Yamaguchi-gumi”.176  This split is incredibly dangerous because 
it could create a gang war involving all twenty-one designated crime groups 
in Japan. 177   The new faction has already set up alliances with other 
organized crime groups.178  The last Yakuza split was in 1984 and caused 
“several years of epic warfare marked with assassinations, attempted 
bombings and gun battles . . . .”179 
A.  Ecuador 
1.  Government 
Ecuador has a Representative Democracy system of government.180  
This government is comprised of three branches:  Executive, Legislative, 
and Judicial.181  The President serves as both the head of the state and head 
of the government and is elected every four years.182  The Executive Branch 
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includes twenty-eight ministries.183  The Legislative Branch consists of the 
national assembly and has the power to pass laws.184  The Judicial Branch is 
Ecuador’s Supreme Court and is independent of the Executive and 
Legislative Branches.185  The Supreme Court consists of the National Court 
of Justice and the Constitutional Court of Judges. 186   There is an 
autonomous electoral agency called the Tribunal Supremo Electoral. 187  
Ecuador had a Congress until 2008 when President Rafael Correa dissolved 
it. 188   Upon dissolving the Congress, Correa convened a “special 
constitutional assembly” which wrote a new Ecuadorian Constitution.189 
2.  Organized Crime Group 
Unlike the United States, Italy, and Japan, Ecuador’s organized crime 
problem is fairly new.190  Although there is no exact date when organized 
crime began in Ecuador, government figures show that in 2010, violence of 
all crimes rose 15 percent in one year.191  Murders alone have doubled 
“over the last twenty years to nearly 19 per 100,000 residents.”192  Much of 
this violence is attributed to the extensive issue of drug trafficking.193 
Roughly a decade ago, drug trafficking in Ecuador was a “relatively 
small law enforcement problem.”194  Due to Ecuador’s geographic location, 
between Colombia and Peru, Ecuador has become the site of illegal drug 
trafficking for international distribution.195  “Mexican, Russian, Chinese, 
and Korean drug mafia members regularly visit to arrange deals . . .  [and] . 
. . [g]rowing amounts of cocaine paste are brought [to Ecuador] to be 
processed because of the Colombian government’s crackdown on illicit 
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labs.”196  Ecuador is “vulnerable to transnational organized crime due to 
weak public institutions, porous borders, and corruption.”197  It is estimated 
that “ 200 tons of cocaine, or one-quarter of all that’s manufactured yearly 
in Colombia and Peru, transits through Ecuador.”198  Ecuador also traffics 
the chemical precursors for drugs other than cocaine or heroin.199  Chemical 
precursors are compounds that are needed in the “synthetic or extraction 
process of drug production.”200 
3.  Law and its Changes 
Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution categorized drug abuse as a “public 
health problem.”201  Because of the rise in addicts in Ecuador, on December 
17, 2013, the Ecuadorian National Assembly passed a new Ecuadorian 
criminal code. 202   The National Council for Narcotic and Psychotropic 
Substances announced a new scale in order to differentiate between drug 
users, micro-traffickers, and large-scale traffickers.203  This was done in 
order to identify the level a person was considered and to control prison 
sentences. 204   The National Council for Narcotic and Psychotropic 
Substances is an administrative institution that was set up to exclusively 
“take charge of drug control.”205 
Before the change in the law, “possession of anything up to one gram 
of heroin and fifty grams of cocaine were considered ‘minimum’ and 
essentially decriminalized. . . .”206  Now, these quantities are considered 
                                                        
196. Kraul, supra note 190. 
197. U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 195. 
198. Kraul, supra note 190. 
199. U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 195. 
200. Precursor Chemical, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/ 
precursor+chemical (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
201. U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 195. 
202. Id. 
203. Aaron Daugherty, Ecuador Toughens Drugs Laws, Muddles Policy, INSIGHT CRIME (Sept. 
10, 2015), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/ecuador-president-proposes-tougher-punishment-
for-microtraffickers. 
204. Id. 
205. Ecuador, TNI DRUGS & DEMOCRACY, http://www.undrugcontrol.info/en/ 
countryinformation/latinamerica/ecuador/item/204ecuador?pop=1&tmpl=component&print=1(last 
visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
206. Daugherty, supra note 203. 
2016] Strompf 49 
 
 
“high” and come with a prison sentence.207  This was done to have a more 
uniform system of sentencing.208 
Surprisingly, in 2014, Ecuador released “500 drug mules or low-level 
traffickers in a move aimed [at] alleviat[ing] prison crowding.”209  Initially, 
Ecuador treated addiction like it was a health problem rather than a 
crime.210  Recently however, the government appears to be recriminalizing 
drug use.211  This is in opposition with the work Correra did in 2014.212  
Because of the new push to criminalize low-level drug offenders in 2015 by 
Correa, Ecuador’s issue of prison overcrowding will continue to rise.213 
4.  Impact of the Law 
Because the issue of organized crime and the recently codified laws in 
Ecuador are so recent, there is not a wealth of information on the impact of 
these laws.  In 2016, Ecuadorian authorities “lashed out” against a recently 
published drug report conducted by the United States State Department.214  
The State Department’s 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report, which discusses drug trafficking trends around the world, labeled 
Ecuador as a “major transit country” and noted the “continuing presence of 
transnational organized crime groups . . . [such as] . . . the Zetas, the 
Sinaloa Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia . . . .”215  Ecuador’s Chief of Police stated that although this study 
has been “accurate” in prior years, “recent police investigations had found 
‘no links to such cartels.’”216  Ecuadorian officials also stated that in 2015, 
the government seized eighty-tons of drugs and over 400-tons in the last 
eight years. 217   Although both governments may be reporting accurate 
statistics, there is speculation that due to recent tension between Ecuador 
and the United States, these reports could be somewhat exaggerated to 
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benefit each side’s point of view.218  The passage of this new Criminal 
Code does provide law enforcement with new tools for surveillance and 
operations however, the “lack of regimented investigative training hinders 
the ability to successfully prosecute transnational crime.”219 
III.  GLOBAL ECONOMY & TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 
“Transnational organized crime is big business.  In 2009 it was 
estimated to generate $870 billionan amount equal to 1.5 percent of 
global GDP.  That is . . . the equivalent of close to 7 percent of the world’s 
exports of merchandise.”220 
In 2009, the General Assembly of the United Nations estimated that 
the “value of illicit trade around the globe was estimated at $1.3 trillion and 
is increasing.”221  For criminal acts to be considered “transnational”, the 
criminal actions must be “profit-motivated” and be “of an international 
nature where more than one country is involved.”222 
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the 
most lucrative types of transnational organized crime are:  drug 
trafficking; human trafficking; smuggling of migrants; illicit trading in 
firearms; trafficking in natural resources; illegal trade in wildlife; sale 
of fraudulent medicines; and cybercrime.223  Almost all of these crimes 
bring in over one billion dollars of revenue annually.224  A breakdown 
of the types of crimes based on the estimated annual value they bring 
shows that drug trafficking continues to bring in the most money  
annually.225  In 2009, it was reported that the total value for drug 
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trafficking was a staggering $320 billion.226  Calculated in that $320 
billion is the $85 billion in the global sale of cocaine.227 
This issue is not, however, only an economic one because 
transnational organized crime also has a major impact on the local 
governments and people living in these areas.228  Giving these criminal 
groups such large sums of money allows them to have a “direct impact 
on governance.”229  This allows for corruption and the “buying of 
elections.”230  It also “destabilizes countries and entire regions, thereby 
undermining development assistance in those areas.”231 
These organizations “undermine development by eroding social 
and human capital.”232  This means that in areas where there is a large 
organized crime presence, skilled laborers are likely to leave work and 
those seeking educational opportunities will be impeded from gaining 
access to schooling.233  The presence of organized crime in a location 
will also drive away both “foreign and domestic investors [because 
they] see crime as a sign of social instability, and crime drives up the 
cost of doing business.”234   
Transnational organized crime also impacts legitimate businesses 
when illegal goods displace the original products, because they are 
made and sold at a much lower price.235  The impact of transnational 
counterfeiting in the United States alone is astounding.  “It is estimated 
that 7 percent of our annual world trade$600 billion worthis 
counterfeit or pirated; that fakes are believed to be directly responsible 
for the loss of more than 750,000 American jobs . . . .”236  This does not 
mean that just a few fake handbags are making their way around the 
world. 
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[E]verything from baby formula to medicine is counterfeited, 
with tragic results; . . . counterfeiters and the crime syndicates 
they work with deal in human trafficking, child labor, and gang 
warfare; and . . . counterfeiting is used to launder money, and the 
money has been linked to truly sinister deeds such as terrorism.237 
The issue of transnational organized crime groups manufacturing and 
selling counterfeit designer goods is becoming such an issue that major 
fashion houses have attempted to bring down these syndicates.238  Some 
organized crime groups used online retail giant, eBay, to sell counterfeit 
designer handbags. 239   As a result, Louis Vuitton sued eBay and was 
successful because it showed that “ninety-percent of the Vuitton and Dior 
items offered on eBay in the first half of 2006 were counterfeits.” 240  
Although there are measures in place to protect these retailers from these 
large-scale operations, these organized crime groups are now shipping in 
“generic items” and then having people within the United States finish them 
domestically.241  This will prevent border agents from detecting counterfeit 
goods.242  Because of transnational organized crime, both local and federal 
governments choose to increase public spending for security and policing 
rather than putting that money toward helping their citizens.243 
IV.  COMPARISONS 
While most of the United States, Japan, and Italy appear to be getting 
increasingly stricter with their organized crime laws, Ecuador has 
decriminalized possession of certain drugs like cocaine and heroin.244  This 
is significant because Ecuador’s organized crime issue is emerging while 
the other three countries have a history with organized crime.  This would 
lead someone to believe that Ecuador would be able to control its emerging 
organized crime issue by enforcing stricter laws and not letting individuals 
with minor drug offenses out of prison.  Italy and Japan have increased the 
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strictness of their laws by codifying changes and enforcing them while the 
United States has just used the vagueness of the RICO statute to prosecute 
more individuals not directly involved in organized crime.245 
V.  CONCLUSION  
Through education, policing and legislation, the United States, Italy, 
Japan, and Ecuador can continue to combat the issue of organized crime.  
The United States needs to clearly define the RICO statute to provide 
prosecutors with more definitive parameters.  This would decrease the 
amount of individuals that are being prosecuted under the statute for 
offenses not related to organized crime.  Clarifying the statute may, 
however, cause an increase in organized crime behavior because 
prosecutors are using ambiguities in the statute to indict and convict more 
individuals.  The legislature should also remove the clause in the RICO 
statute that allows for mandatory forfeitures of property before someone 
under RICO has been found guilty.  Although the mandatory forfeiture is of 
property obtained during the alleged illegal conduct, having this clause in 
the statue deprives a defendant an equal right to competent legal 
representation because their ability to find suitable counsel is thwarted due 
to a lack of finances. 
The United States should also look to the historic and present day 
examples of successful cooperation between organized crime groups and 
the government in order to utilize the mafia to combat terrorist cells that 
threaten the United States.  This may give organized crime participants 
positive avenues to protect their country.  It could also provide increased 
information between crime organizations and the government to combat 
planned attacks before they are carried out.  This would decrease 
government spending because non-governmental groups are using their 
resources to combat terrorist groups. 
Increasing prison terms appears to be a positive step to decrease 
organized crime in Italy.  However, the fact that people are incarcerated 
longer does not necessarily mean that participation will decrease.  The 
mafia is an idea that is so ingrained in the Italian culture that it will be 
difficult to rewrite history.  Instead of codifying more laws, Italy’s 
government should attempt to deal with the stigma, whether positive or 
negative, associated with the mafia.  One way to achieve this goal could be 
to launch a campaign to discuss the impact of the mafia and to inform 
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citizens of the actual damage being done to Italy’s economy.  Italians may 
band together against the mafia and participation may decrease. 
Japan’s recent change to its law has quite possibly done more harm 
than good because this approach forced the Yakuza to move underground 
and reorganize.  Having the Yakuza underground could cause them to 
become more dangerous because the government has less opportunity to 
monitor Yakuza activity.  If the Yakuza have offices, the government could 
conduct searches of these locations and get a better handle on the activities 
they conduct.  It is also important for the government to watch Yakuza 
groups due to the faction that just occurred.  This faction could cause a 
dangerous gang war in Japan.  This gang war would threaten the safety of 
not only the Japanese citizens, but also the economy because the Yakuza 
are so entrenched in Japanese business. 
The rise of drug use and sale in Ecuador is being exacerbated because 
instead of increasing prison terms for drug use and distribution, Ecuador is 
decriminalizing drug possession.  Instead of decriminalizing drug 
possession, Ecuador should become stricter in its enforcement and 
prosecution of drug offenders. Ecuador should also attempt to increase 
border security to quell the import/export of drugs in and out of the country 
and the countries around it.  Ecuador should continue to work with the 
United States, rather than against it, to manage the drug trade before it 
spreads to other industries as well.  Having a rampant drug trade tends to 
increase crime and poverty.  Ecuador needs to get this issue under control 
before its citizens and economy suffer grave consequences. 
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I.     INTRODUCTION 
As the former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Louis 
Freeh once said, “[a]sk the American public if they want an FBI wiretap 
and they’ll say, ‘No’.  If you ask them do they want a feature on their phone 
that helps the FBI find their missing child they’ll say, ‘Yes’.”1  According 
to reports, 2014 was the deadliest year of the twenty-first century as it 
pertained to deaths from a direct result of terrorism with a total of 32,658 
deaths; an increase of eighty percent from 2013.2  Wiretapping is defined 
as, “a form of electronic eavesdropping accomplished by seizing or 
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overhearing communications by means of a concealed recording or 
listening device connected to the transmission line.”3  Wiretapping is one of 
the many tools used to conduct surveillance.  This surveillance is conducted 
domestically, as well as internationally; therefore, a citizen of a specific 
country is not warranted from that country eavesdropping on his or her 
conversations.4 
Terrorism has increased, and has continued to do so over the last 
fifteen years.  Patterns have shown, that when tragedies occur, more 
domestic and international surveillance occurs. Some of this surveillance is 
conducted through wiretapping.  Although there are laws in place for 
wiretapping, the laws are not strict enough and tend to infringe on the 
privacy of many individuals living within that country. 
This article will focus on raising awareness and attention to domestic 
surveillance, specifically wiretapping, the ease of obtaining a warrant for 
such surveillance, as well as how the United States’ laws and frequent 
wiretapping compare to other countries in Europe especially during times of 
terror. 
First, this article will give a brief overview of the structure of the 
United States government, followed by an explanation of the laws used and 
procedures in place to allow wiretapping.  Next, this article will contain 
background information about the structure of the three European 
countries’ type of government—Russia, Italy, and France—followed by an 
explanation of the laws and procedures in place for wiretapping to occur.  
Additionally, this article will compare the four countries and applicable 
laws, and discuss the correlation between terrorism occurrences and 
domestic surveillance, with a focus on wiretapping.  Then, this article will 
discuss society’s opinion regarding whether they agree or disagree with the 
government watching them.  This article concludes with a brief recap of the 
information shared on wiretapping and changes that should be made to the 
wiretapping laws and domestic surveillance as a whole. 
II.     LAWS AND EVENTS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
A. The United States 
The most alarming statistic released from the United States Courts in 
2015 stated, “[n]o wiretap applications were reported as denied in 2015.”5  
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This statistic is alarming because it shows that it is extremely easy to obtain 
a warrant to wiretap and that judges generally will not deny such request.   
Wiretapping in the United States began in 1857 when the telegraph 
was invented, and furthered upon the invention of the telephone.6 
The United States is a federal presidential republic.7  As such, the 
powers of the federal government are limited, therefore allowing the states 
to retain a degree of sovereignty, and giving the citizens the power to vote 
and choose the individuals that will represent their government.8  The 
Congress is a bicameral legislature, thus dividing the legislators into two 
branches or houses—the Senate and the House of Representatives—and 
giving each state the same number of seats regardless of population to 
ensure equal representation in Congress of the smaller less-populated 
states.9  The legislative branch enacts legislation and the executive branch is 
charged with enforcing the law and carrying it out.10  The President of the 
United States is the head of the executive branch.11  This article was written 
during the final days of President Barack Obama’s second and last term. 
In January of 2016, the estimated population in the United States was 
322,762,018.12  While there may not have been nearly as many people 
living in the United States when wiretapping first began, by 1934, Congress 
realized it was time to pass the first federal wiretapping law upon rise of 
multiple challenges pertaining to the admissibility of wiretap evidence as 
being violations of the Fourth Amendment.13  The Fourth Amendment 
establishes:   
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
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probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.14 
The Communications Act of 1934 made wiretapping a criminal 
offense and inadmissible in court.15  However, this law only lasted until 
1960, when the government was unable to enforce laws that were in place 
due to a large amount of criminal activity.16  The case that changed 
everything was Katz v. United States.  In Katz v. United States, the police 
had placed an eavesdropping device on a public payphone to record the 
telephone conversations of an illegal gambling operation which led to Katz 
ultimately being arrested and convicted.17  On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
the United States ruled seven-to-one that police action in this situation 
violated the Fourth Amendment.  The Court determined that Katz’s 
expectation of privacy was reasonable under the circumstances; thus, 
changing the original requirement of a “physical trespass,” previously 
established in Olmstead v. United States.18  In Olmstead, the Supreme Court 
held that the government did not violate Olmstead’s privacy because the 
wiretaps were placed in the street, and therefore, did not trespass onto 
Olmstead’s property and did not constitute a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.19 
Today, constitutional challenges are limited because of 18 U.S.C. § 
2518 which outlines in depth the procedure that a federal prosecutor must 
take to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications.20  To obtain an 
order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication, an application must be made under oath or affirmation to a 
judge with jurisdiction over the matter, and include the following:   
(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer 
making the application, and the officer authorizing the 
application; (b) a full and complete statement of the facts and 
circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief 
that an order should be issued, including (i) details as to the 
particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be 
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committed, (ii) except as provided in subsection (11), a particular 
description of the nature and location of the facilities from which 
or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a 
particular description of the type of communications sought to be 
intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing 
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted; (c) 
a full and complete statement as to whether or not other 
investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they 
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous; (d) a statement of the period of time for which the 
interception is required to be maintained.  If the nature of the 
investigation is such that the authorization for interception should 
not automatically terminate when the described type of 
communication has been first obtained, a particular description of 
facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional 
communications of the same type will occur thereafter; (e) a full 
and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous 
applications known to the individual authorizing and making the 
application, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, or 
for approval of interceptions of, wire, oral, or electronic 
communications involving any of the same persons, facilities or 
places specified in the application, and the action taken by the 
judge on each such application; and (f) where the application is 
for the extension of an order, a statement setting forth the results 
thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable 
explanation of the failure to obtain such results.21 
Although there were procedures in place that require the federal 
prosecutor to obtain a court order prior to intercepting wire, oral, or 
electronic communication, in 2001—shortly after the September 11th 
terrorist attacks, the U.S.A. Patriot Act (Patriot Act) was passed.  The 
purpose of the Patriot Act was to expand and aid the government’s power in 
anti-terrorism investigations while streamlining the process to obtain the 
necessary warrants to wiretap.  Unfortunately, this proved to be 
insufficient.22 
In 2002, former President George W. Bush, expanded the authority by 
approving wiretaps without warrants by authorizing a domestic spying 
program designed to help prevent future attacks by conducting surveillance 
amongst citizens’ phone calls, e-mails, and other forms of 
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communications.23  This law is still currently in place sans a few provisions 
that have been removed.24  The first provision removed was section 215 
which allowed the National Security Agency (NSA) to collect metadata on 
millions of Americans and store the information for five years.25  Metadata 
is defined as data which describes other data by providing information 
pertaining to a certain item’s content.26  The second provision removed was 
the law enforcement officer’s ability to have a roving tap, which means an 
order that is continuous even if the suspect frequently changes 
communication devices.27  As a result, law enforcement officers are now 
required to get a new court order.28  Lastly, the government is no longer 
allowed to use national security tools against “lone-wolf” terror suspects if 
there is no connection found to a foreign terror group.29 
There is no doubt, that when terrorism strikes, there is an increase in 
domestic surveillance.  The Paris attacks which occurred in November of 
2015, triggered a plan from the FBI to increase domestic surveillance of 
suspected ISIS sympathizers as a way to protect against potential threats in 
the United States.30  Further, the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) chairman had suggested to expand wiretap laws.31  Inaccurate news 
reports on the Paris attacks stated that the attackers communicated via a 
game console, PlayStation 4, which was not defined under the 1994 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA).32  The 
CALEA requires telecom companies, internet providers, and some online 
voice services to build their networks in ways that allow simpler access for 
authorities when it is necessary to lawfully intercept a suspect’s telephone 
and online communication.33  The PlayStation 4 was not something that 
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was considered in 1994, and while the reports of communication via the 
gaming console are allegedly untrue, the FCC chairman believes this is 
something worth looking into in the event something were to take place in 
the future.34 
The 2016 shooting at Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, Florida has become 
“the deadliest shooting rampage in U.S. history.”35  A recent interview that 
was transcribed took place between FRESH AIR contributor Dave Davies 
and Eric Lichtblau, who is a winner of the Pulitzer Prize for national 
reporting for breaking the story of President Bush’s administration’s 
warrantless wiretapping program, in which they discussed the Orlando 
attack.36  This is an excerpt of the conversation which took place:   
DAVIES:  Let's start by talking about Omar Mateen, the shooter 
in the massacre in Orlando.  The FBI, we know, did investigate 
him.  What drew their attention to Omar Mateen? 
LICHTBLAU:  Right.  They actually looked at him twice . . . .  
They used an undercover informant to try and see whether he 
was really planning anything.  They did surveillance.  They did 
wiretapping.  They interviewed the co-workers, obviously.  They 
extended the investigation past the six months that they were 
originally allowed to go.  And after about [ten] months, they 
closed it down.  They said they did not have enough evidence to 
indicate that he was supporting terrorism or planned to act on his 
earlier comments.  And the FBI kind of threw up its hands and 
closed the investigation.37 
This is one example of where wiretaps were used domestically to thwart 
potential terrorism and even though they investigated this person twice, an 
attack was still successfully carried out years later. 
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B. European Countries 
1. Russia 
Russia, formally a part of the Soviet Union, became independent in 
1991 when the Soviet Union dissolved.38  Russia is currently a federal 
multiparty republic with a bicameral legislative body.39  This means that 
Russia is made up of a federal state with a constitution and other units that 
are self-governed.40  The government consists of two bodies the Federation 
Council and the State Duma.41  The Federation Council currently has 170 
seats and the State Duma currently has 450 seats.42  Russia has a head of 
state which is the president as well as a head of government which is the 
prime minister.43  The current president is Vladimir Putin and the prime 
minister is Dmitry Medvedev.44  The estimated population of Russia in 
2015 was 146.3 million people.45 
Russia’s national system of lawful interception of all electronic 
communication is The System of Operative-Investigative Measures 
(SORM).46  There are a total of seven Russian investigative and security 
agencies that have been granted the legal right to intercept phone calls and 
emails; however, it is the Federal Security Service (FSB) who defines the 
procedures that take place to intercept electronic communications.47  As 
bizarre as this sounds, the FSB must obtain a court order prior to 
intercepting the oral communications but they do not have to provide it to 
any telecom providers.48  This means, that the FSB can obtain the court 
order and immediately tap right into an individual’s line.49  The FSB 
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requires telecom providers to pay for the SORM equipment and its 
installation while having no access to the surveillance boxes.50 
On August 12, 1995, a law was passed on operative searches and 
seizures which gave the right to the FSB to carry some investigative 
activities without prior judicial approval.51  Some of the activities included 
were wiretapping telephones and monitoring other forms of 
communication.52  The FSB was allowed to engage in these activities if 
there was an emergency and serious crime was going to be committed, or if 
Russia’s political, military, economic or environmental security were 
threatened.53  A judge must be notified within twenty-four hours of any 
action taken and within forty-eight hours either cease the surveillance or 
have the appropriate court order to continue.54  The biggest flaw found in 
this act, is the definition of what constitutes “security” and “emergency” 
because without a fine line, it becomes subjective.55 
In December 2010, a federal law was passed expanding the legal 
grounds for wiretapping domestically in Russia.56  Receiving a report that 
an individual is preparing to commit a crime is sufficient; they do not need 
to back up those allegations.57  The transcript of the conversation will 
remain even if the allegations hold no merit and may turn up later in 
another criminal case in the future.58  Andrei Soldatov, who is a leading 
security expert stated, “telephone and e-mail intercepts and recordings have 
risen from 265,000 in 2007 to 466,000 in 2011 and that it is still on the 
rise.”59  He also stated, “there is a lack of parliament oversight and it is 
almost impossible to establish who is carrying out these wiretap operations, 
even against opposition leaders.”60  In 2011, only 3554 wiretap requests, or 
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one percent out of 466,152 were rejected.61  One of those wiretaps 
conducted were of the Boston Marathon bombing suspect, Tamerlan 
Tsarnaev.62  In 2011, Russia secretly recorded a telephone conversation 
with his mother vaguely discussing jihad.63  There was another telephone 
conversation recorded of the mother speaking to someone in Southern 
Russia who is under FBI investigation for an unrelated case.64  The Russian 
government allegedly told the FBI these individuals were religious 
extremists.65  Lastly, by way of domestic surveillance, the Moscow Times 
have reported that in January of 2016, Moscow has thwarted Islamic State 
terrorist attacks in Russia as they had “operational control” over them from 
the beginning.66 
2. Italy 
“In Italy, you’re nobody if your phone isn’t tapped.”67  Italy’s leading 
political provocateur and blogger Beppe Grillo stated, “this is a nation 
where if you cannot be blackmailed, you will never get ahead.”68  Once a 
monarchy government being ran by a king was replaced shortly after World 
War II, on June 2, 1946, when the Italians voted in a referendum to replace 
the monarchy.69  Today, Italy is now a republic government made up of two 
legislative houses, the senate and the chamber of deputies.70  This means 
that this government is ruled by representatives of the citizen body.71  Italy 
has a head of state which is the president and a head of government which 
is the prime minister.  The current president is Sergio Mattarella and the 
                                                     
61. Wiretapping Doubles in Russia Since 2007, SPUTNIK INT’L (Apr. 6, 2012, 18:27), 
http://sputniknews.com/russia/20120604/173843249.html [hereinafter Sputnik Int’l]. 
62. Russia had wiretap on Boston Marathon bombing suspect, US officials say, 
FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 27, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/04/27/russia-had-wiretap-on-
boston-marathon-bombing-suspect-us-officials-say.html. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Moscow Says It Thwarted IS Terror Attacks in Russia, MOSCOW TIMES (Jan. 29, 2016, 
19:02), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/moscow-says-it-thwarted-is-terror-attacks-in-russia-516 
48. 
67. Rachel Donadio, An Untapped Phone Call in Italy? It’s Possible, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/31/world/europe/31italy.html?_r=0. 
68. Id. 
69. Marino Berengo et al., Italy: Government and society, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Aug. 
12, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/place/Italy/Government-and-society [hereinafter About Italy]. 
70. Id. 
71. André Munro, Republic, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (June 22, 2016), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/republic-government. 
2016] Esau 65 
 
prime minister is Matteo Renzi.72  The Senate has 322 seats currently which 
includes seven non-elective seats; five of which are presidential appointees 
and two former presidents serving.73  The Chamber of Deputies has 630 
seats currently and are popularly elected through a system of proportional 
representation and are considered the lower chamber.74  In 2015 the Italian 
population was estimated at 60.8 million people.75 
Article 15 of the Italian Constitution states, “[t]he freedom and secrecy 
of correspondence and of every other form of communication is 
inviolable,”76 but yet many individuals’ privacy is still being intruded on 
despite this constitutional guarantee.  Article 266 of the Italian Code of 
Criminal Procedure states:   
the interception of a telephone conversation or communication 
and other forms of telecommunications is allowed in proceedings 
relating to the following offenses:  a) intentional crimes for 
which is provided for life imprisonment or imprisonment for a 
maximum of five years; determined in accordance with Article 4; 
b) crimes against the public administration for which is planned 
the penalty of imprisonment of not less than five years 
determined in accordance with Article 4; c) offenses relating to 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; d) offenses relating 
to weapons and explosives; e) smuggling offenses; f) crimes of 
abuse, threats, usury, illegal financial activities, insider trading, 
market manipulation, harassment or annoyance to persons by 
means of telephone.77 
To obtain permission to wiretap in Italy the officer needs to ask the 
judge for preliminary investigations and obtain authorization for serious 
crimes as outlined above and essential for the continuation of the 
investigation.78  In cases where serious harm to the investigation may occur 
the officer may move forward with the interception of communication so 
long as the court is notified not later than twenty-four hours.79  The court, 
within forty-eight hours will render a decision on whether they will allow 
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the intercepting of communications to continue or cease and if it is not 
validated, the interception must cease and the evidence collected cannot be 
used.80  After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Italy has allowed 
anticipatory wiretapping even without any ongoing investigation.81 
Italy is infamous for wiretapping.82  Wiretapping is such a common 
practice in Italy that even former Secretary of State, and current Presidential 
Candidate, Hillary Clinton, and Pope Benedict XVI when they were 
speaking with the head of Italy's civil protection agency, Guido Bertolaso, 
were wiretapped as he was being wiretapped as part of an investigation.83  
In 2006, the Max Planck Institute calculated that seventy-six out of every 
100,000 Italians had their phones tapped.84  Further, in 2008 as reported by 
the ministry of justice, 124,326 phones were tapped.85  With the increase of 
terrorism in Europe, the Russian Today reported that Italy had recently 
stopped potential ISIS attacks on the Israeli embassy in Rome as well as on 
the Vatican by intercepting communications.86  Despite the great news, 
“Italy is the eavesdropping centre of Europe,” putting many Italians’ 
privacy expectations at risk.87 
3. France 
France is a republic government with two legislative houses.88  The 
two houses of the French parliament consist of the Senate and the National 
Assembly.89  The Senate has 348 seats currently and the National Assembly 
currently has 577 seats.90  France also has a head of state which is the 
                                                     
80. Id. 
81. Elizabeth F. Defeis, Italy--Journalists, Privacy and A Right To Information, 20 DIG., 
NAT’L ITALIAN A.B.A. L.J. 41, 42 (2012). 
82. See Donadio, supra note 67. 
83. Nick Squires, Silvio Berlusconi wiretap victory in confidence vote, THE TELEGRAPH (June 
10, 2010, 5:46 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/7818509/Silvio-Berlusco 
ni-wiretap-victory-in-confidence-vote.html. 
84. Italian bill to limit wiretaps draws fire, BBC NEWS (June 11, 2010), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/10279312 [hereinafter Italian bill]. 
85. Id. 
86. Italy busts ISIS supporters cell mulling attacks on Vatican & Israeli embassy in Rome, RT 
NEWS (Apr. 29, 2016, 00:10), https://www.rt.com/news/341304-italy-arrests-isis-supporers/. 
87. Italian bill, supra note 84. 
88. T.N. Bisson, et al., France: The role of the president, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (July 
15, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/place/France/The-role-of-the-president. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
2016] Esau 67 
 
president and a head of government which is the prime minister.91  The 
current president is François Hollande, and the current prime minister is 
Manuel Valls.92  Currently, France’s estimated population is 66.6 million 
people.93 
On July 10, 1991 France passed the 1991 Wiretapping Act which gave 
freedom of telecommunications from being intruded on without a court 
order.94  The only ones that can intrude were police officers without 
magistrate approval or for national security purposes which did not require 
magistrate approval.95  If the reason for intruding telecommunications was 
for national security purposes it only had to be approved by the current 
prime minister who in turn was required to tell an independent three-
member commission of two legislators and of a chair who would be named 
by the courts.96 
On January 7, 2015 terror struck in France and was considered one of 
the “worst security crises in decades.”97  After the attacks, France passed a 
new law allowing domestic surveillance of anyone linked to a “terrorist 
inquiry” by intelligence agencies without prior approval.98  The new law 
allows the intelligence agencies to collect metadata which will be subject to 
analysis for any potential suspicious behavior, place cameras and recording 
devices in private homes, and install key logger devices which record every 
key stroke on a computer that is bugged in actual live time.99  Initially, the 
metadata collected is anonymous but if necessary with follow-up requests, 
the agencies could reveal the identity.100  Metadata is stored for five years 
and recordings only one month.101  The law also allows the use of IMSI 
catchers, which is something flown over a specific area that collects data 
and records all types of conversations whether it is via phone, internet, or 
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text-messaging within a specific area.102  Current Prime Minister, Manuel 
Valls, backed the bill and said it was “necessary and proportionate.”103  
Valls also stated that “previous French law on wiretapping dated back to 
1991, ‘when there were no mobile phones or internet,’ and the new bill was 
crucial in the face of extremist threats.”104  The law also gained more 
support after a “jihadist killing spree” as well as when police stopped the 
attack on a church in April of 2015.105 
III.     COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW  
A. Differences 
While there are differences between the United States and European 
countries, these differences are not too drastic.  While the Patriot Act still 
stands today, things such as metadata collection and storing it for five years, 
roving wiretaps, and the use of national security tools on lone-wolf suspects 
are no longer allowed.106  This is a recent change as of 2015.107 
Unlike the United States, France, the very same year, passed a law 
which allowed the metadata collection the United States no longer allows as 
well as other intrusive surveillance tools.108  Further, while the United 
States has to show a court order to telecom providers to conduct a legal 
wiretap that falls outside of the scope of the Patriot Act, the FSB in Russia 
does not.  All the FSB simply has to do is obtain permission and conduct 
the wiretap because they require any telecom provider to pay for the SORM 
equipment and installation giving them no access to the surveillance boxes 
either.109 
The telecom providers would never know if a wiretap was being 
conducted.110  Also, in Russia, merely receiving a report that an individual 
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is preparing to commit a crime is sufficient grounds for a wiretap, the 
allegations do not even have to be backed up with hard facts.111  This differs 
from the United States because 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(a)–(f) outlines 
detailed requirements to obtain a court order to intercept any type of 
communication, backed up facts being one of the many requirements.112 
Lastly, Italy allows preemptive wiretapping of its citizens without an 
ongoing investigation113 whereas the United States, even with the Patriot 
Act, requires a warrant if it is seeking to intercept communications between 
two United States citizens on American soil.114  While the concept and the 
goals are the same, to avoid terrorism and prevent crime; the process, 
requirements, and information collected are what most differs the most 
from the countries. 
B. Similarities 
France, Italy, Russia, and the United States have more in common than 
one would think.  Wiretapping has become a “norm” in these countries.  
Specifically, the statistics show that “[n]o wiretap applications were 
reported as denied in 2015” in the United States.115  Comparably in 2011, 
out of 466,152 wiretap applications, only one percent were rejected in 
Russia.116 
Whenever there is a terrorist attack, there is a push for heightened 
security measures and an increase in surveillance and the countries know no 
end when expanding their powers of domestic surveillance.117  In Italy, 
shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in the United 
States, Italy allowed preemptive wiretapping which expanded its powers.118  
Further, after the terrorist attacks, former President Bush passed the Patriot 
Act and a domestic surveillance spying program.119  Likewise, shortly after 
the 2015 France terrorist attacks, France passed a new law that allows 
domestic surveillance of anyone linked to a “terrorist inquiry” by 
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intelligence agencies without prior approval.120  France’s Prime Minister 
Manuel Valls’ heavily disapproved of the comparison of the two laws.121 
Further, after the 2015 France terrorist attacks, the FBI increased the 
amount of wiretaps and surveillance against those who were “ISIS 
sympathizers.”122  The laws of France and the United States are strikingly 
similar because of the data that is allowed to be collected such as the 
metadata that was once allowed in the Patriot Act.123  Lastly, the frequency 
of wiretapping being conducted in Russia, Italy, and the United States are 
practically identical because the request for a wiretap is hardly denied 
leading to many wiretaps being conducted.124 
IV.     SOCIETY’S VIEW AROUND THE GLOBE 
A. The United States 
Research shows that results of the polls conducted were somewhat 
dependent on the survey’s phrasing and the way the person completing the 
survey perceived it.125  There was a “controlled study” done by CBS 
News/New York Times with two separate versions of the same poll, version 
“A” and “B”.126 
Version A:  After 9/11, President Bush authorized government 
wiretaps on some phone calls in the U.S. without getting court 
warrants, saying this was necessary in order to reduce the threat 
of terrorism.  Do you approve or disapprove of the president 
doing this? 
Version B:  After 9/11, George W. Bush authorized government 
wiretaps on some phone calls in the U.S. without getting court 
warrants.  Do you approve or disapprove of George W. Bush 
doing this?127 
When the random sample of people took the poll in version “A” the 
results were the following; fifty-three percent approved the president doing 
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this, forty-six percent disapproved, and one percent was unsure.128  When 
the remainder of the random sample of people took the poll in version “B”, 
the results flipped.129  In version “B”, forty-six percent approved the 
president doing this, fifty percent disapproved, and four percent was 
unsure.130  The versions varied in language, but the results remained split 
despite the wording.131  When the poll stated that it was “necessary,” there 
was a seven percent increase in approval rather than disapproval.132  There 
was also a seven percent decrease when former President George W. Bush 
was referred to as “George W. Bush” by itself rather than version “A” 
which stated, “President Bush.”133  As previously mentioned, “[a]sk the 
American public if they want an FBI wiretap and they’ll say, ‘No’.  If you 
ask them do they want a feature on their phone that helps the FBI find their 
missing child they’ll say, ‘Yes’.”134  Essentially, this is same.  American 
citizens do not want the FBI wiretapping their phones but at the same time, 
want to provide the FBI with information so that in the event their child 
goes missing, the FBI can track them.135  This is a double standard amongst 
American citizens. 
The Pew Research Center conducted a research experiment amongst 
registered voters from February 1, 2006 through February 5, 2006.136  The 
survey stated the following:  “[d]o you think it is generally right or 
generally wrong for the government to monitor telephone and e-mail 
communications of Americans suspected of having terrorist ties without 
first obtaining permission from the courts?”137  Here, forty percent of 
registered voters were against it and fifty-four percent of registered voters 
were for it.138 
A little over nine years later, and only two years later from the Edward 
Snowden whistle blowing incident, the Pew Research Center released 
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another study.139  One survey response yielded the following result from a 
spring 2014 question; seventy-four percent of people said “they should not 
give up privacy and freedom for the sake of safety” and twenty-two percent 
felt the total opposite.140  However, a narrower question such as the 
percentage of those that disapproved of the United States government’s 
collection of telephone and internet data as part of anti-terrorism efforts 
yielded the following results; fifty-four percent disapproved and forty-two 
percent approved of this action.141  Not much has changed over the years in 
the eyes of American citizens as the results are still demonstrating a large 
split of people that are for and against domestic surveillance tools, such as 
wiretapping, and these results are likely going to stay constant over the 
upcoming years. 
B. European Countries 
Europe’s views on wiretapping and domestic surveillance as a whole 
differs some from the United States.  In 2013,142 the Pew Research Center 
released the following question that was asked globally, “[a]ccording to 
news reports, the American government has been monitoring 
communications, such as emails and phone calls, in the United States and 
many other countries.  In your opinion, is it acceptable or unacceptable for 
the American government to monitor communications from American 
[c]itizens?”143  Sixty-seven percent of the Russian respondents said that this 
was unacceptable and twenty-eight percent of the Russian respondents 
found it acceptable.144  The Italians responded as well with sixty-three 
percent finding that this behavior was unacceptable and thirty-one percent 
finding that it was acceptable.145  The French responded with an 
overwhelming percentage of disapproval.146  Specifically, eighty-two 
percent of people found it unacceptable to do this while only eighteen 
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percent found it acceptable.147  The United States is split on this issue 
whereas Italy, Russia, and France find it mostly unacceptable conduct by 
the American government. 
A couple years later, when terror struck in France on January 7, 2015, 
it changed the minds of many French citizens.  Three months after the 
January attacks, the CSA poll, via the Atlantico news website was released, 
which demonstrated that the majority of French people were favoring the 
“restrictions on their freedoms in the name of fighting extremism” and only 
thirty-two percent were opposed to freedoms being reduced.148  While large 
majorities of the French people are now accepting of the 2015 law that 
passed, many human rights organizations are against the law as it reduces 
freedom and infringes upon civil liberties.149 
C. Comparison of Views 
The views of European citizens differ amongst each other as well as 
from the United States.  While citizens of Russia and Italy heavily 
disapproved of the American government conducting domestic 
surveillance, France’s latest opinion is that they would rather have their 
rights reduced so that the government can conduct its surveillance and 
thwart potential terrorists.150  Fear plays a role in helping shape the views of 
the citizens of a specific country, because when the French law first came 
about in 2015 allowing wiretaps without prior approval, there was heavy 
criticism, but when there were more killings and terror plots occurring, the 
new law gained much needed support.151  Over the last nine years however, 
American citizens have remained consistent in their views.152  With 
everything going on around the world, American citizens still have very 
split opinions on whether they agree or disagree with domestic 
surveillance.153  With terrorism attacks occurring more and more it will be 
interesting to see how the polls change over the next few years and whether 
American citizens tip the scales and become overwhelmingly in favor of 
domestic surveillance. 
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V.     CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated, there are alleged safeguards and laws in place for 
wiretapping to ensure that society’s privacy is not being intruded upon; 
however, this is not always the case.  As the saying goes, “safety may come 
with a price.”  Even if safety may come with a price, society should have 
more requirements in place and warrantless wiretapping should come to an 
end.  If the government has a reasonable belief that an individual poses a 
threat to United States soil, and there are concrete facts that support this 
threat, then that person should be investigated through the domestic 
surveillance tools necessary, including wiretapping with an appropriate 
warrant to do so.  However, wiretapping should only be used for this one 
specific reason only to prevent terrorism. 
Also, there should be stricter guidelines on what is necessary to obtain 
a warrant to wiretap.  The fact that there were zero applications denied in 
2015, meaning a total of 4148 warrants approved, is alarming because the 
judges are reluctant to deny them and/or it is too easy to obtain.154  This 
does not even include the wiretaps that were obtained without warrants.  
According to Albert Gidari, a top privacy law attorney, there are way more 
wiretaps being conducted without our knowledge.  Albert Gidari stated the 
following:   
Since the Snowden revelations, more and more companies have 
started publishing “transparency reports” about the number and 
nature of government demands to access their users’ data.  
AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint published data for 2014 earlier this 
year and T-Mobile published its first transparency report on the 
same day the AO released the Wiretap Report.  In aggregate, the 
four companies state that they implemented 10,712 wiretaps, a 
threefold difference over the total number reported by the AO.  
Note that the 10,712 number is only for the four companies listed 
above and does not reflect wiretap orders received by other 
telephone carriers or online providers, so the discrepancy actually 
is larger.155 
This poses the question:  what is the Government not saying?  Who is 
being listened to now?  Wiretapping is a powerful surveillance tool and 
should only be used for issues related to terrorism, not drug related offenses 
which happens very frequently as it was the most common type of criminal 
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offense investigated with a wiretap in 2015.156  With the latest terrorist 
attacks occurring around the world, citizens should be prepared for an 
expansion of the use of wiretapping, rather than a decrease, because the 
research has shown that there is a link between terrorism and domestic 
surveillance.  A large percentage of society has little knowledge about the 
Patriot Act.157  It is important to educate society about its rights starting 
from a young age because the more the government is allowed to intrude 
into society’s privacy, the easier it will be for the government to do so.   
Justice Potter Stewart said it best:   
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from 
which the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of 
glass, so that he was as invisible after he entered it as he would 
have been if he had remained outside.  But what he sought to 
exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye—it 
was the intruding ear.  He did not shed his right to do so simply 
because he made his calls from a place where he might be 
seen.158 
American citizens should not have to deal with the “intruding ear,”—the 
government.159 That is the court rationale that should be followed to protect 
society’s privacy.  Current legislation that is going to the Senate for 
consideration is H.R. 699:  Email Privacy Act.160  The proposed bill will 
eliminate the “loophole” by requiring government agencies to seek warrants 
for digital communications 180 days or older.161  Warrants require probable 
cause, versus what is being used now, subpoenas, which do not.162  This is a 
great bill to ensure more privacy to American citizens because it will 
increase the difficulty to obtain such information by government agencies.   
This is the type of legislation—ways of making wiretapping more 
difficult—needed to be enacted or it will be difficult to draw a distinct line 
of where domestic surveillance ends.  Benjamin Franklin once said, 
“[t]hose who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary 
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safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”163  This founding father would 
definitely be disappointed in today’s society for allowing such intrusion 
into its privacy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite great technological progress, increasing free trade, instant 
access to international communications, and other positive aspects of 
globalization, the world is still characterized by systematic and widespread 
violations of human dignity.  For example, it is difficult to express in words 
the shocking actions of terrorist organizations such as the “Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria” (ISIS).  In the 21st century, the systematic killing of 
innocent human beings, slavery, torture, and other violations of human 
dignity should not happen.  The widespread killing of ethnic and religious 
minorities and other atrocities, committed in territories controlled by ISIS, 
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show the reality of the existence of extreme political evil and the 
importance of confronting crimes against humanity by all means. 
According to Malcolm Nance, leading expert on global terrorism, 
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—“ISIS” or “the caliphate of 
the Islamic State”—has become the single most dangerous threat 
to global security since al-Qaeda.  It is more than just a threat to 
America and the West, because it also poses an existential threat 
to Islam:  its goal is to coopt or enslave 1.8 billion Muslims.1 
ISIS’s terrorist actions are global in scope.  However, to properly 
understand the nature of ISIS’s international crimes and why a normative 
response is necessary to end its actions, it is essential to focus on its 
activities in a concrete historical setting and against specific people. 
This article focuses on crimes against humanity in the context of 
ISIS’s violations of fundamental human rights of the Assyrian people.  
Crimes against humanity are very closely related to international human 
rights law, just as war crimes are closely related to international 
humanitarian law.2  The concept of crimes against humanity was first used 
by George Washington Williams to describe Belgium’s practices in the 
Congo in the 1890s,3 and again in 1915 to describe the widespread 
massacre of the Armenian people by the Ottoman Empire.4 It is important 
to remember that the Assyrian people were also victims of Ottoman actions 
during the 19th and 20th centuries.5  Therefore, the concept of crimes 
against humanity, in that historical context, should also be applicable to the 
crimes against Assyrians. 
Today, Assyrians are once again victims of one of the most extreme 
forms of political evil, defined by international law as “crimes against 
humanity.”6  Those crimes include widespread murder, torture and 
persecution.  Assyrian Christians are one of the main victims of the 
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criminal actions of ISIS.7  As a distinct minority ethnic and religious group, 
they were the victims of systematic human rights violations during Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in Iraq, and during other oppressive regimes.8  In the 
current historical context, those violations have become more extreme in 
territories controlled by ISIS.  Assyrians have been targeted because of their 
ethnic and religious identity.9  They have been systematically murdered, 
tortured and enslaved by ISIS’s militants, and Assyrian women have been 
raped and forced into sexual slavery.10 
International law is one of the most powerful discourses to analyze and 
provide answers to ISIS’s actions against the Assyrian people and other 
ethnic and religious groups.  To properly understand the place of 
international law, in situations such as the crimes against humanity 
committed by ISIS, it is necessary to consider not only the applicable 
international legal norms, but also philosophical, historical, and cultural 
issues that influence the process of creation and implementation of legal 
principles and norms. 
II. WHO ARE THE ASSYRIAN PEOPLE? 
The Assyrian people are an ethnic and religious group which has a rich 
historical and cultural heritage.  They have inhabited the territory of what is 
now Iraq for thousands of years.  They speak Syriac, which is a language 
derived from Aramaic.11  Assyrians were among the first people groups to 
convert to Christianity, in the first to third centuries, and they spread their 
religious beliefs across the Middle East in the following centuries.12 
The Assyrian church has a theology which is similar to the Catholic 
faith.13  Assyrians believe in Jesus Christ as the Son of God, they believe in 
the death and resurrection of Jesus, and they accept the Bible as being 
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inspired by God.14  According to the “Profession of the Orthodox Faith of 
the Holy Apostolic Catholic Assyrian Church of the East,” Assyrian 
Christians adhere to seven tenets of faith:  priesthood, holy baptism, oil of 
chrism, Holy Qurbana (Eucharist), absolution of sins, Holy Heaven, and the 
sign of the life-giving cross.15  Unlike ISIS’s followers, Assyrian Christians 
have a missional history; however, they do not believe in forcing others to 
conform to their religious beliefs. 
Some authors hold the view that the term “Assyrian Christians” has 
more of an ethnic connotation than it does a religious one.16  The Assyrian 
people are seeking to have their own land in the Nineveh region where they 
can be politically independent to protect their status as a people group.17 
When the Arab people invaded and conquered the region, the 
Assyrians were subjected to religious and cultural discrimination and 
persecution.18  They were often treated as second-class citizens, and did not 
have the same political and social rights as others.19  In the 19th and 20th 
centuries, the Assyrians were repeatedly massacred and persecuted by the 
Ottoman Empire, which viewed them as a potential threat.  During World 
War I, the “Assyrian Genocide” claimed between 175,000 and 250,000 
lives at the hands of the Ottoman Empire.20 
In 1932, the Assyrian people refused to become part of the state of 
Iraq, instead, choosing to be recognized as a “nation within a nation.”21  
Assyrian Christians enjoyed a short period of peace from the 1940s until 
1963, but have been persecuted by both Iraqi and Syrian Islamic extremists 
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since then.22  Between 2003 and 2009, “over 350,000 Iraqi Christians have 
fled (at least one-third of the Iraqi Christian population).”23 
In recent years, the Assyrian people have found themselves the target 
of further discrimination and persecution at the hands of ISIS terrorists.24  
ISIS justifies its international crimes—against religious and ethnic minority 
groups—by using a totalitarian religious discourse which dehumanizes 
anybody who has a different worldview. 
III. ISIS’S IDEOLOGICAL SOURCES OF JUSTIFICATION FOR CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY 
For Malcolm Nance, a leading expert on ISIS, “[t]he global jihad 
movement is arguably the most wealthy, influential, and violent terror cult 
in the history of humankind.”25 
ISIS is an insurgent and terrorist organization which has the objective 
of establishing an Islamic Caliphate.26  The Management of Savagery is a 
document which serves as a foundation for ISIS’s ideology and actions.  
Regarding this document, journalist Jessica Sterns writes:   
Al Naji wrote of the necessity of violence, in all its “crudeness 
and coarseness,” in order to awaken potential recruits to the 
reality of the jihadis’ war and to intimidate enemies by showing 
the price they would pay for their involvement.27 
The ideology of ISIS is often expressed in audio and video messages.  
One of those messages reflects the complete disregard of any view which 
opposes them.  Al Adnani, an ISIS spokesperson, believes that all 
fundamental ideas which originated in the West, including Christianity, 
secularism and democracy, should be rejected by Muslim believers and 
they should embrace Jihad against non-Muslims.28  This is consistent with 
the Salafist perspective of Islam which is a fundamental tenant of ISIS’s 
ideology.  Salafism is a theological interpretation of Sunni Islam which 
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seeks to eliminate idolatry.29  Salafism holds the view that they are the only 
true Muslims.30  Shi’a Muslims, and the ones who embrace democratic 
values, are apostates. 31 
Another key aspect of ISIS’s ideology is an aggressive extreme form 
of jihad.  Regarding this, Cole Bunzel, a leading expert on ISIS, says:  
“[t]he Islamic State also emphasizes the offensive form of jihad, which in 
the Wahhabi tradition is premised on the uprooting of shirk, idolatry, 
wherever it is found. . . .”32 
ISIS’s ideology seeks the destruction of religious and political symbols 
of whoever opposes its views.  This terrorist methodology serves to 
promote widespread violence and sectarian wars between Sunni and Shiite 
Muslims.33  Malcolm Nance synthesizes ISIS’s ideology as follows:   
In the interpretation of ISIS, their ideology commits them to 
work solely in the belief that all God wishes, is prayer and 
devotion to God and commitment to the literal words of the 
Qur’an and the events it predicts. . . . They believe the only way 
to convince 1.8 billion Muslims that God is pleased with the 
beheading of children and the rape of women is to characterize 
those acts as a form of worship.  This is the interpretation of ISIS 
that defines their cultism.  All mass murder, subjugation, slavery, 
death and more death is the highest form of worship to God.  
They are his instrument and absent direct orders they accept that 
they are fulfilling the events of the Qur’an’s book of 
Tribulation.34 
ISIS’s ideology promotes the view that its members who die in suicide 
attacks, are expressing their greatest faith in God, which insure them a place 
in Paradise.35  Secretary of State John Kerry stated that ISIS’s “entire 
worldview is based on eliminating those who do not subscribe to its 
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perverse ideology.”36  ISIS has pointedly attacked any other group that it 
considers to be in apostasy, including Shia Muslims,37 Yazidis,38 and 
Christians.39  Because this persecution is based on religious identity, it will 
not stop unless either all of the “non-believers” are eliminated, or ISIS is 
defeated.  ISIS’s interpretation of Sharia law specifically authorizes this 
conduct, sanctioning aggressive jihad against all non-Muslims.40 
IV. ISIS’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AGAINST THE ASSYRIAN AND OTHER 
RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS 
To accomplish its objectives, ISIS seeks to expand its control of 
territories and populations, in Iraq and Syria, by using all available means, 
including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, 
torture, rape, persecution, enforced disappearance and other inhumane 
actions.  ISIS’s actions constitute extreme violations of fundamental norms 
of international law, including international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law.  ISIS’s international crimes include 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
In March of 2016, the European Parliament officially recognized that 
the actions of ISIS against minority groups including Assyrian Christians 
are classified as international crimes.41  Just days later, the United States 
followed suit, in a rare unanimous vote in the House of Representatives.42 
Regarding the main characteristics of ISIS’s actions in its control 
territories, Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan said:   
Typically, when ISIS takes over a new town, the first facility it 
establishes is a so-called Hudud Square, to carry out Sharia 
punishments such as crucifixions, beheadings, lashings, and hand 
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amputations.  It then establishes a Sharia court, police force, and 
security operation station.  The work of Sharia police known as 
al-Hisbah, is not restricted to the implementation of the religious 
code, but also includes regulation of the marketplace.43 
The testimonies before the United States House of Representatives 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, regarding Assyrians and other religious and 
ethnic groups, show that ISIS is responsible for widespread violations of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law.  
According to the hearing:   
These communities—Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, Yezidis, 
Alawites, and others—are under mortal threat in their ancestral 
homelands.  And the mass execution of men, the enslavement of 
women and children, and the destruction of religious sites, is part 
of the ISIS effort to destroy these communities, to destroy all 
evidence of the preexistence of these communities.  In fact, ISIS 
maintains a special battalion.  They call it the ‘‘demolition 
battalion.’’  And that battalion is charged with going after art and 
going after artifacts, religious and historic sites that it considers 
heretical or idolatrous, and their job is simply to destroy 
history.44 
The Assyrian people, together with other Christian communities, have 
been systematically persecuted in the territories controlled by ISIS.  This 
persecution is based on ethnic and religious reasons.45 
Regarding the Assyrian and other Christian communities in Iraq, Brian 
Katulis, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, writes:  
“ISIS[’s] seizure of Mosul and surrounding parts of the nearby Nineveh 
Plains devastated Christian communities that had roots in those areas 
reaching back more than 1,500 years.”46 
Amnesty International has documented a number of ISIS crimes.  
Regarding ISIS’s actions against the Assyrian people and against other 
ethnic and religious minorities, Amnesty writes:   
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The group that calls itself the Islamic State (IS) has carried out 
ethnic cleansing on a historic scale in northern Iraq.  Amnesty 
International has found that the IS has systematically targeted 
non-Arab and non-Sunni Muslim communities, killing or 
abducting hundreds, possibly thousands, and forcing more than 
830,000 others to flee the areas it has captured since 10 June, 
2014.47 
Since April 2013, ISIS has expanded its influence and exerted its 
control over large territories and populations in Syria and Iraq.48  ISIS 
indiscriminately targets civilian populations, including children, and 
systematically violates fundamental human rights, displacing civilian 
populations and violating the right to life of minority groups in ISIS 
occupied territories.49  According to the United Nations:   
Where ISIS has occupied areas with diverse ethnic and religious 
communities, minorities have been forced either to assimilate or 
flee.  The armed group has undertaken a policy of imposing 
discriminatory sanctions such as taxes or forced conversion—on 
the basis of ethnic or religious identity—destroying religious 
sites and systematically expelling minority communities.  
Evidence shows a manifest pattern of violent acts directed 
against certain groups with the intent to curtail and control their 
presence within ISIS areas.50 
ISIS has systematically targeted Christian populations and churches.  
In September and October of 2013, ISIS fighters destroyed one Greek 
Catholic church, occupied an Armenian Orthodox church, and burnt down 
another Armenian church.51  As ISIS spreads, so does the destruction of 
Christian places of worship.52 
ISIS terrorists have publicly beheaded, shot, and stoned civilians, 
including women and children, mutilating and publicly displaying the 
bodies.53  This is often justified by “the practice of takfir, declaring 
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someone to be a heretic.”54  ISIS victimizes entire communities by forcing 
them to witness the executions.55  Following the executions, ISIS will 
display the corpses on crosses for days, or place heads on spikes, to 
intimidate local populaces.56 
Some of ISIS’s most disturbing crimes illustrate its complete lack of 
respect for children’s rights.  “Children have been the victims, perpetrators 
and witnesses of ISIS’s executions.”57  ISIS has beheaded and shot children 
“for alleged affiliation with other armed groups,” and has also forced 
children to execute others.58  Trauma is also inflicted on children through 
the psychological effects of public executions, either through forced 
attendance or by viewing the mutilated corpses in the coming days.59 
Inflicting terror on children is not an accidental byproduct of ISIS’s 
actions; rather, children are prioritized “as a vehicle for ensuring long-term 
loyalty, adherence to their ideology and a cadre of devoted fighters that will 
see violence as a way of life.”60  These actions are inhumane, shocking, and 
barbaric.  They are contrary to any rational understanding of what it means 
to be human.  In philosophical terms, these actions constitute extreme 
political evil. 
ISIS systematically destroys churches, monuments, and other 
important cultural buildings, without military importance, of any ethnic or 
religious group that opposes its ideology.61  Those actions, against protected 
objects, are international crimes and violations of international 
humanitarian law.62 
V. ISIS AND THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
Widespread murder, torture, rape, forced disappearance, sexual 
slavery, forcible displacement, sentencing and executions without due 
process of the law, forced pregnancy are some of ISIS’s international 
crimes.63  ISIS is consistently and systematically violating fundamental 
norms of international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law.  Those actions are international crimes.  International crimes are often 
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organized and implemented by government entities or by organizations that 
have political objectives, such as terrorist organizations.  Regarding the 
interconnectedness of diverse international crimes, Wayne McCormack 
writes:   
There are also fundamental links among terrorism, genocide, and 
slavery.  A great deal of collective violence is based on ethnic or 
cultural identity.  The crimes of genocide and crimes against 
humanity reflect not just an intolerance of widespread violence 
but a revulsion for treating people as less than human.64 
The different names used for international crimes help us understand 
why ISIS’s actions are crimes against humanity.  According to Professor 
Bassiouni, “[i]nternational crimes are also called ‘delicti jus gentium’ 
(crimes against humanity) . . . U.S. founders, often citing European scholars 
like Grotius, Vattel, Ayala, and Gentili, referred to them also as ‘crimes 
against mankind’ and crimes ‘against the whole world,’ and their 
perpetrators as ‘enemies of the whole human family.’”65 
The term “crimes against humanity” was first used by the framers of 
the Nuremburg Charter; it was selected by U.S. Supreme Court Justice, 
Robert Jackson, who was the chief U.S. prosecutor during the Nuremburg 
Trials.66  It was used then to describe the actions of extreme political evil 
perpetrated by the Nazi regime, including the systematic killings of 
innocent human beings solely because of their ethnic and religious identity.  
The crimes against the Jewish people were so extreme that they were 
considered not only to be crimes against the Jewish, but against all 
humankind.67 
In the same way, the actions of ISIS against Assyrian Christians and 
other groups—systematic torture and murder of innocent human beings, 
motivated solely because of ethnic and religious identity—are so extreme 
that they constitute crimes against all humanity.  This means, that these 
crimes are committed not only against the Assyrian people, but also against 
the American people, the French people, the Russian people, the Bolivian 
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people, the Nigerian people, and all other people of the world.  Regarding 
the characteristics of crimes against humanity, David Luban stated:   
[First], the phrase, “crimes against humanity,” suggests offenses 
that aggrieve not only the victims and their own communities, 
but all human beings, regardless of their community.  Second, the 
phrase suggests that these offenses cut deep, violating the core 
humanity that we all share and that distinguishes us from other 
natural beings.68 
Luban also states, that crimes against humanity “are so universally 
odious that they make the criminal hostis humani generis—an enemy of all 
humankind, like the pirate on the high seas under traditional international 
law.”69  Luban points to the Biblical account of Cain as an example of the 
concept of hostis humani generis, quoting God’s banishment of Cain in 
Genesis 4:  “The voice of thy brother’s blood crieth unto me from the 
ground.  And now art thou cursed from the earth, which hath opened her 
mouth to receive thy brother’s blood from thy hand . . . a fugitive and a 
vagabond shalt thou be in the earth.”70  Cain became “unfit for the society 
of anyone, and (within the moral limits of proportionality) anyone’s 
legitimate target”—an enemy of humanity.71 
The Charter of the international Military Tribunal for the Trial of Nazi 
War Criminals defines crimes against humanity as:   
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before 
or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds in execution of, or in connection with, any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.72 
Consistent with Professor David Luban’s view, there are five legal 
features of crimes against humanity:  crimes against humanity are 
committed against fellow nationals and foreign citizens; they are 
international crimes committed by politically organized groups; they consist 
of the most extreme acts of violence and persecution and they are inflicted 
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on victims because of their membership to a specific population.73  Each 
one of these distinctive features can be applied to ISIS’s crimes against 
Assyrian Christians. 
ISIS’s crimes are committed against both fellow nationals and against 
foreigners.  The “Islamic State of Syria and Iraq” acts against anyone that 
stands in the way of its goal to create a global caliphate.  ISIS has shown its 
capability to commit crimes around the world, in addition to its ground 
campaign in Iraq and Syria.74  Assyrian Christians are Iraqi and Syrian 
nationals, as are many ISIS members.  The crimes committed by ISIS are 
done against foreign and national citizens.  The crimes against the Assyrian 
people and other groups, who are under the political control of ISIS, are 
comparable to the Nazi regime crimes which included German and non-
German citizens.   
ISIS justifies its actions by applying its “legal” system, which is a 
version of Sharia law, in territories under its control.  Those norms include 
the justification of the killing of human beings who do not share ISIS’s 
view of Islam.75  It is obvious that, by any rational standard, ISIS’s “legal 
system” is unjust, irrational and a perversion of the meaning of law.  ISIS’s 
actions are crimes against humanity and its “legal system” cannot be used 
to justify its criminal behavior.76 
Traditionally, there was a ‘state action’ requirement for a crime to be 
considered a crime against humanity; that is, they “could be committed only 
by state actors, or by high—placed civilians embroiled with state actors.”77  
However, international law has changed in this area, and this requirement is 
not necessary anymore.  This has been seen in cases such as the actions of 
non-state actors, Serb militias, during the Bosnian War and the civilian 
groups who perpetrated a significant part of the Rwandan genocide.78 
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Today, the requirement of state action has transformed into a 
requirement of “organizational responsibility.”79  Professor Luban claims 
that, “the definition of crimes against humanity emphasizes the collective 
character of the perpetrator.”80  Crimes against humanity are characterized 
not by whether a state actor is involved, but rather by whether the 
perpetrator has decided to participate in a widespread and systematic attack.  
ISIS has made its political strategy, to systematically torture and kill 
Assyrian Christians.  These crimes have been committed while the 
organization claims to exert legitimate political power over the citizens of 
its conquered territory, and are justified by ISIS’s interpretation of Sharia 
law.81  Therefore, there is an organizational responsibility in the 
commission of the crimes. 
According to Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, there are two 
categories of crimes against humanity:  the first includes crimes such as 
“murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and ‘other inhumane 
acts,’” such as food deprivation, violating corpses, forced witnessing of 
atrocities against loved ones, and so on.82  Such crimes are considered 
within the realm of crimes against humanity because of the “sheer ugliness” 
inherent in their commission.83  The second category, or “crimes of the 
persecution type,” as Luban terms it, includes acts such as persecution 
based on racial, religious, political, or other grounds; this persecution can 
take various forms, including “deprivations of the rights to citizenship, to 
teach, to practice professions, to obtain education, and to marry freely; 
arrest and confinement; beatings, mutilation and torture; confiscation of 
property; deportation to ghettos; slave labor; and extermination.”84  
Therefore, there is no doubt that ISIS is committing crimes against 
humanity of the “murder” type and the “persecution” type.  As it was 
established in a previous section of this Article, ISIS’s crimes consist of the 
most extreme acts of violence and persecution. 
ISIS’s international crimes against Assyrian Christians are among the 
most repugnant in modern history.  ISIS has repeatedly raided, kidnapped, 
and murdered Assyrian Christians since it came to power, and it has 
committed other heinous acts such as destroying Assyrian homes and 
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churches, vandalizing and digging up Assyrian cemeteries, and forced 
displacement from cultural and historical lands.85 
ISIS’s crimes are committed against the Assyrian Christians and 
against other ethnic and religious minorities because of their ethnic and 
religious identities.  The victims are “getting attacked for being (rather than 
for doing).”86  This is a clear description of what ISIS is doing to Assyrian 
Christians.  The victims of ISIS’s crimes are not being singled out for their 
identities as individuals, but rather because they are identified as part of an 
ethnic and religious group.87  ISIS’s raids target villages with 
predominantly Christian populations, and ISIS’s bombings in Syria 
specifically target Christian neighborhoods, like the bombings of 
restaurants in Qamishli, Syria.88  
Crimes against humanity have two elements:  actus reus and mens 
rea.89  Regarding the first element, Professor Kriangsak Kittichaisaree 
writes:   
The actus reus of a crime against humanity . . . comprises 
commission of an attack that is inhumane in nature and character, 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body, or to mental, or 
physical health.  The inhumane act must be committed as part of 
a widespread or systematic attack against members of a civilian 
population.”90 
ISIS’s actions of systematic murder of ethnic and religious minority 
groups, persecution of anybody that opposes its religious ideas and others, 
are extreme inhumane actions which not only seek to exterminate 
Christians and other religious groups, but are aimed at causing unspeakable 
suffering to innocent human beings.  This is done as part of ISIS’s policy 
and it is implemented in systematic attacks against civilian populations.  
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For example, when ISIS captured Mosul in June of 2014, it issued an 
ultimatum to Assyrian Christians in the city:  convert to Islam, pay the jizya 
tax, or be murdered.91  As a result of this ultimatum, over ten thousand 
Assyrian Christians left the city within the month.92  ISIS has repeatedly 
raided Assyrian villages and kidnapped or murdered Christians and other 
minority groups.  Often, the terrorist insurgent organization has sold women 
and children in the human trafficking market.93  Senior UN official Zainab 
Bangura confirmed in August, 2015, that ISIS had released a “price list” for 
captured sex slaves.94 
Regarding the mens rea element of crimes against humanity, professor 
Antonio Cassesse writes:  “[a]s the ICTY Appeals Chamber held in Tadic 
(Appeal), the perpetrator needs to know that there is an attack on the 
civilian population and that these acts comprise part of the attack.”95  The 
perpetrator must have some mens rea, or subjective intent, for their crime to 
be considered a “crime against humanity.”  Regarding this subjective 
element, Cassesse writes:   
To sum up, the requisite subjective element or mens rea in crimes 
against humanity is not simply limited to the criminal intent (or 
recklessness) required for the underlying offence (murder, 
extermination, deportation, rape, torture, persecution, etc.).  The 
viciousness of these crimes goes far beyond the underlying 
offence, however wicked or despicable it may be.  This 
additional element—which helps to distinguish crimes against 
humanity from war crimes—consists of awareness of the broader 
context into which this crime fits, that is knowledge that the 
offences are part of a systematic policy or of widespread and 
large-scale abuses.96 
As it was seen before in this Article, ISIS’s religious totalitarian ideas 
have the specific intent, as a matter of policy and as part of a systematic 
plan, to exterminate those that do not agree with their version of Islam.  
Therefore, ISIS terrorists have knowledge that their actions are part of a 
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widespread and systematic effort to attack and destroy the Assyrian civilian 
population and other religious minority groups.  As part of ISIS’s strategy 
to implement its ideology, ISIS terrorists force Assyrian and other minority 
groups to choose between adopting its religious extremist worldview or 
death.97 
VI. ISIS, POLITICAL EVIL, AND THE DEHUMANIZATION OF THE OTHER 
Legal ideas and principles are reflections of specific theological and 
philosophical presuppositions.  To understand the nature of ISIS’s crimes 
against humanity and the normative response of the international 
community, it is necessary to have a philosophical consideration of the 
case. 
As rational human beings, who are concerned and attempt to make 
sense of the world in which we live, how can we understand the extreme 
violations against the human dignity of the Assyrian and other ethnic and 
religious groups in territories controlled by ISIS?  The word “evil” properly 
describes actions that can be characterized as crimes against humanity.  One 
of the most important analyses, in the history of Western philosophical and 
theological ideas, regarding the problem of evil was done by St. Augustine 
of Hippo. 
Charles T. Matthews describes Augustine’s perspective on evil in the 
following paragraph:   
[T]he Augustinian tradition interprets evil's challenge in terms of 
two distinct conceptual mechanisms, one ontological and the 
other anthropological.  Ontologically, in terms of the status of 
evil in the universe, it understands evil as nothing more than the 
privation of being and goodness—‘evil’ is not an existing thing at 
all, but rather the absence of existence, an ontological 
shortcoming.  Anthropologically, in terms of the effect of evil on 
a human being, it depicts human wickedness as rooted in the 
sinful perversion of the human's good nature—created in the 
imago Dei—into a distorted, mis-oriented, and false imitation of 
what the human should be.  Privation and perversion:  together, 
these capture the conceptual contours within which the tradition 
proposes its practical response to evil.98 
Although individual members of ISIS may irrationally believe that 
their religious totalitarian ideas are true and justify their crimes, their 
actions against innocent Assyrians and other people, of course, lack 
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goodness altogether.99  These actions constitute a “privation of being.”  The 
systematic murder and torture of innocent human beings is an ontological 
shortcoming.  The extreme wickedness of ISIS’s actions is a perversion of 
what human beings are supposed to be and do. 
Regarding the place of the rational will and the problem of evil in 
Augustine’s perspective, G. R. Evans writes:   
The only creature capable of acting against the good, and 
bringing about an evil happening, is a creature with a mind of its 
own.  Augustine located the source of evil . . . in the rational will, 
which is free to choose between good and evil. . . .  In De Natura 
et Gratia, he shows that the nature of man, too, was created 
faultless (sine ullo vitio), having all good things from God:  life, 
senses, mind.  The fault that darkened and weakened those 
natural goods did not come from the Creator but from the good 
free will he gave them (De Nat. et Grat. I. iii.3).  It is in this 
sense, that every evil event may be said to have a mind behind 
it.100 
The will of sovereign states and non-state actors, is an essential 
element to understand the problem of evil in international relations.  In 
exercising its free will, often sovereign states and non-state actors can and 
do choose to behave consistent with just normative standards which seek, 
among other things, to protect the humanity and dignity of other fellow 
human beings and of ethnic and religious groups which are different from 
one’s own. 
In other situations, sovereign states and non-state actors, such as ISIS, 
exercise their free will by murdering innocent persons, torturing and 
committing other crimes, which are contrary to what a human being should 
rationally do.  In the Augustinian tradition, those actions are considered 
actions of extreme evil.  When evil actions are done to accomplish political 
objectives, such as in the case of ISIS, those action are a form of extreme 
political evil.  Regarding Augustine’s analysis of will and reason, Evans 
writes:   
Evil cannot change directly the good natures God has made.  The 
alteration of those natures is possible . . . [i]t takes place in this 
way:  evil arises in the will of rational creatures and makes itself 
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felt by clouding their reason and making it impossible for them to 
think clearly or to see the truth.  They then act upon the world in 
such a way as to twist everything they touch out of its proper and 
good nature into something diminished or perverted—as far, that 
is, as God allows.  It is in the mind, then, and specifically in the 
will (which together with the memory and the understanding, 
makes up the mind) that we must look for signs of evil.101 
Applying this to ISIS’s crimes against the Assyrian people, it can be 
said that the reasoning of ISIS leaders is clouded by their inhumane 
ideology, which systematically dehumanizes people who disagree with their 
view of the world.  Regarding the relationship between crimes against 
humanity and the dehumanization of others, Professor Wayne McCormack 
said:   
There are also fundamental links among terrorism, genocide, and 
slavery.  A great deal of collective violence is based on ethnic or 
cultural identity.  The crimes of genocide and crimes against 
humanity reflect not just an intolerance of widespread violence, 
but a revulsion for treating people as less than human.102 
The dehumanization of others is one of the most important factors 
behind the actions of terrorist organizations.  ISIS systematically 
dehumanizes its victims, while simultaneously accusing them of attacks 
against ISIS’s version of the Islamic faith.103 
This distorted view of reality has influenced ISIS’s militants thinking.  
Their distorted reasoning has influenced their wills and this has led them to 
disregard fundamental natural human rights, such as:  the right to life, and 
the right to religious freedom.  This has led to an unjust use of violence 
against the Assyrian, and other ethnic and religious groups—which ISIS 
sees as apostates—and therefore, as less than human.  Because of this, 
thousands of innocent children, women, and men have been murdered by 
ISIS.  According to St. Augustine:   
there is no single cause of evil; rather, everyone who does evil is 
the cause of his own evildoing.  If you doubt this, recall what I 
said earlier:  [e]vil deeds are punished by the justice of God.  
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They would not be punished justly if they had not been 
performed voluntarily.104 
The cause of ISIS’s evil actions is found in its leaders’ and followers’ 
will.  Therefore, they can justly be punished for their actions of extreme 
political evil.  They are responsible for the use of their free will and its 
consequences.  St. Augustine further writes:   
[T]here are traits like the love of praise and fame, and the will to 
power.  When that drive is not subject to reason it makes us 
wretched, and no one considers himself superior to another 
because of his wretchedness.  When these impulses of the soul 
are ruled by reason, a human being is said to be ordered.  For we 
should not call it right order, or even order at all, when better 
things are subjected to worse. . . .  Therefore, when reason, mind, 
or spirit, controls the irrational impulses of the soul, a human 
being is ruled by the very thing that ought to rule according to the 
law that we have found to be eternal.105 
ISIS’s irrational desire to conquer people who disagree with their 
ideology, exterminate those that do not convert to their version of Islam, 
and establish a sovereign state where there is absolutely no respect for 
fundamental human rights, is against natural reason and conscience.  ISIS’s 
irrational ideas are seen in its view of “infidels,” in its view of other 
religions, and in its view of human nature. 
International legal instruments have a language that addresses political 
evil actions.  This language is mainly expressed in the fields of international 
criminal law, international human rights law, and international 
humanitarian law.  These areas of international law are expressions of the 
common will of humankind against actions of extreme political evil.  
Considering that widespread violations of fundamental human rights are 
crimes against humanity, analysis of the human rights discourse is 
especially relevant for this work. 
VII. THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECT FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
As the international community is witness to the widespread violations 
of international human rights’ norms by ISIS, it is essential to have a 
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normative language which properly addresses inhumane actions in the 21st 
century such as what Assyrian Christians are facing in the Middle East.106 
One of the most powerful answers to the irrationality of extreme 
political evil actions—such as those of ISIS against Assyrian Christians, is 
the recognition, by governments and individuals, of the inherent dignity of 
each human being and the importance of ensuring that a global culture of 
respect for universal human rights becomes a main foundation for the 
international normative and political systems. 
Regarding the importance of the human rights discourse, Professor 
Mark Amstutz writes:  “[m]uch of the discussion about ethics in 
international relations takes place in making use of the vocabulary of 
rights.”107  The language of international human rights is a powerful 
instrument to prevent and punish crimes against humanity such as the ones 
of ISIS. 
The words of the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) are very relevant for the case of ISIS.  It reads:   
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted 
in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of 
mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall 
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and 
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the 
common people. . . .108 
ISIS’s actions are an expression of a barbarian ideology which should 
outrage the collective conscience of humankind, and the individual 
conscience of each rational human being.  ISIS is violating the norms of all 
international human rights legal instruments, including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide. 
According to Professor Mary Ann Glendon, “[t]he United Nation's 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, is the single most 
important reference point for cross-cultural discussion of human freedom 
and dignity in the world today.”109  Considering that the norms of the 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights are recognized as part of customary 
international law, they serve as a compelling source to highlight ISIS’s 
violations of international human rights. 
Contrary to Article I of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which recognizes the fact that “all human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights,” ISIS denies the freedom and dignity of Assyrian and 
other minority groups.110  Against the norm of Article II of the UDHR, ISIS 
systematical discriminates others because of race, religion, gender and other 
reasons.111  ISIS also violates the customary international norm of Article 
III of the Declaration, which recognizes that everybody “has the right to 
life, liberty and security of person.”112 
In fact, ISIS’s actions against the Assyrian people violate every norm 
recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Considering the 
importance of this normative source in our current historical context, it is 
important to remember the specific norms that the international community 
has embraced and ISIS is constantly violating.  The Universal Declaration 
forbids slavery and the slave trade.113  It prohibits torture and any other 
form of cruel treatment of human beings.114  It recognizes the right to legal 
personality of all,115 and the principle of equal protection under the law.116  
It acknowledges the right to have effective legal remedies for human rights 
violations.117  It rejects any form of arbitrary arrest,118  and it recognizes the 
right “to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal.”119 
ISIS has violated, and continues to violate, fundamental human rights 
of the Assyrian and other religious and ethnic minority groups.  Among the 
rights that ISIS violates, are:  the presumption of innocence until proven 
guilty,120 and the right not to be subjected to arbitrary interference with 
“privacy, family, home or correspondence.”121  ISIS systematically denies 
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the right to freedom of movement and residence122 of Assyrian and other 
minority groups. 
ISIS violates the right of every person “to seek and to enjoy in other 
countries asylum from persecution.”123  It also denies “the right to a 
nationality;124 the right to marriage and family;125 and the right to 
property.”126  ISIS denies Assyrians and other religious and ethnic groups 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression,127 and the right to freedom 
of association.128 
There is no doubt, that the right to life is the most important human 
right, and ISIS is systematically violating that norm.  Although compared to 
the right to life, the right to religious freedom may not seem as 
fundamental; in the context of ISIS’s violations of human rights of 
Assyrians and other religious minority groups, that right is very important. 
The right to religious freedom is of particular significance because one 
of the fundamental ideas of ISIS’s religious totalitarian worldview, is the 
opposition to the concept of religious liberty.  Because of this, religious 
minority groups such as Assyrian Christians, have become the main targets 
of the terrorist organization.  Considering this fact, it is necessary to 
highlight the importance of respect for religious freedom as part of the 
answer against ISIS’s ideology and criminal conduct.   
Professor Robert George, former Chair of the United States 
Commission on International Religious Freedom, defines religious freedom 
as:   
The right to ponder life’s origins, meaning and purpose; to 
explore the deepest questions about human nature, dignity, and 
destiny; to decide what is to be believed and not to be believed; 
and, within the limits of justice for all, to comply with what one 
conscientiously judges to be one’s religious obligations—openly, 
peacefully, and without fear.129 
Contrary to ISIS’s worldview, the international community has 
acknowledged the importance of legally protecting the right of each human 
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being to decide what to believe in.  International religious freedom, is a 
fundamental legal norm which serves to create the conditions for the 
peaceful coexistence of diverse groups.  Assyrian Christians and other 
religious minority groups in ISIS’s controlled territories have the right to 
religious freedom.  ISIS is violating Article XVIII of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Right which states:   
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and 
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, 
practice, worship and observance.130 
ISIS is violating fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter 
which indicates that the purposes of that international organization are the 
promotion and encouragement of “respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion.”131  ISIS is violating the norms of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, which recognizes that every human being has the 
right to religious freedom, which includes the freedom to express religious 
views.132 
ISIS is violating the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief, 
which was adopted in 1981.  The United Nations Declaration recognizes 
that the right to religious freedom includes, among others, the freedom to 
worship, the right to write and publish religious literature, and to teach from 
a religious perspective.133 
VIII.  THE UNITY OF HUMANKIND AGAINST ISIS’S INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMES 
ISIS’s actions, against the Assyrian and other religious minority 
groups, are crimes against humanity.  Therefore, the involvement of only 
some countries, such as France, the United States, Iran, and Russia is not 
enough.  It is true, that certain countries have the military power to stop 
ISIS’s actions; however, from a legal perspective, all countries, both 
developed and developing members of the international community, can 
and should ensure that crimes against humanity, such as the ones committed 
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by ISIS, are stopped and leaders responsible for the crimes are punished 
individually. 
To accomplish this objective, the concept of universal jurisdiction is 
especially relevant.  This type of jurisdiction means that all countries of the 
world can prosecute and punish ISIS’s individuals who are murdering, 
torturing, and raping innocent Assyrians.  According to Professor Paust, 
Universal enforcement has been recognized over ‘crimes against 
mankind,’ crimes ‘against the whole world’ and the ‘enemies of 
the whole human family,’ or those persons who become hostes 
humani generis by the commission of international crimes. . . .  
These crimes also involve obligations erga omnes, which are 
owing not merely to certain states and their nationals, but to all of 
humankind.134 
David Luban describes this type of jurisdiction as “vigilante 
jurisdiction,” which “carries the implication that criminals against humanity 
are anyone’s fair target.”135  Any nation can take official legal actions 
against the perpetrators of crimes against humanity; therefore, all nations 
have the ability to respond to the crimes perpetrated by ISIS against the 
Assyrian Christians.136 
Besides the application of the concept of individual responsibility and 
universal jurisdiction to prosecute and punish ISIS individuals, it is 
essential that the international community, through international 
organizations and each individual country, act to end ISIS’s crimes against 
humanity. 
There have been some efforts to accomplish that objective.  For 
example, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2178 
directly in response to the threat of ISIS.  The resolution “condemns the 
violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, sectarian violence, 
and the commission of terrorist acts by foreign terrorist fighters,” and calls 
member states to cooperate in the efforts to prevent radicalization and 
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recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters.137  Another example is Secretary 
General Nabil Al-Arabi of the Arab League’s statement, stating:  “[w]hat is 
happening in Iraq, is that the terrorist organization not only threatens a 
state’s authority, but threatens its very existence and the existence of other 
states.”138 
Many countries have expressed their views through high ranking 
officials.  For example, regarding ISIS’s crimes, Australian Prime Minister, 
Tony Abbot, said, “Australia cannot leave the Iraqi people to face this 
horror, this pure evil alone, or ask others to do so in the name of human 
decency, what we won’t do ourselves.  It is right to do what we prudently 
and proportionately can, to alleviate this suffering, to prevent its spread and 
to deal with its perpetrators.”139  Khaled Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, the 
Bahraini Foreign Affairs Minister, indicated that “[t]his situation requires 
immediate response from the international community in order to unify 
ranks, beleaguer and terminate all terrorist groups.”140 
German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, said:  “We have seen acts of 
unbelievable brutality . . . can we really wait and hope that somebody else 
will see it as his or her responsibility? . . .  Now, we have the chance to help 
save lives and prevent any further mass murder in Iraq, and we must use 
this chance.”141  King Abdullah II of Jordan said:   
Those who say, this “is not our business” are wrong.  The 
security of every nation will be shaped by the fate of the Middle 
East. . . .  The terrorists and criminals targeting Syria, Iraq, and 
other countries today are extreme reflections of a global threat.  
Our international community needs a collective strategy to 
contain and defeat these groups.142 
United Kingdom’s former Prime Minister, David Cameron, said, “[w]e 
must use all the instruments at our disposal, humanitarian, diplomatic and 
military, to squeeze this barbaric terrorist organization out of existence.143  
Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, said, “Japan regards the activities of 
                                                          
137. S.C.Res. 2178 ¶¶ 22–25 (Sept. 24 2014). 
138. Agence France—Presse, Islamic State Must Be Confronted ‘Militarily and Politically’ - 
Arab League Chief, GMA NETWORK, (Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/ 
378152/news/world/islamic-state-must-be-confronted-militarily-and-politically-arab-league-chief. 
139. Selected Leader Statements About International Efforts to Counter ISIL and Support the 
People of Iraq and Syria, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/seci/c64518.htm (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2016). 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
2016] Mantilla 103 
 
 
ISIL, which extends across national borders and has declared unilaterally 
the establishment of a so—called ‘state,’ to be a serious threat to 
international order.  What is important now is preventing extremism from 
taking root while also responding swiftly to the region's humanitarian 
crises.”144 
Prime Minister Haile Mariam of Ethiopia said, “ISIS’s utmost 
savagery is a satanic act that has no religious basis and that needs to be 
condemned by all people across the globe . . . the people of Ethiopia, 
irrespective of their religious, ethnic, socio-economic and political 
differences, should stand in unison to fight extremism and terrorism.”145 
The Panamanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned ISIS’s 
actions as violations of human rights, intended to “spread panic, grief, and 
pain among the peoples of the international community,” and vowed “to 
combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and acts of 
indiscriminate violence arising from religious, cultural, and ethnic 
intolerance.”146 
Countries such as Germany, France, and Spain have assisted in the 
fight against ISIS by providing military and counter-terrorism training, 
while other countries such as Albania, Hungary, Estonia, Greece, New 
Zealand, and the Czech Republic have pledged support in the form of 
weapons, ammunition, or military personnel.  Several nearby Middle 
Eastern countries have also pledged their support against ISIS, including 
Lebanon, Algeria, Afghanistan, Morocco, Kuwait, and others.147 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In the current historical context, in which the international community 
is witnessing extreme atrocities committed by ISIS against Assyrian and 
other ethnic and religious minority groups, it is difficult to make sense of 
what human beings are capable of doing, and propose normative responses 
to end acts of extreme wickedness. One of ISIS’s main ideological and 
legal foundations, to justify its crimes against humanity, is the 
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presupposition that they have a religious duty to impose their worldview by 
using all means.  This includes the systematic killing of those that oppose 
their ideology such as the Assyrian people.   
An integrative jurisprudential analysis, which considers the historical 
facts, provides philosophical reflections and applies universal legal norms 
to the case, can contribute to understanding the reason for ISIS’s actions 
and creates a persuasive discourse in the struggle to end crimes against 
humanity. 
The Augustinian perspective, on the problem of evil, enables one to 
understand ISIS’s crimes against humanity as acts of extreme political evil. 
ISIS’s ideology provides an irrational justification for international crimes 
against the Assyrian people. Those actions dehumanize Assyrians and 
anybody that opposes ISIS’s religious totalitarian ideas. This leads to 
widespread violations of human rights which amount to crimes against 
humanity. 
ISIS’s extreme form of religious totalitarianism is contrary to the 
consensus of the international community that has recognized the existence 
of fundamental human rights, including the right to life and the right to 
religious freedom, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
international legal instruments. The Declaration exists as a result of the 
historical agreement, of the international community, to codify norms for 
the protection of fundamental inherent natural human rights and human 
dignity. Like, the actions of the Nazis against the Jewish community, ISIS’s 
extreme political evil behavior requires a compelling normative response to 
ensure that the crimes against the Assyrian people and other groups are 
stopped and punished.  
Considering the nature of ISIS’s actions, they are crimes against the 
entire human race. Because of this, a global response to ISIS’s violations of 
international law is essential. This approach should engage most members 
of the international community, not only powerful countries.  In this 
decisive moment in the history of humankind, the international community 
needs to look back to the ideas which provided the foundation for the 
recognition of the existence of universal inalienable human rights.  This 
will contribute to prevent and punish acts of extreme political evil. This is a 
compelling and just normative response to ISIS’s religious totalitarian ideas 
and to their crimes against humanity. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the divide between law and justice, individuals often propend for 
justice and find law.  When it comes to international law, individuals might 
not even find any law, let alone the sacred ideal of justice.  Neither was 
international law originally conceived for directly applying to individuals, 
nor was any court purposefully created for adjudicating their claims.1  Yet, 
this major gap is prominently perceived when industrial installations and 
environmental degradation either affect or threaten to affect individuals’ 
life.  What is the role of international law in adjudicating environment-
related claims which are put forward by individuals or non-state parties? 
The insight to understand how international law and domestic law are 
intertwined is not a novel one.  Nor is the factual and normative assumption 
that individuals are sometimes able to invoke international law norms 
specifically in domestic courts rather than in international settings.  
Nevertheless, attempts to understand whether international law is apt to 
offer a repository of underused assets for advancing the “sacred” idea of 
justice in a specific case, before the case appears in court, might be an 
interesting one.  Not only would domestic courts provide a more proximate 
and familiar environment for individuals than international settings, but 
they would also be better placed to mandate scientific assessments and 
issue enforceable reliefs.  Yet, international law is not always easy to adapt 
neither to domestic courts nor to specific legal claims. 
Kivalina, a community in Northwest Alaska, has recently encountered 
many setbacks in the courts of the United States, in what one may 
characterize as a long and bitter environmental confrontation with major 
corporations, both in terms of climate change litigation and on account of 
water degradation due to the operation of the Red Dog Mine, one of the 
largest mines worldwide. 
In this paper, I will attempt to address Kivalina’s water issues that still 
appear outstanding and not addressed after long years of purely domestic 
litigation in the courts of the United States.  This article will proceed as 
follows.  Part II.A will address the reasons why it is advisable that 
international law be implemented, among other means, within domestic 
courts.  Parts II.B and II.C hinge on the different approaches U.S. courts 
have applied toward international law and how international law can play 
out in future environmental claims.  I will then consider the factual matters 
and case posture of Kivalina claims under Part III.A, with specific reference 
to the shortcomings of domestic litigation and the outstanding claims 
related to the pollution of water under Part III.B.  Under Part III.C, I will 
identify which water claims should still be addressed, and how this can be 
                                                     
1. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 142–44, 376–77 (2nd ed., Oxford University 
Press 2005). 
2016] Colombo 107 
 
done by looking at the United Nations’ Law of the Sea Convention (LOS 
Convention) in order to test the following hypothesis:  would Kivalina 
residents be able to invoke specific provisions of the LOS Convention in 
order to have their claims better addressed in courts of the United States?  
In the affirmative, what techniques could be deployed, in light of past and 
present approaches of U.S. courts, and specifically the U.S. Supreme Court, 
vis-à-vis international law?  I conclude by arguing that Kivalina residents 
are able to advance water-related claims by relying on the interpretation of 
domestic statutes consistent with the LOS Convention.  Most specifically, I 
will hold that both common law and statutory remedies can be triggered 
effectively by relying on the customary character of some of the 
environmental provisions contained in the LOS Convention, as summarized 
in Part IV. 
The foregoing hypothetical is based on a number of assumptions and 
limitations.  I am assuming that Kivalina residents are/will be willing to 
engage in litigation, rather than Alternative Dispute Resolution.  Moreover, 
I am specifically considering the available information in public domain 
documents, yet the factual characterization of the case is necessarily more 
complex.  Furthermore, notwithstanding the host of issues that might be 
addressed, I am going to tailor down this account to solely water issues, 
which will not be assessed through multiple sources of international law, 
but solely by hinging on the LOS Convention.2  Most fundamentally, I am 
going to select exclusively some provisions under the LOS Convention that 
may be applicable.  The chosen wording for addressing the difference 
between U.S. states and States at international law rests on qualifying U.S. 
states as states and states at international law as States. 
II.  THE MIXED FUEL OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The implementation of international law is not a given.  All the more 
so, the implementation of international law in domestic courts is 
specifically challenging due to the host of rules and approaches on how to 
domesticate internationally binding law within domestic legal orders. 
In order to prepare the groundwork for a prospective application of 
international law to the Kivalina case, I will evaluate whether and why a 
given legal order should aim as much as possible at a mixed fuel, namely a 
combination of domestic and international law to be applied by judges for 
the resolution of controversies, especially in environmental matters.  I will 
then sketch the historical trajectory along which U.S. courts have variedly 
applied international law.  The ultimate aim is to appraise the likelihood for 
U.S. courts to make any use of international law in environmental cases, in 
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light of the most recent judgments.  I will conclude by arguing that U.S. 
courts are not as unfriendly to international law as some scholarship has 
depicted them, however, a vein of self-restraint specifically emerges when 
environmental claims are advanced through the Alien Tort Claims Act. 
A.  Do We Actually Need a Mixed Fuel? 
If we look at the law as a fuel for development and prosperity, the 
preservation of the environment and cohesive communities, it would not be 
hard to understand that there is still a long way for environmental laws to 
achieve the most effective fuel composition.  Almost in every country, 
environmental laws are in place, but their enforcement is extremely difficult 
as some instances may exemplify.  In South Africa, a middle-income 
country, transition to democracy has made way for environmental policies 
and legislation, but domestic agencies have faltered to enforce 
environmental law.3  Conversely, in such a developed country as the United 
States, notwithstanding innovative policies,4 enforcement is still critical, 
and a survey has shown that two-thirds of U.S. corporate counsels admitted 
that their companies had recently violated environmental laws.5 
If the law enforcement apparatus is not effective and responsive to 
societal concerns on environmental depletion, individuals usually turn to 
domestic courts.  But what happens if domestic law is not protective 
enough?  If domestic law is narrowly characterized, i.e. as a body of 
normative rules that are domestically produced, individuals might not be 
able to find any effective judicial remedy and courts will not play their 
established role in the dynamics of checks and balances. 
I believe, however, that domestic law can be effectively supplemented 
by an additional ingredient to the fuel of prosperity, environmental 
protection and cohesiveness, namely international law.  This would result 
from either application or interpretation.  By way of application, domestic 
courts are incrementally able and prone to apply international law even 
when the latter has not been fully implemented internally, at either the 
legislative or executive level (direct application).6  By way of 
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interpretation, national courts are often able, and sometimes specifically 
required, to construe and apply national law in such a manner that any 
conflict with international rules is prevented (consistent interpretation or 
the Charming Betsy canon).7  More generally, the types of international 
obligations that I will look after in this paper are ‘inward-looking 
obligations,’ namely obligations undertaken by the specific State in the 
capacity of international actor, in relation to its conduct within its domestic 
jurisdiction rather than with other States on the international plane.8 
This emerging practice, which has been characterized by Lord 
Bingham as almost unimaginable in the past,9 is progressively leading to a 
new branch of international law dubbed comparative international law.10  
Techniques of implementation differ widely and bring about a variety of 
results according to each domestic system,11 yet the domestication of 
international law is not contingent to specific domestic cases, but also 
contributes to the development and enforcement of international law more 
broadly.12  In fact, the implementation of specific international law norms at 
domestic level signals and strengthens their legitimacy, allowing for their 
overall enforcement according to Thomas Franck’s theory of compliance; 
what is more, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has consistently 
portrayed domestic courts’ decisions as reflective of international 
customary law, and the implementation of specific international law norms 
would ease out and fasten the identification of customary rules.13 
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LAW 155–68 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., Hart Publ’g 2011); see THE ROLE OF THE 
DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1–60 (David Sloss ed., 
Cambridge U. Press 2009) [hereinafter STUDY]; see also David Sloss, Treaty Enforcement in Domestic 
Courts:  A Comparative Analysis, in THE ROLE OF THE DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT:  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1–60 (David Sloss ed., Cambridge U. Press 2009) [hereinafter Analysis]. 
9. Lord Bingham, Foreword to SHAHEED FATIMA, USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC COURTS, at xi (Hart Publ'g 2005). 
10. Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law?  The Role of the National Courts in 
Creating and Enforcing International Law, 60 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 57, 60 (2011). 
11. CASSESE, supra note 1, at 224. 
12. Roberts, supra note 10, at 58. 
13. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (Oxford University 
Press 1990); see Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 
110 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 23: 1 
 
Nonetheless, international law is no panacea to the shortcomings of 
domestic environmental law.  As a “global environmental crisis”14 is 
unfolding, international environmental conventions and soft law are at their 
apex, yet enforcement often lacks teeth15 and even domestic measures are 
sometimes “exported,” making for their (extraterritorial) application in 
place of the feeble and fragile specter of international law.16  Yet, exporting 
domestic legislation—albeit highly protective—is a byword for diplomatic 
hostility and non-coordinated, therefore inefficient, implementation of 
common legal rules and principles.  For this reason, I am herein 
propounding the vision of a mixed fuel scenario of domestic law and 
international law as intertwined tools for incrementally addressing 
environmental issues that local communities in general, and the Kivalina 
community in particular, are faced with. 
B.  The Mixed Fuel in U.S. Courts:  An Overview from the Bench 
In order to understand whether the mixed fuel of international and 
domestic law might work in the case of Kivalina, which should be 
advanced in U.S. courts, I will here overview the historical posture of U.S. 
courts vis-à-vis international law, with no intent to provide an exhaustive 
line of cases. 
Notwithstanding the fairly clear interplay between international and 
national law under the monistic and dualistic doctrines,17 the enforcement 
of international law in U.S. courts has been characterized as one of “the 
‘most confounding’ in the United States law of treaties.”18  Within the 
perspective of the present contribution, it is safe to contend that the 
confusion is not limited to the United States’ law of treaties, but also vastly 
affects the status of international law in U.S. courts, as well as the tools that 
are available for individuals to vindicate their rights in court.  When and 
how do treaties create judicially enforceable individual rights in U.S. 
courts? 
                                                                                                                           
Rep. 3, ¶¶ 56–58 (Feb. 14); Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy:  The Strategic Uses of Foreign 
and International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 241, 248 (2008). 
14. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 269 
(University Casebook Series, 5th ed., Foundation Press 2015). 
15. Id. at 367; see some notable exceptions to this assertion id. at 404, 405. 
16. Id. at 1455. 
17. CASSESE, supra note 1, at 213; John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal 
Systems:  A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 311 (1992). 
18. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 
695, 695 (1995) (quoting United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979)); David Sloss, Self-
Executing Treaties and Domestic Judicial Remedies 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 346, 509 (2004) 
[hereinafter Remedies]. 
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The choice of U.S. courts for my hypothesis on the Kivalina case is 
mainly due to three reasons.  Firstly, Kivalina is located in Northwest 
Alaska, namely the 49th State of the Union, so that any remedy to be 
devised for Kivalina at the domestic level will be set in a U.S. court.19  
Secondly, U.S. judges appear to be a good example of a disinterested third 
party able to determine the merits of even complex disputes, which is the 
assumption of any enforcement of international law in domestic courts.20  
Moreover, the case-law trajectory on the interaction between U.S. and 
international law epitomizes some of the most fundamental challenges that 
a national judiciary faces when approaching international law. 
U.S. courts are presently not regarded as particularly international law-
friendly.21  Yet, it strikes to note that in 1972, Justice Powell characterized 
domestic courts as the “the best means for the development of a respected 
body of international law ‘[u]ntil international tribunals command a wider 
constituency.’”22 
The very origins of the United States as a country rest with 
international law.  The Federalist Papers extensively mentioned the role of 
the law of nations in U.S. courts, and the Constitution bestowed the judicial 
power of the United States not only to cases arising under the Constitution 
and the laws of the United States, but also to cases arising under treaties, 
and specific controversies of an international kind.23  According to the 
majestic expression of the U.S. Constitution, “all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land,” which judges are bound to enforce “any Thing 
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”24  
For this reason, U.S. courts and legislators initially viewed customary 
international law and treaty obligations as part of domestic law.25  
Indeed, the Supreme Court took the constitutional wording very 
seriously, as illustrated in Ware v. Hylton, where it held that a treaty 
                                                     
19. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012). 
20. Tzanakopoulos, supra note 8, at 157. 
21. Koh, supra note 6, at 2356–58; Benvenisti, supra note 13, at 248 (sometimes, courts 
cannot be international-law friendly on account of statutes prohibiting any reference to so-called foreign 
law); Tzanakopoulos, supra note 8, at 166 (citing Oklahoma’s constitutional amendments to prohibit 
State courts to consider Sharia law or international law or indeed “the legal precepts of other nations or 
cultures.”  The Amendment passed by referendum in 2011). 
22. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775 (1972). 
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Koh, supra note 6, at 2352 (citing the internationalist approach 
enlivened in the Federalist Papers). 
24. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Remedies, supra note 18, at 508. 
25. Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty:  A Century of Chinese 
Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 868 (1987). 
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overrules all State laws upon the subject.26  Until 1860, the Supreme Court 
gave no deference to the executive branch’s interpretation of treaties,27 but 
it rather vigorously enforced international law to the detriment of statutes, 
and more sparsely interpreted the Constitution itself in light of international 
treaties.28 
An abrupt change occurred in mid-nineteenth century, when the 
Supreme Court started denying treaties’ status of federal law,29 under the 
comity exception, the separation-of-powers and related political question 
doctrine, as well as the judicial incompetence exception.30 
Firstly, under the comity exception, which was further asserted 
through the act of state doctrine, the Supreme Justices decided not to 
adjudicate on “the acts of the government of another,”31 for sake of a 
‘comity’ exception,32 further declaring that no federal common law could 
govern the case “except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or 
by acts of Congress.”33 
Secondly, the separation-of-powers exception revolved around the 
separation-of-powers disclaimer, by which the Supreme Court inaugurated 
a phase of deference to the President of the United States,34 and more 
generally to the executive power of states.  Self-restraint was no more 
                                                     
26. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796); David Sloss et al., International Law in the Supreme 
Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 13 
(Cambridge U. Press 2011) [hereinafter Supreme Court]. 
27. Supreme Court, supra note 26, at 17. 
28. Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (2006); 
Supreme Court, supra note 26, at 41 (where the international law-bound interpretation of the 
Constitution is deemed more opportunistic than with statutes). 
29. Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1861–1900  INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
THE US SUPREME COURT CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 55–59, 60, 61–88 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 
Cambridge U. Press 2011). 
30. Koh, supra note 6, at 2357. 
31. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (noting that "every sovereign State is 
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State"); see Oetjen v. Central Leather Co, 
246 U.S. 297, 303–04 (1918) (act of State doctrine “rests at last upon the highest considerations of 
international comity and expediency"); see also Ricaud v. American Metal Co, 246 U.S. 304 (1918); 
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
32. Koh, supra note 6, at 2357. 
33. Erie R Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (a case of diversity jurisdiction on civil 
liability overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)). 
34. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (holding that “the 
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations—a power 
which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every 
other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the 
Constitution.”). 
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applied in light of mere comity to other countries, but was rather entrenched 
in the U.S. separation of powers system, by which any question entailing 
determinations on the legality of foreign states’ acts was tantamount to a 
political question,35 which appertain to the political branch’s prerogatives.  
It is no coincidence that such shift happened quite lately, and precisely in 
the 1930s and 40s,36 when alliances were sought and wars waged.37 
Thirdly, the Supreme Court branched out the separation-of-powers 
doctrine into a new exception, namely the judicial incompetence exception, 
by which “the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is 
political, not judicial,”38 thus banning not only findings of fact in 
international cases, but also the very activity of interpretation regarding 
international law and foreign affairs law.39 
Besides the three exceptions, more interpretive hurdles were set forth 
by the courts.  It might have very well been that the wave of human rights 
treaties, which swept and reshaped international law after the Second World 
War, increasingly put pressure on the U.S. judiciary, and prompted federal 
and state courts to hammer out a more defined doctrine of non-self-
executing treaties, which must be domesticated into national law by a 
statute to become the “Law of the Land.”40  The judge-made distinction 
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties kept percolating in 
the case law as long as the Cold War era ensued, and the need for protecting 
U.S. governmental actions might have been one of the reasons for 
upholding such a theory.41 
A new trend favoring international law was impressed back again in 
such decisions as Mendoza-Martinez and Afroyim on denaturalization laws, 
                                                     
35. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
36. See generally United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
37. See generally Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 311. 
38. Chicago & S Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Co., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). 
39. Koh, supra note 6, at 2358. 
40. See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718 (1952); Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252 
(D.C. Cir. 1960) (individual may not invoke the UN Charter to enjoin detonation of test nuclear 
weapons in Marshall Islands); Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1959) (alien may not resist 
deportation on ground that U.N. Charter superseded racist provisions of immigration laws); See 
Remedies, supra note 18, at 20.  But see Hollis, supra note 29, at 76; Lori Fisler Damrosch, Medellin 
and Sanchez-Llamas:  Treaties from John Hay to John Roberts INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 460 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2011) (according to some commentators, the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties was first shaped in 
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829)) (the distinction Foster drew between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties, did not prove a hurdle in the judicial enforcement of treaties.  The most extensive 
discussion of the issue case in a dissent by Justice Field in Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887)). 
41. Koh, supra note 6, at 2362; Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 398 (which also dates 
back to the Cold War era and is a landmark decision on the act of state doctrine). 
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which the Court struck down by relying on the Law of Nations.42  The 
Eighth Amendment also prominently became a fertile ground for citing 
foreign and international sources.43  With Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,44 a 
branch of transnational public law litigation seemed to parallel the 
achievements of domestic public law litigation45 in Federal courts under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA or ATS, Alien Tort Statute).46 
In Sosa the Supreme Court explained at length the “transnationalist” 
approach historically applied in such decisions as Paquete Habana47 and 
Nereide,48 but refrained from adjudicating ATS claims for violations of 
“any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance 
among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar” when the 
ATCA was enacted,49 and therefore “specific, universal, and obligatory.”50  
The ATS-kind of law of nations, however, was understood as encompassing 
even present-day norms of international law.51 
The understanding of Sosa is still debated,52 yet it has been argued that 
it bestows jurisdiction on Federal courts to decide on customary 
international law status if no express interpretation is offered by the 
political branches, which is a fairly balanced solution since judges are still 
often perceived as unelected actors.53 
Yet, the rise of transnational public law litigation was apparently 
quelled in recent cases, such as Breard,54 Sanchez-Llamas,55 and Medellin 
                                                     
42. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161 
(1963) (citing the EMER DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS (1758) and HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF 
TOTALITARIANISM (2007)). 
43. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
44. See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 442 U.S. 901 (1979). 
45. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281 (1976). 
46. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
47. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 714 (1890). 
48. The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 423 (1815). 
49. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 U.S. 2739, 2766 (2004). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 2761–62; see U.S. v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (2010). 
52. John O. McGinnis, Sosa and the Derivation of Customary International Law 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT:  CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 481–93 (David L. Sloss et 
al. eds., Cambridge U. Press 2011). 
53. Id. at 484. 
54. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); see Damrosch, supra note 40, at 458. 
55. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 U.S. 2669, 2679 (2006) (concerning the police not 
informing a person under arrest or detention that he/she could request his/her own Consulate to be 
notified of his/her detention). 
2016] Colombo 115 
 
II.56  The latter decision is widely known for having further extended the 
wall of separation between domestic law and international law by excluding 
the automatic enforcement—absent implementing legislation—of ICJ 
decisions when provisions at issue are not self-executing, in this case 
Article 94 of the U.N. Charter.57 
The legacy of this new line of decisions, and specifically of Medellin, 
is a seeming presumption of non-self-execution of international law 
norms,58 however enforcing environmental treaties and customary norms 
requires a separate analysis, to which I will now turn.59 
C.  The Enforcement of Environmental Treaties and Customary 
International Law 
With respect to environmental agreements, almost twenty years ago 
they were considered non-self-executing60 more often than not.  In a notable 
case, involving the enforcement of international whaling quotas, the 
Supreme Court seemed to set aside the political question doctrine61 by 
maintaining that, “under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s 
characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this 
responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political 
overtones.”62  In some other instances, courts have not found provisions 
specific enough to warrant their application,63 or applicable to non-state 
parties.64 
More generally, with concern to international agreements, U.S. courts 
apply two different approaches that have been labeled as the nationalist 
approach and the transnationalist approach.65  Under the nationalist 
                                                     
56. Medellin v. Texas, 522 U.S. 491 (2008). 
57. U.N. Charter art. 94. 
58. Crootof, supra note 7, at 1787. 
59. Damrosch, supra note 40, at 453. 
60. Daniel Bodansky & Jutta Brunnée, The Role of National Courts in the Field of 
International Environmental Law, 7 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 11, 113, 129 (1998). 
61. See Baker, 369 U.S. 186. 
62. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (at the end of 
the decision, the Court cited Moby Dick by Melville). 
63. Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (1991). 
64. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Defenders of Wildlife 
Inc. v. Endangered Species Scientific Authority, 725 F.2d 726, 726 (1984) (the Court merely referred to 
Article VI (2) of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna 
(CITES) and then struck down administrative guidelines as incompatible with it); see CATHRIN 
ZENGERLING, GREENING INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 57, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013). 
65. Remedies, supra note 18, at 504. 
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approach, courts deploy an array of interpretive tools as agents of the 
domestic legal system only, while under the transnationalist approach 
courts act as agents of both the domestic and international legal system, in a 
sort of double role.66  Quite understandably, outcomes vary according to the 
specific approach that courts discretionarily apply.  Most notably, the 
transnationalist approach is shown as the most favorable approach for the 
advancement of international law in U.S. courts.67 
According to recent empirical research on the subject, the 
transnationalist conceptual framework is applied more often than the 
nationalist approach when private parties are adverse to each other, rather 
than to the government.68 
When it comes to customary law, customs in environmental matters 
have not been often invoked in court, however such a litigation strategy has 
been attempted in some instances by hinging on the Alien Tort Claims 
Act.69  In a specific case of alleged pollution of the rain forests and rivers in 
Ecuador and Peru, a Federal court implied that a corporation could be liable 
to indigenous people for breaches of international environmental law,70 but 
later dismissed the claim on the forum non conveniens ground.71 
Still, a recent attempt to have human rights law directly applied as 
customary law in domestic courts brought about the landmark Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. lawsuit,72 characterizing ATCA as 
presumptively against extraterritorial application in the absence of an 
express declaration of extraterritoriality on the part of Congress, according 
to the political question theory.73  Secondly, it maintained that ATCA can 
be invoked only in “causes of action based on sufficiently definite norms of 
international law,” namely norms that are “specific, universal, and 
obligatory.”74 
Not only is Kiobel relevant for environmental litigation, but it also 
encapsulates the Supreme Court’s most recent attitude toward ATS 
                                                     
66. Id. at 522; GEORGES SCELLE, PRÉCIS DE DROIT DES GENS:  PRINCIPLES ET 
SYSTÉMATIQUE pt. 2, at 10–12 (1934). 
67. See Remedies, supra note 18, at 509. 
68. Id. at 532 (according to a recent empirical research, in cases where private parties are 
adverse to each other, U.S. courts are more likely to apply transnationalist tools than nationalist tools, 
whilst in government-party cases U.S. courts are more likely to apply nationalist tools than nationalist 
tools). 
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1350; see HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14 at 1380–90. 
70. Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470 (2nd Cir. 2002). 
71. See Change of Venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012). 
72. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659 (2013). 
73. Id. at 1668; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001). 
74. Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1664–65; Sosa,124 U.S. at 2766. 
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litigation, which is all the more restrictive in light of the political question, 
separation of powers and act of state theory.75 
All in all, such a framework concerning the aptitude of U.S. courts to 
either apply or interpret international law will be especially useful as soon 
as it is applied to the specific facts of the Kivalina case, which will now be 
considered. 
III.  THE KIVALINA CASE 
In this section, I will illustrate the most relevant environmental 
impacts that the Red Dog Mine is alleged to have caused on the Kivalina 
community and the surrounding environment. 
The Red Dog Mine is the United States’ largest mining polluter, 
whose activities have been often countered by the nearby Kivalina 
community.  Three issues have principally arisen from its operation:  the 
effects of wind-blown ore dust and traffic air pollutants; the disruption of 
animal migration; and the unlawful discharge of pollutants in riverine 
waters as well as at the port site. 
For the purposes of the present paper, I will tailor down the scope of 
the research to water-related issues. 
With reference to water protection from the operation of the mine, 
Kivalina individuals currently perceive that many issues are still 
outstanding, in spite of the long-battled lawsuits.  Such a recount attempts 
to make way for the application of my initial hypothesis stating the need for 
a mixed fuel of domestic and international law in the case of Kivalina.  
Most notably, I argue that water-related issues that have not been addressed 
at domestic level could receive a more effective response through the 
intertwinement of domestic law and international law. 
A.  Factual and Procedural Recount 
The Red Dog Mine is a lead and zinc mine, and the most heavily 
polluting facility in the United States,76 which was excavated and mined out 
by Teck Alaska Incorporated (Teck) on the land owned by NANA 
Development Corporation (NANA),77 approximately forty-six miles inland 
                                                     
75. Koh, supra note 6. 
76. Toxic Release Inventory, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://myrtk.epa.gov/info/report.jsp?IDT=TRI&ID=99752RDDGP90MIL [https://perma.cc/L3XX-TCR 
G] (last visited Aug. 2, 2016) (showing Red Dog Mine ranking #1). 
77. CHRISTINE SHEARER, KIVALINA. A CLIMATE CHANGE STORY 79, 106–07 (Haymarket 
Books 2011). 
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from the coast of the Chukchi Sea.78  Teck is now excavating a nearby 
deposit, the Aqqaluk Pit, which is also located on NANA land.79 
In order to understand which norms of either treaty law or general 
international law are applicable to the case, an overall assessment of the 
mine’s environmental impact is in order. 
Three main issues have arisen from the operation of the mine.  Firstly, 
the mine has been deemed responsible of emitting wind-blown ore dust and 
traffic air pollutants, principally due to the transportation of mineral ore 
from the Delong Mountain Transportation System (DMTS) to a Teck-run 
nearby port.80  Secondly, environmental groups and native communities 
have been vocal in reporting the disruption of animal migration, mainly due 
to the use of the DMTS and the operation of the Aqqaluk Deposit.81  Lastly, 
Teck has experienced waste-water discharge issues, inland and at the port 
site on coastal/ocean waters.82  With reference to the port site, the Alaska 
Spill Prevention Unit has also reported the occurrence of petroleum spills.83 
All three types of alleged degradation were perceived by Kivalina 
residents, an Iñupiat community living fifty-four miles southwest of the 
mine on a thin long-barrier reef island located between the Chukchi Sea and 
a lagoon at the mouth of the Kivalina River.84  Kivalina is perhaps best 
known as the first village suing major fossil fuel companies on the ground 
of their contribution to climate change,85 which is now disrupting not only 
the subsistence life of Kivalina but also its own very existence.86  
Subsistence is at danger due to the faster migration of animals to northern 
colder areas, and related difficulties for hunters to provide the community 
                                                     
78. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RECORD OF DECISION FOR THE RED DOG 
MINE EXTENSION AQQALUK PROJECT 1 (2010). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 11.  The 52-mile DeLong Mountain Regional Transportation System (DMTS) haul 
road leads to port facilities located on the Chukchi Sea.  The road has been of concern also for the fact 
that it passes through the Cape Krusenstern National Monument.  However, EPA stipulated with the 
Alaska State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) that no adverse impact would ensue if measures and 
operational controls were included in the Cultural Resources Protection Plan (CRPP) presented by Teck, 
which it did. 
81. Id. at 5. 
82. Red Dog Mine, STATE OF ALASKA CONTAMINATED SITES PROGRAM, http:// 
dec.alaska.gov/spar/csp/sites/reddog.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2016). 
83. Id. 
84. SHEARER, supra note 77, at 101. 
85. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 133 U.S. 2390 (2013); Kivalina, 696 
F.3d at 849. 
86. SHEARER, supra note 77, at 101. 
2016] Colombo 119 
 
with sufficient traditional food.87  Additionally, recurrent storms and the 
rising sea level have put the community under physical and emotional 
stress, with a majority of people voting for relocation.88  Indeed, the lawsuit 
against the major fossil fuel companies on grounds of climate damages was 
intended to collect the necessary funds for relocating the threatened village, 
but it was unsuccessful.89 
Action has recently been taken with former President Obama 
requesting Congress to earmark $400 million “to cover the unique 
circumstances confronting vulnerable Alaskan communities, including 
relocation expenses for Alaska Native villages threatened by rising seas, 
coastal erosion, and storm surges,” which would be administered by a 
Coastal Climate Resilience Fund to be established at the Department of the 
Interior.90 
Nevertheless, given the difficulties in finding an alternative location 
and the lack of governmental involvement, I am arguing that more efforts 
need be devoted to understanding whether life as it is now in Kivalina can 
be ameliorated by way of international law.  Domestic law has often been 
invoked, especially with reference to water-related issues, but not much has 
been achieved, and people in Kivalina still characterize water as being one 
of the most urgent challenges to be addressed.91 
Given the limited aim of this paper, I will tailor down my quest for 
domestic remedies through international law by considering only water-
related issues that have been attributed to the Red Dog Mine and leaving 
aside those contentions that the Kivalina community relates to wind-blown 
ore dust and animal wildlife disruption.  Both aspects will nonetheless come 
up in relation to water issues.  In case water claims are established, my 
ultimate aim is to tentatively equip Kivalina people with tools to make them 
justiciable, and achieve an enhanced quality of life. 
                                                     
87. Id. at 76. 
88. Id. at 103–04; Glenn Gray et al., Kivalina Consensus Building Project:  Results of Door-
to-Door Survey (July 2010), http://www.relocate-ak.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/ 
Kivalina_survey_summary5.pdf. 
89. Kivalina, 133 U.S. at 2390; Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 849.   
90. See Chris Mooney, The Remote Alaskan Village That Needs to be Relocated Due to 
Climate Change, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2015/02/24/the-remote-alaskan-village-that-needs-to-be-relocated-due-to-climate-
change/ [https://perma.cc/4DPT-EZ2T]; 'President Obama Proposes New Funding to Build Resilience 
of Alaska’s Communities and Combat Climate Change' WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET (Feb. 9, 2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/fact-sheet-president-obama-proposes-new-
funding-build-resilience-alaskas [https://perma.cc/7BD4-LJK5]. 
91. Gray, supra note 88. 
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B.  Water Issues and Responses at Domestic Law 
In the present paragraph, I broach the specific mining processes 
undertaken by Teck, which relate to the alleged degradation of water.  After 
considering the first site (the “Main Deposit”), I will turn to the newly-dug 
Aqqaluk Deposit.  Finally, I will look at the port facilities, which have been 
serving both sites.  In all instances, I will also highlight the procedural 
history of the relevant environmental claims that have been brought 
throughout time, notably by members of the Kivalina community.  
Notwithstanding a host of claims, which have been adjudicated by 
notoriously advanced courts, most of such water-related issues are still 
outstanding, all the more so after the excavation of the second site, namely 
the Aqqaluk Deposit.92 
The Main Deposit started operating in 1989 and was mined out by 
2011.93  It was subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment under 
NEPA94 and both a point-source wastewater/stormwater permit and a 
dredge-and-fill permit under the Clean Water Act (CWA).95  Ore was 
removed from the open pit mine and milled to obtain zinc and lead 
concentrates; tailings and process wastewater were impounded in a storage 
area (tailings pond); from there, treated wastewater was discharged into the 
Middle Fork of Red Dog Creek.96 
What is here of concern is the wastewater permit, which is known as 
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination permit (NPDES), in that 
Kivalina residents rely on that water—specifically, from the Wulik River—
for drinking, subsistence hunting and fishing, and aesthetic enjoyment.97 
In 2002, six Kivalina residents filed a citizen enforcement suit under 
section 505 CWA, documenting over 2,171 violations of Teck NPDES 
permit, of which Teck admitted to more than 1,100.98  The ultimate aim was 
                                                     
92. See ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d at 849. 
93. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 2. 
94. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (2012) (under § 
102(2)(C) NEPA, all major Federal actions “significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment” are to be accompanied by a “detailed statement.” Under 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2016), 
Major Federal Action, private projects requiring federal approval are also subject to NEPA). 
95. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012) (Teck was 
specifically required to apply to and obtain a NPDES permit under § 402 CWA (EPA’s authority and a 
dredge-and-fill permit under § 404 CWA (Army Corps of Engineers’ authority))) [hereinafter Clean 
Water Act]. 
96. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 2. 
97. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387; SHEARER, supra note 77, at 113. 
98. James Macpherson, Village Claims Red Dog Contamination, COMMUNITY (Sept. 29, 
2002, 8:00 PM), http://www.alaskajournal.com/community/2002-09-30/village-claims-red-dog-conta 
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to ask the Court to enforce/have enforced the limit standards.  The lawsuit 
was eventually settled through consent decree with Teck purchasing reverse 
osmosis units and good faith-pledging to build an effluent pipeline from the 
Red Dog Mine to the Chukchi Sea.99  The interesting part of the settlement 
comes about when it reads that, whether Teck Cominco decided not to build 
the pipeline for good cause, it would pay a penalty of $8 million, or, 
whether it did not build it without a good cause, then it would pay a penalty 
of $20 million, both penalties apparently to the Federal Government.100 
Turning to the Aqqaluk Deposit, major litigation arose after the EPA’s 
issuance of its Record of Decision and new NPDES permit taking into 
account the imminent reclamation of the Main Deposit and fast advancing 
project for the Aqqaluk Deposit.101  Such issuance followed a complex 
Teck-led Supplemental Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIS), which 
convinced the EPA to permit the operations and discharges at the Aqqaluk 
deposit, lower some of the effluent standards,102 and allow for self-
compliance by Teck coupled with periodic inspections on the part of the 
Administration.103  For the fact that Kivalina and Port Hope residents did 
not explain why such enforcement strategy was not sufficient, their appeal 
was dismissed by both the Environmental Appeals Board and the Ninth 
Circuit.104  The SEIS also clearly stated that maintenance of the two 
deposits would be needed in perpetuity,105 with the concurrent need of 
                                                                                                                           
mination#.V-cOaVUrJEY; see Adams v. Teck Comnico Alaska Inc., No. 3:04–cv–00049–JWS, 2006 
WL 2105501 (D. Alaska Jul. 28, 2006). 
99. Kivalina Settlement Summary, TECK, http://www.reddogalaska.com/DocumentViewer.as 
px?elementId=128367&portalName=tc [https://perma.cc/VNW6-A5PF] (last visited Aug. 2, 2016). 
100. Id. (another prong of the settlement dwelled on the compliance Teck pledged to the 1998 
permit, as amended in 2003, with a major exception on Total Dissolved Solids (TDS), for which Teck 
would have paid a penalty when non-compliance occurred). 
101. Native Village of Kivalina IRA Council v. EPA, 687 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012). 
102. Red Dog Mine Extension—Aqqaluk Project:  Final Supplemental Environmental Impact 
Statement, TETRA TECH, INC., (Oct. 2009), http://dnr.alaska.gov/mlw/mining/largemine/reddog/ 
pdf/rdseis2009vol.1.pdf [hereinafter TETRA TECH, INC.] (most specifically, in their adjudicatory appeal 
lodged with the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC), petitioners held that the 
Alaska certification under § 401 CWA was violating the State’s Antidegradation Policy (no degradation 
analysis plan was in place) and amounted to backsliding under CWA (§§ 402(o) and 303(d)(4)), 
restricting the cases under which NPDES permit limits might be relaxed in case of permit renewal, 
reissuance, or modification.  Most notably the contested limits covered average monthly effluent limits 
(AMEL) for lead, and the effluents limits for cyanide, zinc and TDS as compared to the 1998 permit 
limits.  A request for recusation was made towards ADEC’s Commissioner, who was appointed in 2007 
by Alaska Governor Sarah Palin as Commissioner of the ADEC, after being Teck’s lawyer for a 
decade). 
103. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 7–8. 
104. Native Village of Kivalina IRA Council, 687 F.3d at 1216. 
105. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 4. 
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hazing activities to deter wildlife from using open water at the sites.106  
There appears to be, however, no relevant plan in place to address this 
specific issue. 
All in all, the EPA approved the plan put forward by Teck.  The EPA 
approved Teck’s plan as the Preferred Alternative, yet the Environmentally 
Preferable differed from what Teck proposed, and consisted of three 
pipelines for transporting (i) concentrate to the port, (ii) wastewater to the 
Chukchi Sea instead of the Middle Fork Red Dog Creek, and (iii) diesel 
fuel from the port to the mine.107  The Preferred Alternative was identified 
in the plan proposed by Teck because the EPA asserted not to have the 
authority “to require construction of a pipeline and a separate marine 
discharge, but rather this would be a separate permitting action in response 
to an application provided by Teck.”108  Nevertheless, the EPA 
acknowledged that the Preferred Alternative was identified precisely on the 
basis of the SEIS, including an assessment of impacts that would result 
from the construction and operation of the pipeline.109 
Teck ultimately opted out of any wastewater pipeline project, lodging 
a file with the U.S. District Court for Alaska that contained the findings of a 
study it conducted.110 
Yet, doubts that Alaskan officials will not be able to monitor the actual 
release of water effluents are still looming over the wilderness of Alaska.  
All the more so after the EPA tasked the Alaska Department of 
Environmental Conservation (ADEC) with the NPDES permit program, a 
decision that was unsuccessfully challenged in court.111 
In June 2014, Kivalina residents faced a public health emergency as 
Kivalina’s source of drinking water was contaminated due to an equipment 
                                                     
106. TETRA TECH, INC., supra note 1062 at 245; U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
supra note 78, at 47 (“EPA accepts that personnel may not be available to implement hazing practices 
24 hours a day, seven days a week; however, we are confident that the measures Teck proposes will not 
result in population-level effects to any species in the vicinity of the operation.”). 
107. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 6–7. 
108. Id. at 36. 
109. TETRA TECH, INC., supra note 102, at 99 (the SEIS, upon which the Record of Decision is 
based, at times appears to ground its assessment on the construction of a water pipeline, which is 
“considered reasonably foreseeable in terms of cumulative effects,” on the basis of a future NEPA 
action “once Teck finalizes its plans and submits an application to build and operate a wastewater 
pipeline.”). 
110. Id. at 110. 
111. Akiak Native Community v. U.S. EPA, 625 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (DEC started 
administering wastewater and discharge permitting and compliance program for Alaska on October 31, 
2012, after the passage of Senate Bill (SB 110) and EPA’s final approval in October 2008, under State 
primacy). 
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failure at the mine site.112  Teck recognized that the company failed to keep 
Kivalina residents informed after the incident,113 and no specific action 
appears to have ensued. 
By way of difference, Kivalina residents have not brought issues 
concerning the port along the Chukchi Sea from where Teck ships minerals 
overseas.  According to the Alaska Division of Spill Prevention and 
Response, the entire transportation corridor (DMTS) from the mine to the 
port, including the road, the port facilities, and the barges is under Alaska’s 
Contaminated Sites Program, apparently due to escaping (“fugitive”) dust 
from operations along the transportation corridor.114  The program is also 
addressing historic spills of petroleum products at the mine.115  Still, risk 
assessments have never covered organic compounds associated with past 
petroleum hydrocarbon spills at the port site, allegedly because they occur 
in localized areas and generally remain at depth or beneath pavement, 
apparently being “not in a place where current human exposure occurs.”116 
Moreover, it does not appear that the Corps made a decision to issue, 
deny or update a Rivers and Harbor Act Section 10 permit for any work or 
structures at the port sites.117 
The EPA acknowledges the existence of a pollution issue concerning 
the port site and nearby wetlands.118  In its Record of Decision to the SEIS, 
it deemed wetlands already contaminated due to past and ongoing fugitive 
dust emissions from the road.119  The latest independent study on fish 
                                                     
112. Jillian Rogers, After Red Dog Spill, Kivalina Issues Wulik River Water Advisory, THE 
ARTIC SOUNDER (June 20, 2014), http://www.adn.com/article/20140620/after-red-dog-spill-kivalina-
issues-wulik-river-water-advisory [https://perma.cc/6MLH-M942]. 
113. Id. 
114. STATE OF ALASKA CONTAMINATED SITES PROGRAM, supra note 82. 
115. Red Dog Mine, DIVISION OF SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE CONTAMINATED SITES 
PROGRAM, http://dec.alaska.gov/spar/csp/sites/reddog.htm [https://perma.cc/BN7T-BQKW] (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2017) (Red Dog Mine sites are subject to the regulatory requirements under DEC Contaminated 
Sites Program (CSP), pursuant to 18 AAC 75.360). 
116. Id. 
117. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1899); see generally United States v. 
Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); see generally United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 
224 (1966). 
118. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78, at 6. 
119. Id. (the EPA concedes that a concentrate pipeline would have manifold beneficial effects.  
It would avoid truck traffic, reduce fugitive dust emissions and future dust-related effects on the 
environment, as well as reduce effects on traffic-induced caribou movement to the advantage of 
Kivalina’s harvest of caribou.  Concerning particulate matters, EPA asserts that it is highly unlikely that 
the PM2.5 NAAQS is exceeded, but does not exclude that.); id.at 4 (the State of Alaska has proposed to 
adopt the federal PM2.5 standard, although this has not yet been finalized.  According to area 
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population was undertaken by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game 
Division of Habitat in 2011, and it seems to ambiguously reveal that heavy 
metals were found in the Dolly Varden fish population in the Wulik 
River.120  Yet, no sampling was undertaken in marine waters.  The only 
available sampling on marine water appears to date back to 2003, and was 
published in 2007 but the ensuing assessment does not seem to be in the 
public domain.121 
Furthermore, the latest study concerning heavy metals on mosses and 
soils can only be tracked to 2001, when the highest levels of heavy metal 
concentrations were retrieved near the Red Dog Haul Road, prompting 
evaluators to state that those levels equaled or exceeded (1.5 – 2.5 times) 
“maxima reported for samples from severely polluted regions in Central 
European countries.”122 
Harvesting animals both at sea and in the tundra, Kivalina residents 
have been concerned with possibly heightened blood lead level (BLL).123  
The EPA did not address the issue in its Record of Decision, stating that 
there was no baseline to contrast current BLLs against since no blood lead 
levels were collected prior to the opening of the mine.124  In 2005, Teck and 
ADEC signed a Memorandum, later amended in 2007, by which Teck 
                                                                                                                           
designation in 2006 (the latest issued) Northwest Arctic Borough is unclassifiable/attainment areas for 
PM2.5 under Part C of the Clean Air Act (CAA)). 
120. ALVIN G. OTT & WILLIAM A. MORRIS, AQUATIC BIOMONITORING AT RED DOG MINE 
2010, ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME DIVISION OF HABITAT vi (2011) (the study on the 
Dolly Varden fish concluded that it “is unlikely that tissue metals concentrations or changes could be 
related to events at the Red Dog Mine since large Dolly Varden fishes attain their growth in the marine 
environment.”  However, ADEC Spill Division acknowledges that marine degradation principally 
results from ore dust-blown pollution). 
121. DIVISION OF SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE CONTAMINATED SITES PROGRAM, 
APPENDIX A 23 (2007); see STATE OF ALASKA CONTAMINATED SITES PROGRAM, supra note 82. 
122. Jesse Ford & Linda Hasselbach, Heavy Metals in Mosses and Soils on Six Transects Along 
the Red Dog Mine Haul Road, ALASKA (May 2001), http://dec.alaska.gov/spar/csp/docs/ 
reddog/reddogrpt2.pdf. 
123. Elizabeth J. Kerin & Hsing K. Lin, Fugitive Dust and Human Exposure to Heavy Metals 
around the Red Dog Mine, 206 REVIEWS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION AND TOXICOLOGY 60 
(David M. Whitacre ed., Springer 2010) (residents do not appear to have blood levels of concern, 
however no statistical analysis and no isotopic studies were undertaken for elucidating the 
environmental source of blood level in children.  Moreover, the last public health analysis dates back to 
2001 and referred to blood tests undertaken in the 90s); see Public Health Evaluation of Exposure of 
Kivalina and Notak Residents to Heavy Metals from Red Dog Mines, DIVISION OF SPILL PREVENTION 
AND RESPONSE CONTAMINATED SITES PROGRAM, http://dec. 
alaska.gov/spar/csp/docs/reddog/publichealthexpos_102501.htm [https://perma.cc/HJA3-45EK] (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Heavy Metals]. 
124. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78; see Jason Prno &D. D. 
Slocombe, 'A Systems-Based Conceptual Framework for Assessing the Determinants of a Social License 
to Operate in the Mining Industry' 53 ENVTL. MGMT. 672 (2014). 
2016] Colombo 125 
 
committed to hammer out and implement a fugitive dust risk management 
plan.125  The latter gave rise to a series of Annual Management Plan 
Reports, the latest of which is from 2013 and refers to a 2007 human health 
and ecological risk assessment undertaken by Teck-contracted Exponent.126  
The human health risk assessment stated that harvesting remained off limits 
only within the DMTS, and the ecological risk assessment evaluated 
potential risks to “ecological receptors inhabiting terrestrial, freshwater 
stream and pond, coastal lagoon, and marine environments from exposure 
to DMTS-related metals,” therefore also at the port site.127  No specific 
action, however, was undertaken. 
C.  A Proposed Solution at International Law 
The mixed fuel of domestic and international law, as proposed in 
Section II of this paper, is not intended to remain wishful thinking, but 
should rather be tested in practice, and specifically in the Kivalina case. 
I will first assess which water-related claims might not have found a 
proper response in previous litigation.  I will contend that this legal gap 
could be filled by applying relevant international law norms, and 
specifically the LOS Convention.  Since its provisions can only be applied 
in U.S. courts if they are proven customary, I will draw on political 
statements, relevant case law and scholarship in order to prove that specific 
environmental provisions of the LOS Convention have reached the rank of 
customary rules.  I will advocate for the adoption of the Charming Betsy 
canon when invoking relevant federal law, namely NEPA, the CWA, 
EPCRA, the Rivers and Harbors Act, as well as Alaska private nuisance 
law.  To my understanding, such interpretation of domestic law can be 
embraced by U.S. courts, allowing for the recoup of damages to be awarded 
to Kivalina people and the prevention of further pollution. 
1.  In the Aftermath of Domestic Litigation:   
Prospective Outstanding Claims 
In the following paragraph, I briefly summarize the main water-related 
impacts of the mine sites on Kivalina residents that are still outstanding, 
                                                     
125. Elizabeth J. Kerin & Hsing K. Lin, supra note 123 (residents do not appear to have blood 
levels of concern, however no statistical analysis and no isotopic studies were undertaken for elucidating 
the environmental source of blood level in children.  Moreover, the last public health analysis dates back 
to 2001 and referred to blood tests undertaken in the 90s); see Heavy Metals, supra note 123. 
126. See Fugitive Dust Risk Management Plan 2013 Annual Report, RED DOG MINE (Nov. 
2014), https://dec.alaska.gov/spar/csp/sites/docs/2013_fugitivedustriskmanagementplan_annualreport. 
pdf. 
127. Id. at 8. 
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either because they were not mitigated through domestic litigation or they 
never achieved the status of legal claims. 
As explained in Sections III.A and III.B, three factors have been and 
are allegedly affecting inland and coastal waters, as well as Kivalina 
residents’ life, namely (i) the water pollutants discharged from the mine 
sites onto the Middle Fork Red Dog Creek, which confluences with the 
Ikalukrock Creek and then flows into the Wulik River, the source of 
Kivalina’s drinking water and a tributary of the Chukchi Sea; (ii) the 
contamination of the fish population, which constitutes part of Kivalina’s 
subsistence life, through effluents in the river, and ore deposits/possibly oil 
spills at the port site; (iii) the contamination of marine waters and sediments 
at the port site due to air pollution and possibly oil spills. 
Some of these adverse impacts of the mine operations have already 
been known, e.g., the exceedance of effluents discharges on the creeks.128  
Some of these impacts have seemingly been overlooked, such as the 
presence of petroleum and ore contamination at the port site.129  Past 
litigation under both Alaska and federal law—albeit somewhat successful—
has not addressed specific issues, nor provided long-term solutions. 
Some leeway left for effective litigation might revolve around the 
following:  (i) the need for compensating individuals, rather than the 
executive branch, for noncompliance of Teck with environmental laws; (ii) 
the need to increase permit standards and assess the impact of wastewater 
discharges, oil spills and air-borne ore dust on the marine environment, at 
least at the port site, since no follow-up ensued the 2007 ecological risk 
assessment undertaken by Teck-contracted Exponent, which evaluated 
potential risks to ecological receptors inhabiting terrestrial, freshwater 
stream and pond, coastal lagoon, and marine environments from exposure 
to DMTS-related metals; (iii) the need to tackle the presence of 
hydrocarbon spills, even in localized areas, and primarily at the port site 
since the site might well become a Superfund site130 if no proper action is 
undertaken; (iv) the need for an Environmental Assessment in light of fresh 
data to be collected, especially at the port site; (v) the tools that are 
available for preventing the unlawful degradation of waters; (vi) the 
feasibility of building a wastewater pipeline directly discharging on the 
Chukchi Sea so that Kivalina’s residents’ drinking water would not risk 
being contaminated; (vii) the protection of the marine ecosystem from 
climate change, and the protection of Kivalina from submergence. 
                                                     
128. See SHEARER, supra note 77, at 113. 
129. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 78. 
130. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
9601–75 (2012). 
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2.  Possible Responses from International Law:  A Case for the Law 
of the Sea Convention  
I now turn to the LOS Convention in order to test the hypothesis that I 
put forward in Section I, namely whether outstanding water issues of 
Kivalina can be addressed by way of a mixed fuel encompassing 
international (substantive) law and U.S. (procedural and substantive) law. 
The chosen international law instrument to be deployed in the case is 
the LOS Convention, namely the most comprehensive, and successful, 
instrument for protecting the seas.  For the purpose of this paper, I will not 
be able to offer a fair account of the Convention’s history, case law and 
varied implementation.131  Rather, I will first overview the sections 
specifically relevant to the case, give an account of the positioning of the 
United States vis-à-vis the Convention and understand whether a case can 
be made for the customary status of some of the Convention’s 
environmental provisions. 
Indeed, here lies a legal dilemma:  the United States has never ratified 
the Convention, but the ‘magic’132 of customary law has persuasively been 
invoked with respect to specific sections of the Convention. 
If it is true that the law of the sea is “as old as nations,”133 the modern 
law of the sea is also the remarkable result of UNCLOS III, a nine-year 
negotiated conference extending the efforts of the previous UNCLOS I and 
II conferences.134  The Convention resulting from UNCLOS III notably 
contains a comprehensive legal framework devoted to the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment (Part XII), encompassing a variety 
of provisions, among which general obligations, monitoring and 
environmental assessment, international rules and national legislation to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment, 
enforcement in general and provisions for the smooth coordination of the 
LOS Convention with other conventions on the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment.135 
                                                     
131. See generally JAMES B. MORELL, THE LAW OF THE SEA:  A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
1982 TREATY AND ITS REJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES (McFarland 1992); DAVID D. CARON & 
HARRY N. SCHEIBER, BRINGING NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS (2004); HUGO CAMINOS ET AL., LAW OF 
THE SEA, FROM GROTIUS TO THE INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2015). 
132. Quoting Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 
491 (2008). 
133. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE:  LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 212 (2d ed. 1979). 
134. LORI F. DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 
1354 (West Academic 2014). 
135. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 207. 
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The United States signed and ratified all four UNCLOS I conventions.  
It also actively engaged in UNCLOS III negotiations, yet an abrupt change 
of posture occurred after the election of President Reagan, when, among 
other opposition techniques, an internal U.S. policy review known as the 
Green Book was being circulated at the Conference in early 1982, with the 
proposal of over 100 amendments.136  On that account, President Reagan 
considered the deep seabed provisions137 fatally flawed and in contrast with 
his “free enterprise philosophy.”138  In July 1982, Reagan announced that he 
would not sign the Convention, which nonetheless hit all previous records 
with 117 countries signing on the very first day it was open to signature.139 
As early as in 1983, Reagan announced that the United States regarded 
the LOS Convention, save for the deep seabed mining provisions (Part XI), 
as containing “provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans 
which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly 
balance the interests of all states.”140  Reagan sketched instances of the 
traditional uses of the oceans as navigation, overflight, and generally all 
high seas rights and freedoms that are not resource related.141  Quite 
interestingly, the Declaration also encompassed a number of statements 
concerning the marine environment, establishing a 200 nautical mile 
Exclusive Economic Zone with a view to enable “the United States to take 
limited additional steps to protect the marine environment,” specifically by 
working “through the International Maritime Organization and other 
appropriate international organizations to develop uniform international 
measures for the protection of the marine environment while imposing no 
unreasonable burdens on commercial shipping.”142 
After the adoption of the Convention’s Implementing Agreement by 
the U.N. General Assembly in 1994,143 the Convention was sent to the 
Senate for advice and consent, which have not been given yet.144 
Since this paper is geared toward judicial remedies, it is worth 
considering whether U.S. courts have characterized the LOS Convention as 
part of customary law.  Firstly, I am going to tackle this issue by looking at 
                                                     
136. TED L. MCDORMAN, SALT WATER NEIGHBORS:  INTERNATIONAL OCEAN LAW 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 101 (Oxford University Press 2009). 
137.  Id. at 102. 
138. Id. at 103. 
139. Id. at 104;  TETRA TECH, INC., supra note 102, at 99. 
140. Ronald Reagan, President, U.S. Statement on United States Oceans Policy (March 10, 
1983). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1357. 
144. Id. 
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courts’ understanding of the customary character of the LOS provisions in 
light of the declarations made by the United States in that concern.  
Secondly, I will turn to a tentative analysis of the customary character of 
some of the LOS environmental provisions at international law and besides 
the understanding that U.S. courts have had of the political branch position 
on the issue. 
With reference to the courts’ view on the U.S. Executive Branch 
stance toward the LOS Convention, the Supreme Court has consistently 
maintained that the United States has not ratified the Convention, “but has 
recognized that its baseline provisions reflect customary international 
law.”145  This understanding has prompted a District Court to note in Sarei 
v. Rio Tinto, that the United States “is obliged to refrain from acts that 
would defeat the object and purpose of the agreement,”146 specifically when 
the norms at issue are customary norms reflected in Article 194(1) of the 
LOS Convention, but dismissed the claim as non-justiciable, which was 
overturned in appeals.147  Eventually the Supreme Court vacated the 
appellate judgment and remanded the case to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Kiobel.148  
The Appellate Judges affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding the 
non-justiciable character of the claim for it being a political question and 
rendered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice, which means any further 
attempt to bring the same case to court is ruled out.149 
Be that as it may, the finding of a customary character of specifically 
Article 194(1) by the District Court was not contended, and will be material 
to the Kivalina case, as I will explain further in this paragraph under the 
prong of a general (non US-based) assessment of the customary nature of 
some of the LOS Convention’s environmental provisions.  Nevertheless, in 
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, the district court approached the environmental claims of 
the dispute by asking for and obtaining evidence of the linkage between the 
mining corporation and the State where environmental violations 
occurred,150 yet it later dismissed the case precisely because any such act 
                                                     
145. United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 (1992) (citing Brief for United States 25, n.6) 
(internal quotation omitted); Mayaguezanos por la Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 198 F.3rd 297, 
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146. Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc., 221 F. Supp 2d. 1116, 1116 (2002); see also Rio Tinto PLC et al. 
v. Alexis Holyweek Sarei et al., 133 U.S. (2013); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc., 722 F.3d 1109, 1109 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
147. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1209. 
148. Rio Tinto, 722 F.3d at 1109 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 
(2013)). 
149. Id. at 1207. 
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would fall under the act of state doctrine, making any claim non-justiciable.  
Were the customary character of Article 194(1) to be put forward in future 
claims, courts might be confused by the district court’s request of a linkage 
between the corporation and the State in the perpetration of the alleged 
environmental violations.  Such a linkage would not be present in the 
Kivalina case since the concession for exploiting mineral resources is 
granted by a Nonprofit Organization, NANA Regional Corporation Inc., 
rather than by the state or the federal government, and the latter have no 
part in the management of the mines. 
As a separate strand from the U.S. positioning and practice, U.S. 
courts might alternatively consider whether provisions show a customary 
character at international law.151 
Any such inquiry should follow the strict dicta put forward by the 
Second Circuit in Kiobel, even more so in the context of environmental 
cases since Kiobel was an environmental case also.152  The first step of the 
evidentiary inquiry dwells on retrieving “international conventions, whether 
general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by contesting 
states,” which in this case is the LOS Convention.153  As Kiobel maintains, 
the treaty’s evidentiary value for customary law depends on the number of 
signatory parties and the parties’ relative influence on the issue,154 which 
are quite numerous and would lead to the affirmative in the case of the LOS 
Convention.155  Nonetheless, the further steps pointed out by Kiobel are not 
as easy to assess since evidence of a custom also springs from a general 
principle of law recognized by civilized nations; an international custom as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; or judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most qualified publicists of the various nations, which 
would only constitute subsidiary means for the determination of rule of law. 
Since the Convention’s text was finalized and adopted, all countries 
have agreed that many provisions parallel the provisions included in the 
UNCLOS I Conventions, and even some of the provisions that had no 
UNCLOS I counterpart are clearly established customary law.156  As of late 
2014, 167 countries have become party to the Convention, and 147 of them 
have become party to the Implementing Agreement.157  It is, however, safe 
                                                     
151. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 634. 
152. Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1660. 
153. Id. at 1161. 
154. Id. at 1166. 
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156. DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1356. 
157. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, BLUEBIRD, http://www.bluebird-
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to say that the UNCLOS I Conventions still govern States Parties to them, 
but it also governs States Parties to the UNCLOS III Convention insofar as 
the latter did not supersede the earlier Conventions.158  Since the 1958 
Conventions are guides to the customary law of the sea governing States 
not party to the convention, we now turn to those.159 
The 1958 Convention on the High Seas, resulting from UNCLOS I, 
encompasses several provisions seeking to ensure safety at sea (Article 10) 
and the prevention of sea pollution by the discharge of oil from ships or 
pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the seabed 
and its subsoil (Article 24), or even from the dumping of radioactive waste 
(Article 25).160  It does not, however, comprise some of what UNCLOS III 
would later cover, namely pollution from land-based sources, through the 
atmosphere and from dumping at sea (Article 207 – 212), nor its 
enforcement provisions, notably foreign vessels, by port countries (Article 
218 covering pollution in the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive 
economic zone) and coastal countries (Article 220 covering pollution in the 
territorial sea and exclusive economic zone).161 
With reference to land-based sources of marine pollution (LBSMP), 
which is material in the case of Kivalina, it was argued that customary law 
is established as covering the principles and obligations of good 
neighborliness and reasonable use of the seas.162  The same commentator, 
however, also recalled the customary nature of Article 207 of the LOS 
Convention (Pollution from land-based sources), which is eventually 
deemed too general for effectively tackling this kind of pollution, but the 
author did not set as his objective to provide a thorough account of all the 
applicable provisions of the Convention to cases of land-based pollution 
affecting the marine environment.163 
                                                     
158. MORAKINYO ADEDAYO AYOADE, DISUSED OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS AND PIPELINES 
TOWARDS “SUSTAINABLE DECOMMISSIONING” 56 (Kluwer Law Int’l eds., 2002); DAMROSCH & 
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159. DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1359. 
160. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 10, 24, 25. 
161. DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 134, at 1494; see Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
supra note 2. 
162. Daud Hassan. Land-Based Sources of Marine Pollution:  The Global Framework for 
Control AUSTL. INT’L L. J. 61, 62 (2003). 
163. See id. (for retrieving soft law instruments relating to LBSMP, most notably Montreal 
Guidelines for Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-Based Sources, 
Decision 13/18/li, Governing Council of Unep (May 24, 1985); Washington Declaration on Protection 
of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities, a/51/116, Annex I, Appendix li (Nov. 3, 1995).  
Further soft law instruments relevant to the environmental provisions of the LOS Convention are, inter 
alia, Principles 7 and 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Intergovernmental Working Group on 
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In my view, the underused assets of the Convention’s environmental 
provisions can be better retrieved in the repository of the general provisions 
(Arts. 192 – 196).  As sharply noted, Article 192 sets forth an obligation on 
“States,” rather than “States Parties,” to “protect and preserve the marine 
environment,”164 alternatively implying (i) the customary character of such 
rule; (ii) obligations for third-State parties within the meaning of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Articles 34 – 48 of the 
VCLT);165 or, (iii) a general principle of international law, which is the 
most favored option by commentators.166  The term pollution and dumping 
are quite broadly defined in Article 1 of the LOS Convention.167  Article 
192 of the LOS Convention seems to require active measures to maintain or 
improve the marine environment,168 in “all parts of ocean space both within 
and beyond the limits of any national jurisdiction.”169 
Article 192 is further fleshed out in Article 194(1), whereby “States 
shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent” 
with the Convention “that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of the marine environment from any source, using for this purpose 
the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their 
capabilities, and they shall endeavor to harmonize their policies in this 
connection.”170  Again, the article appears applicable also to countries that 
have not ratified the LOS Convention,171 and clearly refers to the need for 
establishing international standards (also Article 213 – 222 of the LOS 
                                                                                                                           
Marine Pollution (IWFMP) Principles for Assessment and Control of Marine Pollution (1971), 
a/Conf.48/lwgmp.li/5). 
164. Myron H. Nordquist et al., Commentary, United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea 1982:  A Commentary, Vol. IV, 39 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985). 
165. 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
166. Nordquist et al., supra note 164. 
167. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 1(1)(4) (pollution of the marine 
environment means:   
The introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the 
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in 
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human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other 
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and 
reduction of amenities. 
According to Article 1(1)(5)(a) dumping means “(i) any deliberate disposal of wastes or other 
matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea; (ii) any deliberate disposal 
of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea.”). 
168. Nordquist et al., supra note 164, at 40. 
169. Id. at 43. 
170. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 2, at art. 1, ¶ 1. 
171. Nordquist et al., supra note 164, at 64. 
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Convention), to be enforced through national organs, whether judicial or 
not.172  Most notably, Article 194(3) provides that prevention/protection 
measures should be applied in relation to a number of circumstances, and, 
for the purposes of this paper, “(a) the release of toxic, harmful or noxious 
substances, especially those which are persistent, from land-based sources, 
from or through the atmosphere or by dumping; (b) pollution from vessels,” 
taking into consideration vessels’ construction, equipment, operation and 
manning.173  Pursuant to Article 194(5), the required measures “shall 
include those necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as 
well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other 
forms of marine life,” which is specifically suited to the ecosystems in and 
around Kivalina.174 
Nonetheless, what is most important to assess is the host of 
international standards that would allow these provisions to be specific 
enough, in the light of the Sosa decision, to supplement domestic rules.  
With relation to pollution from vessels, MARPOL175 would fill in the gap 
or suggest an increase of domestic standards through its six technical 
annexes requiring preventive measures covering five categories of 
substances, as well as a Protocol concerning Reports on Incidents Involving 
Harmful Substances.176  Differently, with relation to the inadequacy of 
water permit standards, further standards cannot be provided by the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, since the United States signed it in 
1993, but never ratified it.177  Rather, possibly applicable provisions can be 
retrieved in the LOS Convention itself, and specifically in Article 204(1), 
which sets forth the obligation for “States” to “observe, measure, evaluate 
and analyze, by recognized scientific methods, the risks or effects of 
pollution of the marine environment.”178 
Furthermore, pursuant to Article 204(2) of the LOS Convention, States 
shall “keep under surveillance the effects of any activities which they 
permit or in which they engage in order to determine whether these 
activities are likely to pollute the marine environment.”179  The obligation 
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to carry out an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was acknowledged 
as customary in character under certain circumstances by the ICJ in the 
Pulp Mills case,180 and a domestic court might be able to flesh out the 
content of Article 204 of the LOS Convention by mandating EIAs on 
environmental agencies, even when the activities have been permitted but 
long-term effects were not duly/possibly anticipated. 
All in all, Article 192, Article 194 and Article 204 of the LOS 
Convention, as supplemented by further instruments at international law, 
are seemingly apt to be applied also in domestic settings, on ground of their 
fairly established customary character and specificity.181  With reference to 
the U.S. judicial setting, specificity would be needed for these provisions to 
meet the Sosa test and therefore be applied either directly as a rule or 
indirectly as a standard within the canon of interpretation (the Charming 
Betsy canon).  Moreover, the holding by which Article 194 of the LOS 
Convention partakes in customary law has never been invalidated through 
the Sarei v. Rio Tinto case law.182 
Be that as it may, this conceptual framework is now to be applied to 
the specificities of Kivalina’s prospective claims. 
3.  The LOS Convention at Play in Kivalina 
In the following paragraph, I specifically address the water issues that 
I have previously characterized as still outstanding for Kivalina residents in 
light of my contention on the customary character of Articles 192, 194 and 
204 of the LOS Convention.  I will eventually argue that specific legal 
claims may be brought to the competent U.S. courts, or environmental 
administrations, mainly by relying on specific provisions of the LOS 
Convention. 
Such legal claims would be targeted to the following objectives:  (i) to 
achieve compensation for individuals; (ii) to increase the environmental 
standards contained in the relevant permits and assess the impact of 
wastewater discharges, oil spills and air-borne ore dust on the marine 
environment, at least at the port site in that the last ecological risk 
assessment dates back to 2007, was undertaken by Teck-contracted 
Exponent and it eventually emphasized potential risks to ecological 
receptors inhabiting terrestrial, freshwater stream and pond, coastal lagoon, 
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and marine environments from exposure to metals related to the operation 
of the mine; (iii) to assess the presence of hydrocarbon spills, even if in 
localized areas, and primarily at the port site since no official documents 
have been issued apparently on this concern; (iv) to undertake an 
Environmental Assessment in light of fresh data to be collected, especially 
at the port site; v) to understand which tools are available for preventing the 
unlawful degradation of waters; (vi) to assess the feasibility of the 
construction of a wastewater pipeline directly discharging on the Chukchi 
Sea so that Kivalina’s residents drinking water would not risk being 
contaminated; and (vii) to ensure the protection of the marine ecosystem 
from climate change, and the protection of Kivalina from submergence. 
I will eventually argue that Kivalina residents might resort to three 
avenues, and specifically to (a) a private nuisance action before an Alaska 
state court and an ATS action before a federal court for point (i); (b) a 
request for the issuance/re-issuance, modification and revocation of permits 
and the right to petition for points (ii), (iii) and (iv); (c) a citizens’ suit 
based on the violation of the NPDES permit and an EPCRA183 action for 
point (v).  I did not find, however, a way to address points (vi) and (vii) by 
relying on the customary provisions of the LOS Convention. 
With reference to the need for compensating individuals, the CWA 
spells out the right for citizens to sue in section 505, with no possibility to 
be awarded damages in case of violation of the wastewater permit, i.e., the 
NPDES permit.184 
Alaska’s Civil Code of Procedure allows individuals to bring a civil 
action to enjoin or abate a private nuisance, with damages awarded in the 
action.185  Such remedy has not been displaced by the CWA, according to 
section 505 (e) CWA.186  In case of actions connected to air emission or 
water or solid waste discharge, which would be the case for Kivalina 
people, an action would be barred “where the emission or discharge was 
expressly authorized by and is not in violation of a term or condition of (1) 
a statute or regulation; or (2) a license, permit, or order that is issued after 
public hearing by the state or federal government and subject to (i) 
continuing compliance monitoring; (ii) periodic review by the issuing 
agency; or (iii) renewal on a periodic basis; or (3) a court order or 
judgment.”187 
Kivalina residents might contend that no continuing compliance 
monitoring nor periodic review has been warranted at the port site, nor a 
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periodic renewal of the permit for the operation of the port has been 
undertaken since the NPDES renewal ensuing the approval of the Aqqaluk 
project arguably refers only to discharges on the Middle Fork Red Dog 
Creek, neglecting discharges at the port and the effect that the discharge of 
increased effluents on the Middle Fork Red Dog Creek has on the port site.  
Nevertheless, plaintiffs need to work very carefully to (i) show substantial 
harm, probably by referring to the effects of water pollutants on the animals 
they harvest and the fallouts of air pollutants on their own health, as well as 
(ii) negligence or reckless conduct.188 
Such actions are not apparently displaced by the Clean Water Act in 
that the Supreme Court referenced to Ouellette189 in a dicta of American 
Elec.  Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut190 asserting that the Clean Water Act 
does not preclude aggrieved individuals from bringing a “nuisance claim 
pursuant to the law of the source State.”191 
Be that as it may, Articles 192, 194, and 204 of the LOS Convention 
would not need to be directly applied, but rather invoked for the consistent 
interpretation with international law of Alaska’s provisions on private 
nuisance (Charming Betsy canon).192  Most notably, the three LOS 
provisions would imply a need for stringent monitoring and permit renewal 
in order to protect and preserve the marine environment, and Kivalina 
residents could bring a private nuisance action concerning all three 
outstanding claims that I identified previously.  As for most international 
agreements, provisions are not binding on private parties, be they either 
individuals or corporations, but rather on States Parties.193  Still, by 
applying the Charming Betsy canon, the analyzed LOS Convention 
provisions would not be apt to horizontal application (private-to-private 
claim), but rather would specify both state and federal legislation as they 
belong to the law of the land and should therefore be enforced.194 
With reference to the first outstanding claim, namely the water 
pollutants discharged from the mine sites onto the Middle Fork Red Dog 
Creek, which are alleged to impact the source of Kivalina’s drinking water 
and possibly also the Chukchi Sea, any violation of the NPDES might 
trigger a private nuisance claim in that Kivalina residents might show 
substantial harm and recklessness/negligence of the violating conducts, 
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which are further aggrieving given the lack of notification of such events, 
as it turned out in 2014.195  Article 194(3) of the LOS Convention would 
help construe some of the terms of Alaska private nuisance rules, and 
specifically the reference to “continuing compliance monitoring,” “periodic 
review by the issuing agency” or “renewal on a periodic basis,”196 which 
should cover “(a) the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, 
especially those which are persistent, from land-based sources, from or 
through the atmosphere or by dumping,” as set forth in Article 194(3)(a) of 
the LOS Convention.197  By leveraging on the threat of private nuisance 
claims, companies might be incentivized to voluntarily put in place such 
customary-based monitoring mechanisms even when the permit does not 
require them to do so.198  
In relation to the second outstanding claim, namely the contamination 
of the fish population, which constitutes part of Kivalina’s subsistence life, 
through effluents in the river, and ore deposits/possibly oil spills at the port 
site, the monitoring apparatus necessary for avoiding a threat of private 
nuisance claims would consist of mechanisms “to protect and preserve rare 
or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or 
endangered species and other forms of marine life,” pursuant to Article 
194(5) of the LOS Convention, which is particularly apt for the fragile 
ecosystem of Alaska.199  On Kivalina’s facts, no recent impact statement on 
the fish population at the port site is currently available. 
Also with respect to the third outstanding claim, namely the 
contamination of marine waters and sediments at the port site due to air 
pollution/possibly oil spills, in order not to be liable for a private nuisance 
claim, Teck would be required to comply with Article 194(5) of the LOS 
Convention, assessing the impact of vessels and discharges on the “fragile 
ecosystems” of the port, as well as the “habitat of depleted, threatened or 
endangered species and other forms of marine life.”200  More importantly, 
Teck itself is in charge of operating the port.  In order to avoid pollution 
from vessels, Teck would be spurred on to evaluate which MARPOL 
protocols have been domesticated in the U.S. legal system, as well as to 
assess whether any such obligation is binding on private port authorities as 
well. 
What is most interesting about Alaska’s Code of Civil Procedure is the 
fact that the foregoing restrictions on private nuisance actions do not apply 
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if the discharge produces a result that was unknown or not reasonably 
foreseeable at the time of the authorization.201  Therefore, if Kivalina 
residents were able to prove the unknown result/not reasonably foreseeable 
effect of the discharge, they would be able to succeed in the action, even 
when the relevant judge deems the level of monitoring and permit renewal 
sufficient.  Unfortunately, it is not possible to make any prediction on the 
environmental impact of the mine operations on the port site in that data are 
lacking.  Nevertheless, permit and monitoring do not appear to have been 
periodic.  This might suggest that nuisance conducts were unknown or not 
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the authorization, allowing private 
nuisance actions to be brought with no restriction.  By qualifying the 
polluting conduct as “an action for waste or trespass upon real property” 
and in light of Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Fernandes v. Portwine, 
the statute of limitations appears to be six years.202 
With reference to the ATS claim, an alien should file it, so there 
should be at least one person within the Kivalina community having 
multiple citizenships/a foreign citizenship and being willing to file the 
claim.  Yet, no case law has been retrieved on standing for U.S. citizens 
filing the ATS claim as foreign nationals on account of multiple 
citizenships. 
On the likelihood of succeeding in court, the Sarei v. Rio Tinto 
litigation would not be a legitimate precedent.203  Although the Court did 
not rule out the customary nature of the LOS Convention, and specifically 
Article 194, Kiobel204 is still an overpowering legacy and might dispel 
purely environmental law-based ATS claims without a specific 
differentiation between human right-based and environmental law-based 
claims.  Given the non-extraterritorial character of a prospective ATS claim 
brought by Kivalina residents, however, the outcome might not be impacted 
by Kiobel.  Yet, the Sosa standards for a customary rule to apply would still 
need to be met.  ATCA contains no limitations period, yet this does not 
imply there is none and court practice is varied in this regard.205 
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As a second prong of litigation, Kivalina residents might petition for 
the re-issuance, modification, and revocation of permits pursuant to specific 
environmental regulations,206 which are also applicable to state programs.207  
In the case of Alaska, the NPDES permit program is administered at the 
state level.208  This prong of litigation is not per se judicial, however, it 
might become so in case the petition is denied with no reasonable ground in 
light of the holdings of Massachusetts v. EPA.209 
Under this prong, the analyzed LOS Convention provisions would be 
directly binding on the relevant level of government in the permit process, 
rather than on a corporation, such as Teck.210  A corporation would, 
however, be indirectly affected by the application of those provisions at the 
governmental level, which would result in higher environmental 
standards.211 
Most specifically, with regard to section 402 CWA (stormwater) 
permit, which is required for the discharge of water pollutants on the 
Middle Fork Red Dog Creek, Kivalina plaintiffs will need to petition the 
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation.  Kivalina plaintiffs are 
in the position to ask for more stringent effluents limits, which would 
counter the lowering of some of the effluent standards in the latest NPDES 
permit, which were challenged unsuccessfully.212  Such a right to petition is 
enshrined in the Code of Federal Regulations and can be better fleshed out 
by relying on the need for states to “take, individually or jointly as 
appropriate, all measures consistent” with the LOS Convention “that are 
necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine 
environment from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable 
means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities, and they 
shall endeavor to harmonize their policies in this connection” (Article 
194(1) LOS Convention).213  On the same ground, Kivalina residents might 
require a modification of the current system of NPDES enforcement, which 
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presently provides a mechanism of self-compliance by Teck coupled with 
periodic inspections on the part of the Administration.  Enhanced controls 
on the part of either ADEC or third parties that have been assessed as truly 
neutral could provide a better enforcement system. 
With regard to section 404 CWA (dredge-and-fill) permit, which is 
required for the operation of the Aqqaluk deposit and probably also at the 
port site, yet the latest point is not apparent, the relevant authority to 
petition would be the Army Corps of Engineers, Alaska District.214  The 
aim would still be to petition for increased environmental standards and 
more frequent controls on the governmental side. 
Moreover, Kivalina residents would also need to petition the Army 
Corps of Engineers, Alaska, for a Rivers and Harbors section 10 permit for 
the operation of the port site in that it does not appear to be in place.  By 
way of difference from the CWA, the right to petition is not specifically 
granted in the Rivers and Harbors Act.215  Such a right should be derived 
from the general right to petition as enshrined in the Right to Petition 
Clause contained in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the 
petition would be substantiated by relying on Article 204(1) of the LOS 
Convention (Charming Betsy canon), which sets forth the obligation for 
“States” to “observe, measure, evaluate and analyze, by recognized 
scientific methods, the risks or effects of pollution of the marine 
environment,” namely the activities that are required for the issuance of a 
Rivers and Harbors section 10 permit.216 
All in all, pursuant to Article 204(2) of the LOS Convention, States 
shall “keep under surveillance the effects of any activities which they 
permit or in which they engage in order to determine whether these 
activities are likely to pollute the marine environment.”217  This obligation 
appears specifically stringent in the context of permit issuance, re-issuance, 
modification, and revocation, all the more so at the port site, which was not 
covered by the latest Supplemental Environmental Impact Assessment. 
Since the project is subject to NEPA, one further line of petitioning 
might dwell on the request for an Environmental Assessment to be carried 
out at the port site according to specific environmental regulations.218  
Moreover, the same LOS Convention provision, as complemented with the 
Pulp Mill judgment,219 can be construed as requiring recurrent or at least 
precautionary Environmental Assessments.  On Kivalina’s facts, citizens 
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may petition for an Environmental Assessment concerning the impact of 
Middle Fork Red Dog Creek’s discharges on the Chukchi Sea, and 
specifically at the port site, which was not analyzed by the latest SEIS. 
With concern to the permit process, Kivalina residents might also 
petition for the withdrawal of approval from the programs that have been 
delegated to Alaska, under both the stormwater (section 402(c)(3)) and 
dredge-and-fill (section 404(i)) programs.220  Even in these cases, the right 
to petition would need be grounded on the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and substantiated within the activities mandated by Article 
204(2) of the LOS Convention. 
Under the third prong of action, namely citizens’ suits and civil 
actions, Kivalina residents may bring a suit against any person alleged to be 
in violation of water-related permits,221 immediately for violations of 
NPDES or toxic effluents standards,222 and in general after sixty days from 
when the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation to the 
Administrator, the State, and the alleged violator.223 
Nonetheless, any such action is barred if the Administrator or State 
“has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action.”224  
Kivalina residents were able to meet the standing prongs in previous 
NPDES litigation, therefore they are likely to meet them also at this time.  
Such a citizen enforcement action, however, could only be targeted to stop 
permit violations, since it does not allow citizens to recoup damages, but 
only litigation costs.225 
A citizens’ suit may also be brought against the EPA Administrator on 
a failure to perform any act or duty.226  Such a strand of litigation, however, 
is specifically difficult to pursue in that the duty/act should be non-
discretionary.  On Kivalina’s facts, the Administrator’s duty can be fleshed 
out in the obligation to update and tighten up the NPDES and dredge-and-
fill permits, as well as in the duty to carry out/update an environmental 
assessment at the port in light of the obligation for States, pursuant to Art. 
194(1), to “prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment 
from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable means at their 
disposal and in accordance with their capabilities.”227  Yet, the means for 
accomplishing these duties are discretionary.  Besides, this strand of 
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litigation would not specifically benefit from the consistent interpretation of 
the CWA with the customary environmental provisions of the LOS 
Convention. 
This prong of litigation also rests on the civil actions’ provision set 
forth in EPCRA,228 which can be filed against either the violator or the 
State Administrator.  Such actions, nonetheless, are geared toward a 
different goal from the one set in the CWA, and precisely compliance with 
reporting obligations, also in case of accidental chemical release under the 
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Program.  The EPA would investigate cases 
of EPCRA non-compliance and may issue civil penalties, including 
monetary fines, and require correction of the violations.  On Kivalina’s 
facts, citizens can certainly file such an action were a violation of the 
NPDES to occur without Teck stating an emergency notice, as it happened 
in 2014.229  This specific prong of litigation, however, would not require the 
application of the Charming Betsy canon with reference to the LOS 
Convention, since the latter could not add much to such a specific piece of 
legislation.  Citizens would not be able to recoup damages, but they can still 
count on the further means of an injunctive relief.230 
Likewise, I do not see how the actual construction of a wastewater 
pipeline directly discharging into the Chukchi Sea can be mandated by 
wielding on LOS Convention provisions.  Therefore, this specific claim of 
Kivalina people cannot be advanced by relying on the LOS Convention. 
The last outstanding claim that I have put forward is the protection of 
the marine ecosystem from climate change, and the protection of Kivalina 
from submergence.  I believe that both concerns might come under the 
ambit of the specific solicitude that States need to show for “rare or fragile” 
ecosystems (Article 194(4) LOS Convention)231 and climate change 
considerations should be internalized within a new EIS232 according to 
NEPA and Article 204 of the LOS Convention.  Notwithstanding, I cannot 
see how greenhouse gas emissions, namely the cause for Kivalina’s 
prospective submergence, might be curbed by relying on the LOS 
Convention.  Therefore, this prong of litigation cannot rely on the 
Charming Betsy canon, as applied to the LOS Convention. 
A specific concern might be addressed at policy level, which is the 
environmental justice posture of the present case.  The landmark executive 
order issued by President Clinton in 1994 prompts all federal agencies to 
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carry out a review of their internal decision-making procedures to 
incorporate consideration of environmental justice issues therein.  Such an 
executive order will not create a right of action for Kivalina people, still the 
concerns it addresses must be adequately incorporated in such federal 
executive actions as an environmental statement/EIS under NEPA.233 
All in all, I contend that it is possible to flesh out rules of diligence at 
both company level (Teck), and governmental level (State and Federal 
government) by way of a consistent interpretation of domestic legislation 
with the specific provisions resulting from the customary rules of the LOS 
Convention, namely Article 192, Article 194 and Article 204.  In this way, 
companies, such as Teck, might anticipate the risk of litigation, especially 
under the private nuisance prong, and undertake actions to exceed permits’ 
requirements.  Similarly, under the administrative prong, in case the 
relevant authorities refusal to reissue modify or revoke permits, courts 
might pay less deference to the executive branch under the Chevron 
doctrine, or at least frame deference within the limit of political discretion 
and claim jurisdiction to rule on how the agency is fulfilling its duties in 
light of the environmental rules of the LOS Convention, which have been 
ascertained as customary in character.234 
Nevertheless, in any thread of litigation one should carefully balance 
the opposing interests of full environmental soundness and public health 
safety with the economic prosperity Teck is bringing to the area.  In all the 
foregoing legal argumentations, legal counsels should emphasize the need 
for tackling pending environmental issues as they appear now in order to 
avoid future litigation costs, epidemiological diseases, reclamation costs, 
and internal opposition from Native American workers at Teck. 
In conclusion, and especially in light of the historical trajectory of the 
stance U.S. courts have taken vis-à-vis international law and its judicial 
enforceability, I would not recommend a litigation strategy that depends on 
the direct application of the LOS Convention environmental provisions, but 
rather on the application of the Charming Betsy canon while applying 
relevant domestic legislation and regulations. 
IV.  TAKING STOCK 
In this paper, I have attempted to analyze how a specific case of 
environmental injustice can be addressed by hinging on international law 
provisions. 
                                                     
233. Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994); see Counsel of Executive Quality, 
Environmental Justice:  Guidance under the National Environmental Policy Act, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT (1997). 
234. Chevron USA, Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
144 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 23: 1 
 
The case of environmental injustice is now unfolding around the 
largest zinc mine worldwide, Alaska’s Red Dog Mine, and is specifically 
impacting the Native Alaskan Kivalina community.  The latter has long 
battled against environmental degradation under U.S. law, with no apparent 
success.  In light of the impasse of purely domestic remedies, I have 
focused on the water-related issues of the litigation and argued that 
international law might equip plaintiffs with stronger arguments allowing 
for the implementation of international law in U.S. courts. 
Most notably, I have made the case for specific pieces of U.S. 
environmental legislation being interpreted consistently with the 
environmental provisions of the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention.  The 
LOS Convention is of interest to the case not only by the fact that it is 
strictly relevant to the subject matter, but also because of the customary 
character of some of its provisions, as acknowledged by U.S. courts and 
scholarship. 
Some issues, however, are still outstanding, even at the end of my 
analysis. 
It still must be proven that the ICJ Pulp Mill decision can be extended 
to the imperative of undertaking recurrent or even precautionary 
environmental assessments.  Moreover, I have not tested the potential of the 
LOS Convention on all the possibly applicable pieces of environmental 
legislation.  For instance, I did not assess its impact on the interpretation of 
some of the provisions of the Safe Drinking Water Act.  Furthermore, I 
have not tested the potential of all LOS applicable provisions either.  The 
understanding of how the LOS Convention can be intertwined with climate 
change instruments is specifically compelling, but worth a brand new 
chapter. 
The quest for justiciable rights and competent courts to assess them is 
ultimately intended to enhance awareness on the part of the national 
judiciary of its entrustment as interpreter of the whole of the relevant law, 
be it both domestic and international.  Moreover, this attempt of 
domestic/international solutions to current environmental issues might also 
serve the cause of the international legal order, where enforcement is often 
problematic.  It can also conjure up the threat of litigation costs that 
companies may incur in case such litigation claims prove successful, 
enabling companies to prevent environmental degradation in the first place.  
Lastly, and more importantly, the domestic staging of environment-related 
claims against the backdrop of international law would set individuals, and 
not only States, as recipients and actors of international law, hopefully 
equipping them with further tools to advance their rights. 
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JOINT NOTIFICATION 
ADDRESSED TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE COURT: 
 
The Hague, 1 September 2015 
 
On behalf of the State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland, in 
accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, we have the honor to transmit to you an original of the Special 
Agreement for submission to the International Court of Justice of the 
differences between the Applicant and the Respondent concerning the Frost 
files, signed in The Hague, The Netherlands, on the first day of September in 
the year two thousand fifteen. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mata Rosenberg,  Klaus Hall, Ambassador of the State of Amestonia 
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Riesland to the Kingdom of The 
Netherlands to the Kingdom of The Netherlands 
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SPECIAL AGREEMENT 
 
SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE BY 
THE STATE OF AMESTONIA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
OF RIESLAND 
ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM CONCERNING 
THE FROST FILES 
 
The State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland (hereinafter 
referred to as “Amestonia” and “Riesland” respectively and “the Parties” 
collectively), 
 
Considering that differences have arisen between them concerning the 
legality of certain alleged acts of espionage, and other matters; 
 
Recognizing that the Parties have been unable to settle these differences by 
means of negotiation; and 
 
Desiring further to define the issues to be submitted to the International Court 
of Justice (hereinafter referred to as “the Court”) to resolve this dispute; 
 
In furtherance thereof the Parties have concluded this Special Agreement: 
 
Article 1 
The Parties submit the questions contained in this Special Agreement 
(together with Clarifications to follow) (“the Case”) to the Court pursuant to 
Article 40(1) of the Statute of the Court.  
 
Article 2 
(a) It is agreed by the Parties that Amestonia shall act as Applicant and 
Riesland as Respondent, but such agreement is without prejudice to 
any question of the burden of proof. 
(b) The Parties agree that any reference in this Special Agreement to 
documents obtained and disclosed without the consent of 
Respondent is without prejudice to Respondent’s objection to the 
admissibility of these documents as evidence before the Court.  
Article 3 
(a) The rules and principles of international law applicable to the 
dispute, on the basis of which the Court is requested to decide the 
Case, are those referred to in Article 38, paragraph 1 of the Statute 
of the Court. 
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(b) The Court is also requested to determine the legal consequences, 
including the rights and obligations of the Parties, arising from its 
Judgment on the questions presented in the Case. 
 
Article 4 
(a) All questions of rules and procedure shall be regulated in accordance 
with the provisions of the Official Rules of the 2016 Philip C. Jessup 
International Law Moot Court Competition. 
(b) The Parties request the Court to order that the written proceedings 
should consist of Memorials presented by each of the Parties not later 
than the date set forth in the Official Schedule of the 2016 Philip C. 
Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition. 
 
Article 5 
(a) The Parties shall accept any Judgment of the Court as final and 
binding upon them and shall execute it in its entirety and in good 
faith. 
(b) Immediately after the transmission of any Judgment, the Parties shall 
enter into negotiations on the modalities for its execution. 
 
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized, have 
signed the present Special Agreement and have affixed thereto their 
respective seals of office. 
Done in The Hague, The Netherlands, this first day of September in 
the year two thousand fifteen, in triplicate in the English language. 
 
Mata Rosenberg,  Klaus Hall, Ambassador of the State of Amestonia 
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Riesland to the Kingdom of The 
Netherlands to the Kingdom of The Netherlands 
**SPECIAL AGREEMENT** 
THE CASE CONCERNING THE FROST FILES 
AMESTONIA / RIESLAND 
1. Riesland is a developed democratic state with a population of 
approximately 100 million, which boasts one of the fastest growing 
free-market economies in the world. Many of Riesland’s top 
corporations are listed on the New York, London, and Shanghai 
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stock exchanges. Its rapidly-expanding information technology and 
communications sector is world-renowned.  
2. Amestonia is a developing country bordering Riesland to the south, 
with a population of approximately 20 million. Amestonia is a 
predominantly agrarian export economy. Agriculture employs 55% 
of Amestonia’s workforce.  
3. The Rieslandic Secret Surveillance Bureau (“the Bureau”) engages, 
inter alia, in covert operations and collects intelligence outside of 
Riesland pursuant to the provisions of the Secret Surveillance 
Bureau Act 1967 (“SSBA”), as amended. 
4. Section 21 of the SSBA, entitled “Electronic Surveillance,” grants 
the Director of the Bureau (“the Director”) the power to authorize 
“electronic surveillance,” without a court order, to acquire “foreign 
intelligence.” The SSBA defines “electronic surveillance” as “the 
installation of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device 
outside Riesland’s territory, and/or the acquisition by such a device 
of the content of or other technical information concerning a wire or 
radio communication.” The statute defines “foreign intelligence” as 
“any information located or emanating from outside Riesland’s 
territory, which is relevant to the ability of Riesland to protect itself 
against any actual or potential threat to its national security or the 
ability of Riesland to conduct its foreign affairs.” 
5. Section 32 of the SSBA, “Minimization Procedures and Structural 
Safeguards,” sets forth five limitations on the Bureau’s surveillance 
activity. First, electronic surveillance may not be authorized by the 
Director whenever there is a “substantial likelihood” that 
information acquired thereby will include “any communication to 
which a national of Riesland is a party.” Second, it establishes a five-
judge National Security Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), which must 
review all electronic surveillance conducted under the SSBA every 
six months. Proceedings before the Tribunal are closed to the public, 
but the Tribunal is authorized to call on technical experts, academics, 
and NGOs to participate as amici curiae. Third, a Parliamentary 
Committee for Surveillance Oversight is created, with access to all 
information relating to the Bureau’s operations, and the capacity to 
launch independent investigations and to summon the Bureau’s 
Director and other personnel to appear before it. Fourth, the statute 
provides that surveillance of “foreign public officials” may be 
authorized only when the Director, with the concurrence of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, considers it “necessary.” Fifth, the 
Bureau must comply with any regulations issued by the Attorney 
General concerning legal aspects of any surveillance program.   
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6. Relations between Riesland and Amestonia, which share a common 
language and have similar ethnic composition, have been largely 
positive. On 11 December 1970, Riesland’s Prime Minister visited 
Amestonia to mark the centenary of the completion of the first 
railway line between the two countries. During that visit, the Prime 
Minister and his Amestonian counterpart signed a number of 
bilateral agreements, concerning tourism, trade, extradition, 
intelligence-sharing, and other fields of cooperation. Since then, the 
two nations have enjoyed healthy cross-border economic, cultural 
and security ties, including the establishment of a free-trade area in 
agricultural and agricultural-related goods in 1992. By 1998, 
Riesland had become the top importer of Amestonian agricultural 
produce, totaling approximately €1.5 million per day. Between 2003 
and 2013, Amestonia saw an annual GDP growth rate of between 
6.8% and 7.4%, the highest in the region. 
7. On 4 March 1992, Riesland and Amestonia signed the “Treaty on 
The Establishment of Broadcasting Facilities” (“the Broadcasting 
Treaty,” Annex I), pursuant to which each state was permitted to 
build, staff, and operate a television station in the other’s territory. In 
a joint press release, ministers from both states expressed their hopes 
that the treaty “will become yet another milestone in what is already 
the warmest of friendships between our two societies.” Both Parties 
ratified the Broadcasting Treaty shortly thereafter. 
8. Riesland National Television is a state-owned and operated 
corporation, which provides public broadcasting services across 
Riesland. In accordance with the Broadcasting Treaty, Riesland 
established a new division of the corporation, The Voice of Riesland 
(“VoR”), to operate in Amestonia. The inaugural program of the new 
station and its Amestonian counterpart, a combined performance by 
the two countries’ national orchestras of Vivaldi’s “The Four 
Seasons,” aired on 22 December 1992. VoR broadcast a variety of 
award-winning documentaries and highly-acclaimed programs for 
the next 22 years.  
9. One of VoR’s most popular shows was “Tea Time with Margaret,” 
a weekly one-hour news program featuring interviews with leading 
Amestonian political and business figures. Margaret Mayer, the 
show’s host, is a television icon from Riesland, appointed by the 
Ministry of Telecommunications to serve as Head of VoR. Among 
those appearing on her show were former and incumbent 
Amestonian presidents, cabinet ministers, parliamentary party 
leaders, business executives, and diplomats.  
10. The Institute for Land and Sustainable Agriculture (“ILSA”), a 
Dutch NGO established for the purpose of monitoring global soil 
2016] Jessup Compromis 151 
 
structure, composition, and biodiversity, began to express concerns 
in the early 1990s about the long-term sustainability of Amestonia’s 
agricultural production and trade. In particular, ILSA’s reports 
addressed Amestonian farmers’ reliance on a class of neuro-active 
insecticides known as neonicotinoids, or “neonics,” produced solely 
by Rieslandic companies, to boost yields. From time to time ILSA 
called on the governments of both countries to study and review the 
environmental and ecological impacts of these insecticides on the 
regional biosphere.  
11. On 2 October 2012, ILSA published a report entitled “The Plight of 
the Bumblebee.” The report summarized a 20-year peer-reviewed 
scientific study examining the negative effects of the increased use 
of neonics by Amestonian farmers on populations of bees and other 
pollinators. ILSA experts found that the region’s honeybee 
population had decreased by some 25% over the previous 20 years, 
due in part to the well-documented phenomenon of Colony Collapse 
Disorder (“CCD”). The report also found a statistically significant 
correlation – but not definitive evidence of causation – between the 
gradual increase in CCD and the rise in the use of neonics across the 
region. ILSA urged Riesland to reevaluate its production of this type 
of insecticide, and Amestonia to reevaluate its extensive use, 
suggesting that the only long-term solution would be a complete 
phase-out of neonicotinoids. It concluded, “the current rate of 
decrease in bee populations will, if it continues unchecked, result in 
catastrophic consequences for the environment, for food production, 
for sustainable farming, and ultimately for the economies of both 
states.” 
12. The European Commission adopted a Regulation on 24 May 2013, 
restricting for a period of two years the use of a number of neonics 
for seed treatment, soil application, and foliar treatment in crops 
attractive to bees. The ILSA report and the European Commission’s 
action sparked academic and parliamentary debates in both Riesland 
and Amestonia, but no policy changes were undertaken in either 
country.  
13. On 2 July 2013, a new website, www.longlivethehive.com, was 
launched. The website invited environmental activists to register 
online and to utilize its chat rooms to discuss ways to stop the 
continued production and use of neonicotinoids. The website quickly 
gained attention in Amestonia and Riesland, and at its peak was 
visited by approximately 200,000 users a day. Conversations on its 
online forums, which protected users’ anonymity, often focused on 
lobbying activities in support of draft legislation. However some 
members also promoted violent actions, including sabotage and 
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arson. One anonymous post, which was later reposted onto social 
media and received widespread attention in Amestonia, read: “Our 
politicians have failed to respond to peaceful initiatives. We must 
take charge and command attention. The despoliation of the Earth, 
and of its living creatures, is an act of violence, and unless it is 
stopped, it must be responded to effectively and in kind.” 
14. On the night of 2 February 2014, seven Amestonian warehouses 
were simultaneously set on fire. The warehouses stored a significant 
number of barrels of neonicotinoids. In total, five people died from 
smoke inhalation, and many others were injured. Two of the dead 
were Rieslandic nationals. Police found spray-painted images of a 
bee on the asphalt outside the sites. Initial government reports 
estimated the damage from the attacks, including long-term adverse 
health consequences for the local population, at €75 million.  
15. The President of Amestonia, Jonathan Hale, was interviewed by 
Margaret Mayer on the day following the arson attacks. When asked 
about the alleged involvement of environmental activists in the 
attacks, President Hale responded: “We do not yet have all of the 
facts concerning these terrible, orchestrated crimes. The police are 
investigating and will bring the perpetrators to justice. Given the 
critical importance of agriculture to our national economy, acts of 
sabotage like these should be seen as attacks on us all. My 
administration will not tolerate such provocations.” 
16. On 7 March 2014, 263 envelopes containing white powder were sent 
to the Ministries of Trade and Agriculture in both Riesland and 
Amestonia, to prominent Amestonian farmers, and to board 
members of three neonic-producing Rieslandic corporations. The 
image of a bee was stamped on the back of all of the envelopes. 
Examinations determined that the powder was a non-toxic variant of 
a neonicotinoid. An anonymous tweet by user @buzzkiller24601 
posted that evening, which quickly went viral, read: “You’ve been 
warned. The threat is real. It must be addressed. Next time you’ll 
taste your own poison. #banneonics #savethebees.”  
17. President Hale and the Prime Minister of Riesland, Alice Silk, 
discussed the arson and the white powder incident in a telephone 
conversation the following day. Prime Minister Silk offered 
Riesland’s continued cooperation in combatting what she called 
“acts of eco-terrorism,” including coordination and sharing of 
intelligence information, and stressed the importance of continued 
agricultural trade between the two countries. Following the call, the 
Prime Minister announced that she had ordered Riesland’s security 
and intelligence services to direct their operations against “what 
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appears to be a new, growing, and dangerous threat to the well-being 
of both of our countries.”  
18. On 16 October 2014, Tom Sivaneta, the Bureau’s Director, met with 
the Amestonian Minister of Internal Affairs. He informed the 
Minister that the Bureau had succeeded in identifying a ring of 
Amestonian environmental activists who had been plotting to 
contaminate a large shipment of honey, intended for consumption in 
Riesland, with a chemically-altered and toxic neonicotinoid. He 
provided the Minister with the names and locations of the ring 
members. The following day, Riesland declared a Terrorism Alert 
pursuant to the Terrorism Act 2003 (Annex II). The Terrorism Alert 
was reissued in April 2015.  
19. On 21 October 2014, the police broke into a garage located in 
Amestonia’s capital and apprehended three Amestonian college 
students. The students had in their possession significant quantities 
of chemically-altered neonicotinoids and detailed maps of a number 
of honey extraction facilities in Amestonia. They admitted to 
planning an attack (which they insisted would not cause injuries or 
deaths), and to being part of a group of environmentalists, which they 
called “The Hive.” The students refused to provide the authorities 
with the names, locations, or future plans of other members of the 
group. 
20. Frederico Frost, a national of Riesland, is a former Bureau 
intelligence analyst who had been part of the Bureau’s eco-terrorism 
working group, established in early 2014. Frost had full access to 
sensitive information relating to Riesland’s intelligence operations 
in Amestonia. On the morning of 16 December 2014, Frost drove 
from the Bureau’s facilities to Amestonia, where he contacted 
Chester & Walsingham, a law firm that had previously represented 
defendants in a number of high-profile whistle-blower and national 
security cases. Frost handed lawyers from the firm a USB drive 
containing nearly 100,000 documents labeled top secret that he said 
he had directly downloaded from Bureau computers. The firm agreed 
to represent Frost in relation to any disclosure or dissemination of 
the materials. 
21. On 18 December 2014, accompanied by his lawyers, Frost met with 
two reporters from The Ames Post, Amestonia’s most widely-
circulated newspaper. He gave the reporters a copy of the USB drive, 
requesting that the newspaper publish the contents on its website. In 
a written statement, Frost explained that “I have come to realize how 
surveillance programs, like the ones I was engaged in, threaten 
individual liberties and sovereign equality. I am compelled to talk 
about this! If we are going to trade liberty for security, we have to do 
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it with our eyes open. These decisions should be made by the public, 
not by politicians.”  
22. In January and February 2015, thousands of documents marked “top 
secret” were gradually published, unedited and unredacted, on the 
website of The Ames Post, following what the newspaper termed “a 
process of authentication and review performed by our reporters and 
lawyers.” One of the documents, published on 23 January and 
headed “The Verismo Program,” bore a signature of Tom Sivaneta. 
It detailed a May 2013 operation he had authorized, in which a 
waterproof recording pod was installed on the undersea fiber optic 
cable that was the primary backbone for Amestonia’s international 
internet and telephone communications traffic. The device was 
placed on a section of the cable located in Riesland’s exclusive 
economic zone. The pod copied all information that went through the 
cable and transferred it to the Bureau’s servers. According to the 
document, 1.2 million gigabytes of data were collected and stored 
daily pursuant to Verismo. The document also noted that, following 
the white powder incident on 7 March, Bureau employees had been 
instructed to use all of the Bureau’s resources “to track 
environmental activists in Amestonia,” relying on specifically 
tailored search terms, or “selectors.”  
23. On 29 January 2015, The Ames Post published on its website a 
document on the letterhead of the Office of the Attorney General of 
Riesland, James Deloponte. Dated 2 July 2014, it detailed 
regulations issued by the Attorney General regarding the Bureau’s 
surveillance. The document provided that all data collected by the 
Bureau through Verismo or related programs, other than as the result 
of investigation of a specific individual, could be stored for a 
maximum of two years. It also noted that the Tribunal, in accordance 
with the SSBA, had reviewed the Verismo Program every six months 
since its inception with no participation from outside experts. The 
Parliamentary Committee for Surveillance Oversight had also 
reviewed Verismo twice in closed-door hearings, but neither the 
Tribunal nor the Committee had ever challenged its legality. 
According to the document, Amestonian security authorities had 
knowingly accepted, on at least 50 occasions, redacted information 
relating to terrorist activity derived from Verismo. 
24. On 2 February 2015, Riesland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a 
diplomatic note to his counterpart in Amestonia requesting the 
immediate extradition of Frost, in accordance with the 1970 
Extradition Treaty, to stand trial for theft and a number of data 
security offenses. The diplomatic note also requested that Amestonia 
recover the information Frost had downloaded, believed to be held 
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by either Chester & Walsingham or The Ames Post, and return it to 
Riesland for use in the ongoing criminal investigation against Frost. 
It emphasized that “any further publication of these materials will 
have a long-term, damaging impact on cooperation between our two 
nations in our joint campaign against terrorism.” The Amestonian 
Minister indicated that the extradition request would be considered 
in accordance with the Treaty, but noted the Amestonian 
Government’s “surprise at the reported scope and reach of 
Riesland’s surveillance programs.” He called upon the Minister to 
provide more information on the extent of these activities and their 
impact on Amestonian nationals’ private lives. 
25. On 16 February 2015, the banner headline of The Ames Post website 
read: “Margaret the Spy!” Another document leaked by Frost stated 
that since its inception in 1992, the premises of the VoR station had 
been used by the Bureau to promote its surveillance activities on 
Amestonian soil. The document was printed on the letterhead of the 
Office of the Bureau’s Director. According to the document, 
Margaret Mayer was part of an operation called “the Carmen 
Program,” intended to collect intelligence on high-ranking 
Amestonian public figures and private sector leaders. Whenever 
such individuals came to be interviewed for Mayer’s show, they 
were told that their electronic devices could interfere with the 
sensitive wireless microphones used during broadcasts. They were 
offered the opportunity to place their devices in a locker within their 
line of sight from the studio. Electronics placed in the locker were 
removed during the interviews by means of a concealed backdoor. 
This provided Bureau engineers, who doubled as VoR employees, 
sufficient opportunity to hack into the guests’ phones and portable 
computers and install a rootkit malware referred to in Frost’s 
documents as “Blaster,” which then provided the Bureau full remote 
privileged access to these devices. The information collected from 
“Carmen” was stored and later analyzed in an underground floor 
within the VoR building, code-named “The Opera House.”  
26. A number of memoranda mentioning “Carmen” were also published 
in raw form on The Ames Post’s site. They revealed that over 100 
Amestonian public figures, businessmen, officials, and diplomats 
were surveilled under this program, whose primary objective was “to 
collect information concerning Amestonia’s domestic and foreign 
policy, in order to advance Riesland’s political and economic 
interests in the region.” One memorandum contained an image of 
David Cornwell, Amestonia’s Ambassador to the United Nations, 
and detailed how Carmen operatives had been able to hack his phone 
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and access emails regarding Amestonia’s positions on upcoming 
votes in the General Assembly and specialized agencies. 
27. That evening, Amestonian police applied to a judge for an 
emergency warrant to seize all assets and property of VoR pending 
an investigation into whether criminal offenses had been committed, 
citing as probable cause the Carmen Program documents published 
by The Ames Post. While the police were in chambers with the judge 
applying for the warrant, VoR’s television broadcasting was 
interrupted and replaced with old reruns of “Tea Time with 
Margaret.” The judge immediately granted the warrant. Upon 
execution of the warrant that night, the Amestonian police found the 
station unattended, although the TV broadcasting equipment and 
various other devices and documents had been left untouched. These 
articles were all catalogued and removed by the police. 
28. At 3:15 A.M. the following morning, Amestonia’s Border Patrol, 
conducting routine operations, encountered Margaret Mayer and two 
other Rieslandic VoR employees on a train crossing into Riesland. 
The Border Patrol requested that they present their travel documents 
for inspection. They refused, and were promptly detained. When the 
commander of the police unit conducting the investigation into VoR 
learned of this development, she sought and was granted a warrant 
for the arrest of the three on suspicion of espionage. They were 
subsequently charged with that offense, and were denied bail on the 
basis that they were a flight risk. 
29. President Hale held a press conference on the morning of 17 
February 2015. Before taking questions, he read a prepared 
statement:  
I am deeply troubled by reports that Riesland has, for 
decades, engaged in a concerted surveillance campaign 
targeting our citizens and violating our territorial 
integrity and political independence. Riesland’s own 
documents show that these offenses against our 
sovereignty were purely politically motivated and had 
no public order implications. We are entitled to an 
explanation. Any claims that such programs are 
necessary to combat terrorism simply ring hollow. No 
matter how severe any perceived threat to Riesland’s 
national security, there is absolutely no justification for 
the systematic infringement of our citizens’ privacy. 
Mass electronic surveillance of our people and 
institutions violates Riesland’s obligations under the 
U.N. Charter, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic 
and Consular Relations, the Broadcasting Treaty, and 
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principles of comity between nations. Simply put, 
gentlemen do not read each other’s mail, and friends do 
not spy on friends. 
30. In response to a reporter’s question, President Hale went on to say, 
“Our police authorities are treating the VoR facilities and its 
equipment as a crime scene. Margaret Mayer and the other VoR 
employees are suspected of having committed the very serious crime 
of espionage, charges which will be handled according to our laws.” 
He denied that the search of the premises and the detention of the 
three individuals violated Amestonia’s obligations under the 
Broadcasting Treaty, saying: “the VoR facilities and employees lost 
their immunities and privileges once the station ceased acting as a 
broadcaster and became a nest of spies.” Amestonia then recalled its 
ambassador to Riesland for consultations, and officially closed its 
TV station in Riesland. 
31. On 19 February 2015, Prime Minister Silk rejected President Hale’s 
characterization of Riesland’s and VoR’s activities in a televised 
interview. She explained that Riesland’s surveillance programs 
complied with both domestic and international law because they 
“were prescribed by statutes, structured around minimization 
procedures, and routinely reviewed by competent authorities with 
oversight power.” She asserted that the methods employed were 
“both necessary and proportionate,” observing that the results of the 
surveillance “had benefited the national security and interests of 
Amestonia just as much as those of Riesland.” She ended her 
statement by saying:  
Our two nations have enjoyed decades of fruitful 
bilateral cooperation, which is now being severely 
compromised. We make no apology for our efforts to 
keep ourselves and our friends safe from acts of 
terrorism. Meanwhile, the Amestonian administration is 
hardly reciprocating our acts of friendship. It is 
providing sanctuary to Frederico Frost, who is accused 
of very serious crimes in Riesland, and has expropriated 
our property and arrested our nationals in blatant 
disregard of the treaty between us. 
32. Joseph Kafker is a 70-year-old retired Amestonian politician who 
founded the Green Party, now the third largest in the Amestonian 
Parliament. For years, Kafker has been a vocal opponent of the use 
of neonics in agricultural production. During his years as a Member 
of Parliament he attempted, on a number of occasions, to promote 
legislation banning them. None of these efforts was successful, a fact 
he lamented on his retirement in 2012. On 7 March 2015, Kafker was 
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invited to give the keynote address at an international environmental 
law conference at Riesland’s largest law school. After he completed 
his speech, he was detained by the police, allegedly in accordance 
with the Terrorism Act. The story broke in the international media 
the following day. In a special session, the Amestonian Parliament 
adopted a resolution denouncing Kafker’s detention and demanding 
his release. The Government of Riesland did not respond. 
33. On 10 March 2015, Kafker’s case was brought before the National 
Security Tribunal. Following a request from the Attorney General’s 
Office, the Tribunal ruled that all evidence pertaining to Kafker’s 
activities and leading to his apprehension was “closed material,” as 
the term is defined in the Terrorism Act. The Tribunal further 
allowed Bureau officers to testify via video conferencing, with their 
faces and voices obscured, regarding the need to detain Kafker. 
Following their testimony, the Tribunal granted the petition to extend 
Kafker’s detention for reasons of national security. Kafker’s lawyer, 
who had been selected from a list of approved “special advocates,” 
was present during the proceedings, but was not permitted either to 
consult with his client or to share with him any of the secret 
information said to substantiate the allegations against him. Kafker 
remains detained without charge in a maximum-security facility in 
Riesland and his detention has been extended by the Tribunal every 
21 days. A motion challenging the constitutionality of the 
proceedings was filed before the Supreme Court of Riesland but was 
denied. 
34. On 12 March 2015, Amestonia’s Foreign Minister contacted his 
counterpart in Riesland and demanded access to the secret evidence 
that constituted the basis for Kafker’s detention. He also stated that, 
in Amestonia’s view, the Terrorism Act did not comply with 
international human rights standards. The Rieslandic Minister 
rejected the request, responding that disclosure of the information 
concerning Kafker’s apprehension would endanger the integrity of 
particular intelligence sources and therefore the national security of 
Riesland. The Minister further stressed that the National Security 
Tribunal had already determined that the information could not be 
disclosed in accordance with the Terrorism Act. 
35. On 14 March 2015, President Hale instructed his Minister of Justice 
to refuse the extradition request for Frederico Frost, citing the 
“political offense” exception in the Extradition Treaty. He also 
ordered that Riesland’s request for the documents held by The Ames 
Post be denied. Attorney General Deloponte responded to these 
developments in a statement:  
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The Government of Riesland has repeatedly made clear 
that it will not tolerate the publication of leaked 
confidential information, and that it will do whatever is 
in its power to disrupt any further threats to our national 
security. With or without foreign government support, 
we will continue our efforts to bring the fugitive Frost to 
justice, and to stop the damage that will result from any 
dissemination of Riesland’s top secret documents. 
36. On 17 March 2015, The Ames Post website’s banner read “A Kafker-
esque Affair.” A memorandum, sourced from Frost’s USB stick, 
revealed that a May 2014 interview with Kafker on “Tea Time with 
Margaret” had allowed the Bureau to hack into his electronic 
devices. According to the memorandum, Kafker was considered a 
“high-level suspect with ties to The Hive, including the planned 
contamination of a large shipment of honey with a toxic variant of 
neonicotinoids in 2014.” The continuous surveillance of Kafker, 
following the bugging of his devices, was considered a “top 
priority.” From intercepted communications, Bureau analysts were 
able to establish that Kafker was a frequent visitor to the 
longlivethehive website, had participated in online chats, and had 
used the forum’s “like” function to endorse conversations including 
calls for violent disruptions to raise public awareness of the neonics 
controversy. Attorney General Deloponte refused to comment on 
questions raised by the media following The Ames Post’s 
publication. He stated only that Riesland was in possession of 
“closed materials” that “directly link Kafker to The Hive’s senior 
echelons.” 
37. On 22 March 2015, the computer networks and communication 
switches at both The Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham were 
hacked and disabled. Investigators found that the hackers had used a 
malicious program to disrupt the operation of the computer systems 
and to corrupt master boot records, to the extent that nearly 90% of 
the information was “non-recoverable.” 
38. Based on traffic analysis, cyber security experts from the 
Amestonian Institute of Technology concluded: “The malware used 
in the hacking of the computers has been traced to IP addresses 
within Riesland’s territory that are associated with Riesland’s 
computer infrastructures. Significant segments of code in the 
malware are exact replicas of those used in the Bureau’s ‘Blaster’ 
program. These code segments are not otherwise known to be in use 
or available to the general public.” Both Chester & Walsingham and 
The Ames Post contracted external appraisers, who have estimated 
the combined damages related to infrastructure and to unrecoverable 
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data at €45-50 million. A significant number of proceedings before 
Amestonian courts were delayed for months as a result of Chester & 
Walsingham’s inability to access its files. The Ames Post had to shut 
down its operations entirely; it resumed publication only in June 
2015. 
39. On 1 April 2015, President Hale issued a statement denouncing the 
cyberattacks, stating that “all of the evidence points back to the 
Bureau and to Riesland.” He described them as “not only 
undermining freedom of expression and attorney-client privilege – 
essential values in and of themselves,” but as an “assault upon the 
very principles that stand at the core of our society.” In an interview 
with local news held on 5 April 2015, Attorney General Deloponte 
refused to respond to allegations that Riesland was involved in the 
attacks. 
40. On 22 April 2015, the Amestonian Ministry of Justice announced 
that the police investigation into the items found at the VoR station 
premises had determined that a number of them had been used for 
surveillance. The Ministry reported that it had obtained a forfeiture 
order against the premises and all property found there on the basis 
that it was employed in criminal activity. Finally, the Ministry stated 
its intention to sell the station’s real estate and property, estimated to 
be worth €20 million, by public auction. Challenges to the original 
warrant dated 16 February 2015 and to the forfeiture order, presented 
to Amestonia’s High Court by attorneys from Riesland National 
Television Corporation, were rejected. All subsequent appeals were 
summarily dismissed. The auction has been stayed until the 
conclusion of all outstanding legal proceedings before the 
International Court of Justice. 
41. In mid-2015, diplomats from Riesland and Amestonia began 
meeting in an attempt to settle their differences. After several months 
of negotiations, the parties were unable to reach an agreement. In 
July 2015, Amestonia circulated among the members of the United 
Nations Human Rights Council the text of a proposed resolution 
calling on the recently-appointed Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Privacy to investigate whether Riesland’s cyber and surveillance 
programs were in compliance with international law. An article 
published in The Sydney Morning Herald on 9 July 2015 reported 
that Riesland’s supporters on the Council had urged it to resolve its 
disputes with Amestonia. A source within the Council told the 
newspaper: “A number of countries voiced their concern that the 
continued uncertainty as to the legality of the challenged surveillance 
programs would hinder their ability to continue to engage and share 
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intelligence with Riesland without fear of being complicit in human 
rights abuses.” 
42. In light of growing international pressure, Riesland and Amestonia 
agreed to refer all matters in dispute to the International Court of 
Justice, and for this purpose have drafted and signed this Special 
Agreement. Riesland, however, has reserved its objections to the 
admissibility of information derived from any confidential 
documents that may have been provided to The Ames Post by Frost. 
The parties agreed that the issue of the admissibility of the 
documents would be left for the Court to resolve, as reflected in 
Article 2(b) of this Special Agreement. 
43. Amestonia and Riesland are both members of the United Nations, 
and are parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice; the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations; the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations; the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings; and the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Neither state has made 
any reservations, declarations or understandings with regard to any 
of these treaties. 
44. Applicant asks the Court to adjudge and declare that: 
(1) The documents published on the website of The Ames 
Post are admissible as evidence before the Court; 
Riesland’s mass electronic surveillance programs 
against Amestonian public figures and nationals 
revealed in those documents violates international 
law; and Amestonia is therefore entitled to an order 
directing the immediate cessation of those programs 
with assurances of non-repetition;  
(2) The seizure and forfeiture of the VoR station and its 
equipment, and the arrest of Margaret Mayer and the 
other two VoR employees, did not violate the 
Broadcasting Treaty, and were in accordance with 
Amestonia’s other international law obligations; 
(3) The detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism 
Act violated international law, and Amestonia is 
therefore entitled to his immediate release, the 
disclosure of all information which formed the basis 
of his apprehension, and the payment of compensation 
for his detention; and 
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(4) The cyber attacks against the computer systems of The 
Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham are attributable 
to Riesland, and constitute an internationally wrongful 
act for which Amestonia is entitled to compensation.  
45. Respondent asks the Court to adjudge and declare that: 
(1) The illicitly-obtained documents published on the 
website of The Ames Post are inadmissible before the 
Court, but in the event that the Court does find them 
to be admissible, they do not evidence any breach by 
Riesland of an international obligation owed to 
Amestonia; 
(2) The arrest of Margaret Mayer and the other VoR 
employees, and the expropriation of the VoR facility 
and its equipment, violated the Broadcasting Treaty 
and international law generally, and Riesland is 
therefore entitled to the immediate release of its 
nationals and compensation for the value of the 
confiscated property;  
(3) Riesland’s detention of Joseph Kafker under the 
Terrorism Act is consistent with its obligations under 
international law, and the Court has no authority to 
order either Kafker’s release or the disclosure of the 
information relating to his apprehension; and 
 (4) The cyber attacks against the computer systems of The 
Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham cannot be 
attributed to Riesland, and in any event did not 
constitute an internationally wrongful act.  
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ANNEX I 
 
TREATY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT 
OF BROADCASTING FACILITIES 
BETWEEN THE STATE OF AMESTONIA 
AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF RIESLAND 
4 MARCH 1992 
 
[excerpts] 
 
The State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland (“the 
Contracting Parties”),  
(a) desiring to fortify the friendship between the two countries; (b) 
recognizing the importance of strengthening understanding and cooperation 
between their peoples; (c) seeking to offer their citizens radio and television 
channels that will reflect the two nations’ dynamic political, cultural, and 
artistic activity; have agreed upon the following articles: 
 
ARTICLE 1 
1. Each Contracting Party may establish and operate in the territory of the 
other a radio and television broadcasting station. 
2. The land on which each station will be constructed will be procured by 
the operating-state and held in its name. The operating state will be 
responsible for staffing, running, and funding the station, and shall 
procure at its own expense and in its own name the materials and other 
equipment required for its operation.  
 
[...] 
 
ARTICLE 2 
Each station shall produce and air programs and content including news 
stories, interviews, documentaries, and movies produced either in or by the 
operating country, with local viewers and listeners in the host country as the 
target audiences. 
 
[...] 
 
ARTICLE 14 
1. The premises referenced in article 1(2) of the present Treaty shall be 
inviolable, and agents of the host state may not enter those premises 
without the consent of the head of the station. Such consent may be 
assumed only in cases of fire or other similar disaster posing or 
threatening serious immediate danger to public safety or order. 
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2. In addition to the premises of the station, its furnishings, equipment, and 
other property used in its operation, as well as its means of transport, 
shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment, expropriation, or 
execution. 
3. The receiving state is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to 
protect the premises of the station against any intrusion or damage, and 
to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the premises or impairment of 
its dignity. 
 
4. The archives and documents of the station shall bear visible external 
marks of identification, and shall be inviolable at all times and wherever 
they may be. 
 
[...] 
 
ARTICLE 15 
1. Each station's employees, who are also nationals of the operating state, 
shall be entitled to the  
following immunities and privileges: 
a) The persons of each station’s employees shall be inviolable, and 
they shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The 
host state shall treat them with due respect and shall take all 
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their freedom or 
dignity. 
b) Each station’s personnel shall enjoy immunity from the criminal 
jurisdiction of the receiving state, and shall not be obliged to give 
evidence as witnesses.   
c) In respect of acts performed by an employee of the station in the 
exercise of its functions, the immunities and privileges shall 
continue to subsist after the employee’s functions at the station 
have come to an end. 
  
[...] 
 
ARTICLE 23 
1. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of 
all persons employed by each station to respect the laws and 
regulations of the host state. Those who are nationals of the operating 
state have an additional duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of 
the host state. 
2. The premises of the station must not be used in any manner 
incompatible with the station’s functions as envisaged in the present 
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Treaty, in other rules of general international law, or in any other 
agreements in force between the Parties hereto.   
 
[...] 
 
ARTICLE 36 
All privileges and immunities provided for in this Treaty, save for those in 
Article 15(1)(c) above, shall cease to have effect upon the cessation of the 
station’s functions as envisaged in the present Treaty.  
 
[...] 
 
ARTICLE 40 
The term of this agreement shall be 30 years.  
 
 
(Signed)     (Signed) 
Shannon Belle Cambridge   John Andre Sorge 
Minister of Telecommunications Minister of State of 
State of Amestonia Telecommunications 
 Federal Republic of 
Riesland 
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ANNEX II 
 
TERRORISM ACT 2003 
 
[excerpts] 
 
 
1. Definitions 
[...] 
“National Security Tribunal” (“the Tribunal”) shall have the meaning given 
that term under the Secret Surveillance Bureau Act 1967;  
[...] 
“Terrorist Act” shall mean an act as defined in Article 2.1(b) of the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
(9 December 1999);  
[...] 
 
2. Terrorism Alert 
If the Government receives information that there is a credible danger of an 
imminent terrorist act being committed in Riesland, it may issue a Terrorism 
Alert. Such an Alert shall be valid for six months, unless it is revoked earlier. 
Upon its expiration or revocation, the Government may issue a new 
Terrorism Alert if it considers that the credible danger of terrorist acts still 
persists or has been revived. 
 
3. Detention Powers 
a.  When a Terrorism Alert is in force, the Government may detain any 
foreign national suspected of being involved in instigating, authorizing, 
planning, financing, carrying out, or aiding a Terrorist Act, as defined 
herein, for a period not exceeding 180 days.  
b. Except as provided herein, no court shall review the detention of any 
person hereunder, but every detainee shall be brought before the Tribunal 
within three days of his or her detention.  
c. Proceedings before the Tribunal will be held in secret, and its 
proceedings will not be disclosed to the public or the media. Records of 
the Tribunal’s proceedings shall be entitled to the highest protection 
provided by law.  
d. The Tribunal may decide whether continued detention of an individual 
is required for reasons of national security or public safety. The Tribunal 
shall give appropriate consideration to factors including, but not limited 
to: 
i. the likelihood that the detainee has in fact committed, instigated, 
authorized, planned, financed, or aided a Terrorist Act; 
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ii. the likelihood that the detainee will commit a Terrorist Act or will 
incite others to do so if he or she is released; 
iii. the likelihood of family or government rehabilitation or support 
for the detainee if he or she is released; 
iv. the likelihood that the detainee may be subject to criminal trial, 
whether under this Act or some other statute;  
v. the likelihood that, following release, the detainee’s country of 
nationality will request extradition from Riesland; and 
vi. any substantial interest in the detainee expressly stated by 
national law enforcement or intelligence authorities. 
e. In making its decision under subsection (d), the Tribunal may receive 
and accept any documentary or testimonial evidence from any source. It 
shall determine whether or not particular evidence is to be treated as 
“closed material.” Closed material shall not be made available to the 
detainee, his or her counsel, or third parties, without the Tribunal’s 
authorization.  
f. In proceedings before the Tribunal, officials from the security and 
intelligence authorities may be allowed to testify anonymously via video 
conferencing with their faces and voices obscured.  
g. After the initial review provided in subsection (b), each detainee will be 
brought before the Tribunal no less often than every 21 days for a 
periodic review. The Tribunal will consider whether conditions such as 
those listed under subsection (d) have changed, allowing for the 
detainee’s criminal prosecution or release.   
h. The Tribunal may extend the detention of any detainee in appropriate 
circumstances, but no detainee shall remain in custody under this Act for 
a period of more than 540 days in total. 
i. Persons detained under this Act may be represented by legal counsel to 
be selected by them from a list of “Special Advocates,” who possess 
appropriate security clearance. This list shall be compiled by the 
Attorney General. Only Special Advocates will be entitled to participate 
in proceedings where closed material is presented. A Special Advocate 
may not disclose closed materials to or discuss them with the detainee or 
any third party, or obtain the detainee’s instructions pertaining to such 
materials. 
 
[...] 
  

2016 PHILIP C. JESSUP  
INTERNATIONAL LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION 
 
CORRECTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS TO THE SPECIAL 
AGREEMENT 
 
The following corrections and clarifications to the Special Agreement 
have been agreed to by the parties, and the text jointly notified to the Court 
on 1 September 2015 should be considered amended accordingly. The 
Registrar of the Court reminds all parties and participants of the following: 
a. The Special Agreement is, in essence, a negotiated stipulation of 
facts. Its words have been carefully chosen, and are the result of 
extensive negotiation. The parties decline to “clarify” matters 
about which they are unlikely to agree.  
b.  Any request for clarification not addressed in the following 
paragraphs has been considered by the parties to be redundant, 
inappropriate, or immaterial, or the parties were unable to reach 
agreement on a mutually acceptable answer. 
c.  Except to the extent that corrections and clarifications are set out 
below, participants are to assume that the Special Agreement is 
accurate in all respects. 
d.  With respect to pronunciations of the various proper names used 
in the Special Agreement, all parties and the Court have agreed 
that they will not take formal or informal offense at any 
reasonable effort to pronounce proper names correctly. 
 
CORRECTIONS 
 
1. The words “radio and” should be deleted from both subparagraph (c) 
to the preamble and Article 1(1) of the 4 March 1992 Broadcasting 
Treaty, excerpted in Annex I.  
2. At the end of section 3(a) of the Terrorism Act, excerpted in Annex 
II, the following sentence should be added: “No detention shall be 
undertaken under this Act except pursuant to a warrant issued by the 
National Security Tribunal.” 
3. At the end of Paragraph 43 the following sentence should be inserted: 
“Amestonia and Riesland are not parties to any other bilateral or 
multilateral treaty of potential relevance.” 
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CLARIFICATIONS 
 
1. Amestonian police investigators found that the chemically altered 
neonicotinoids in the possession of the three Amestonian college 
students, referenced in Paragraph 19, could potentially cause serious 
bodily injury to anyone handling or inhaling them. 
2. The undersea fiber optic cable, referenced in Paragraph 22, is owned 
by a multinational telecommunications company registered in 
Germany, and is roughly 2000 km in length. At the request of the 
Amestonian government, divers from the telecommunications 
company were sent to the coordinates cited in the “Verismo 
Program” published on the Ames Post website. They identified the 
pod and dismantled it by 6 April 2015. Company investigators were 
able to determine that the pod did not cause any breaking or injury 
to the cable, nor did it interrupt or in any other manner obstruct 
communications.  
3. When, as referenced in Paragraph 23, the intelligence obtained under 
what the Frost Files called “the Verismo Program” was provided to 
Amestonian security authorities, its source was never disclosed. 
Amestonian officials always accepted the intelligence, and never 
challenged or otherwise demanded additional information as to the 
nature, scope, and reach of the Verismo Program, until 2 February 
2015. 
4.  In accordance with the provisions of the Broadcasting Treaty, 
Amestonia approved the appointment of each Rieslandic national 
working at VoR. Thereafter, these employees received 
documentation detailing their privileges and immunities under the 
Treaty.  
5.  The memoranda detailed in Paragraph 26 additionally revealed that 
the Rieslandic Minister of Foreign Affairs was consulted on the 
authorization of the Carmen Program and was routinely briefed on 
the program’s activities. 
6.  Amestonia was immediately informed of Kafker’s detention when 
he was apprehended, and he was afforded consular assistance. 
Kafker has access to medical care and the ability to communicate 
with, and accept visits from, his immediate family.  
7.  Riesland reissued a Terrorism Alert in October 2015. It has notified 
the Secretary General of the United Nations of each of the issued 
Alerts without providing any additional information. 
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8.  The Amestonian Institute of Technology (AIT) referenced in 
Paragraph 38 is a world-renowned research-intensive academic 
institution with a focus on engineering and computer science. The 
Amestonian Government turned to security experts from AIT 
following the 22 March 2015 cyberattack, and asked for their 
assistance in determining the identity of the perpetrators. The experts 
were also provided unfettered access to the devices seized from the 
VoR station. 
9. AIT’s subsequent investigation determined that the computer 
infrastructures referenced in Paragraph 38 were Rieslandic 
governmental computer infrastructures. 
10. Amestonia and Riesland became parties to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties in 1982 and 1976 respectively. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland appear 
before the International Court of Justice in accordance with Article 40(1) of 
its Statute through submission of a special agreement for resolution of all 
the differences between them concerning the Frost Files. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 36(1) of its Statute, as both 
parties have agreed that this Court will adjudicate the dispute under its ad 
hoc jurisdiction. The parties concluded this special agreement and 
Compromis in The Hague, The Netherlands and jointly notified this Court 
of their special agreement on 1 September 2015. 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
The State of Amestonia respectfully requests the Court to adjudge: 
I. 
Whether documents published on the website of The Ames Post are 
admissible as evidence before the Court, whether Riesland’s mass 
electronic surveillance programs against Amestonian public figures and 
nationals revealed in those documents violate international law, and 
whether Amestonia is entitled to an order directing the immediate cessation 
of those programs with assurances of non-repetition; and  
II. 
Whether the seizure and forfeiture of the VoR station and its 
equipment, and the arrest of Margaret Mayer and two other VoR 
employees, violated the Broadcasting Treaty and were in accordance with 
Amestonia’s other international law obligations; and  
III. 
Whether the detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism Act 
violated international law, and whether Amestonia is entitled to his 
immediate release, the disclosure of all information which formed the basis 
of his apprehension, and the payment of compensation for his detention; 
and  
IV. 
Whether the cyber-attacks against the computer systems of The Ames 
Post and Chester & Walsingham are attributable to Riesland and whether 
they constitute an internationally wrongful act for which Amestonia is 
entitled to compensation. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
BACKGROUND 
Amestonia is a developing nation with a population of 20 million and 
an agrarian-based economy.  It borders Riesland, a developed country with 
a population five times that of Amestonia and a world-renowned 
information technology and communications sector. The two nations share 
a language and have enjoyed largely positive political and economic 
relations.  They have concluded a number of bilateral treaties in diverse 
fields of cooperation, among them the 1992 “Treaty on the Establishment of 
Broadcasting Facilities” (“the Broadcasting Treaty”).  The Broadcasting 
Treaty entitles each State to furnish and operate a television station in the 
other’s territory in hopes of facilitating mutual understanding and fortifying 
the friendship between the two nations. To this end, the treaty extends 
certain privileges and immunities to the stations and their employees, 
obligates the station’s employees to respect the laws of the host State and 
not to interfere in its internal affairs, and requires that the station not be 
used in any manner incompatible with the treaty. 
 
THE FROST FILES 
 The Riesland Secret Surveillance Bureau (“the Bureau”) engages in 
spying and covert activities pursuant to the Secret Surveillance Bureau Act 
of 1967 (“SSBA”).  The SSBA provides for some external oversight of the 
Bureau’s activities by other Rieslandic government bodies. In December 
2014, whistleblower Frederico Frost, a former Bureau intelligence analyst, 
fled to Amestonia and turned over numerous top-secret documents relating 
to the Bureau’s activities (“the Frost Files”) to Chester & Walsingham, a 
law firm representing him, and The Ames Post, an Amestonian newspaper. 
The Ames Post independently reviewed and published the documents on its 
website gradually over January and February 2015. Amestonia declined 
Riesland’s request for Frost’s extradition under the political offense 
exception in the countries’ Extradition Treaty. 
 
VERISMO AND CARMEN 
 The Frost Files revealed that beginning in May 2013, as part of a 
surveillance program called “Verismo,” the Bureau collected and stored 1.2 
million gigabytes of data a day from an undersea fiber optic cable that 
serves as Amestonia’s primary means of international communication.  
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The Frost Files also revealed that from its establishment in 1992 
pursuant to the Broadcasting Treaty, the Voice of Riesland (“VoR”), a 
division of state-owned corporation Riesland National Television, had 
operated as the pretext for a Rieslandic surveillance program known as “the 
Carmen Program.” Under this program, Bureau employees acting as VoR 
employees covertly collected information from Amestonian public and 
private sector leaders, including U.N. Ambassador Cornwall. These 
prominent Amestonians were invited to be guests on “Tea Time with 
Margaret,” a weekly show hosted by Rieslandic television icon Margaret 
Mayer, the government-appointed head of the VoR. While Mayer 
interviewed her guests, Bureau employees would install a rootkit malware 
known as “Blaster” on their electronic devices, allowing the Bureau full 
remote privileged access to the interviewees’ phones and computers. The 
program’s primary objective, as described in the leaked documents, was “to 
collect information concerning Amestonia’s domestic and foreign policy, in 
order to advance Riesland’s political and economic interests in the region.” 
 
THE VOR ARRESTS AND SEIZURES 
 On 16 February 2015, the day The Ames Post published the Carmen 
documents, Amestonian police applied for a warrant to seize VoR assets 
and property, citing the documents as probable cause. While the police 
were applying for the warrant, the VoR interrupted its broadcasting and 
replaced it with reruns of Teatime with Margaret. The judge thereafter 
granted the warrant. Upon execution, the police found the station 
unattended and seized the station’s property. At 3:15AM the following 
morning, Amestonian border patrol encountered three VoR employees, 
including Margaret Mayer, attempting to cross into Riesland by train. The 
three refused to produce their travel documents upon request by the 
Amestonian officials and were subsequently detained. Amestonian police 
then sought and obtained an arrest warrant for all three on suspicion of 
espionage. Amestonian investigators later determined that the confiscated 
property had been used for surveillance. The Amestonian Ministry of 
Justice obtained a forfeiture order against VoR real estate and property. 
Amestonia intends to sell the property at public auction, pending the 
resolution of this case. 
 
THE NEONICS CONTROVERSY 
 To boost crop yield, Amestonian farmers use a class of insecticides 
known as neonicotinoids (“neonics”) produced by Rieslandic companies. 
Following a report finding a correlation between the use of neonics and a 
dramatic decline in the region’s honeybee population, environmental 
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activists began advocating for legislation to ban the production and use of 
neonics. Some online contributors advocated for violence on the activist 
website www.longlivethehive.com. 
 On 2 February 2014, seven Amestonian warehouses were set on 
fire, killing three Amestonian nationals and two Rieslandic nationals and 
injuring many others. On 7 March 2014, Amestonian and Rieslandic 
government officials and Rieslandic businessmen received 263 envelopes 
of white powder, later determined to be non-toxic neonics. That night, an 
anonymous online tweet warned that the “threat is real” and that “next 
time” the envelope recipients would “taste [their] own poison.” On 16 
October 2014, Tom Sivaneta, the Bureau’s Director, informed the 
Amestonian Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Bureau had identified a 
group of environmental activists planning to contaminate a honey shipment 
bound for Riesland with a toxic neonicotinoid. The next day, Riesland 
issued a Terrorism Alert pursuant to the Terrorism Act 2003. On 21 
October 2014, Amestonian police arrested three college students—self-
professed members of an environmental group called “The Hive”—in 
possession of toxic neonics and maps of Amestonian honey extraction 
facilities. Riesland reissued Terrorism Alerts in April 2015 and October 
2015. 
 
THE DETENTION OF KAFKER 
 On 7 March 2015, shortly after the VoR arrests and Amestonia’s 
refusal to extradite Frost, Riesland detained Joseph Kafker—a 70-year-old 
retired Amestonian politician and vocal opponent of the use of neonics—
after a speaking engagement in Riesland. Pursuant to provisions of the 
Terrorism Act applying to detentions when a Terrorism Alert is in force, 
Kafker was denied, inter alia, appearance in person before the Tribunal, 
contact with his appointed special advocate, and access to the information 
providing the basis for his arrest. The Tribunal continues to extend his 
detention every 21 days, and the Supreme Court of Riesland has denied 
Kafker’s motion challenging his detention. 
 
CYBER-ATTACKS 
 On 22 March 2015, malware similar to that used in the Blaster 
program and traceable to the cyber-infrastructure of the Rieslandic 
government was used to attack the networks and communication switches 
at Chester & Walsingham and The Ames Post. As a result of the attacks, the 
two targets suffered a combined €45-50 million in damages, The Ames Post 
shut down operations for approximately two months, and a significant 
number of proceedings in Amestonian courts were delayed for months. 
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APPLICATION TO THIS COURT 
 Amestonia and Riesland have agreed to refer this dispute to this 
Court by a Special Agreement. Riesland, however, does not consent to the 
introduction of information derived from confidential documents published 
by The Ames Post. The parties have stipulated in Article 2(b) of the Special 
Agreement that the issue of the admissibility of the documents is left for 
this Court to decide. 
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS 
FIRST PLEADING 
The Frost Files are admissible before this Court, Riesland’s 
surveillance programs violate international law, and Amestonia is entitled 
to immediate cessation and a guarantee of non-repetition of such 
surveillance programs.  This Court does not exclude evidence on the bases 
of reliability or providence. In any event, the Frost Files are of sufficient 
reliability and probative value to warrant their admission, and Amestonia 
did not violate international law in accessing and submitting them. The 
Frost Files and additional evidence prove the existence and scope of 
Riesland’s surveillance programs. These programs violated Riesland’s 
treaty obligations under the ICCPR and the Broadcasting Treaty, as they 
deprived Amestonian civilians of their fundamental human rights and 
contravened Amestonian law.  These programs further violated 
Amestonia’s territorial integrity and U.N. Ambassador Cornwall’s 
diplomatic immunities.  Amestonia is entitled to immediate cessation and a 
guarantee of non-repetition of Riesland’s programs, as Riesland continues 
to store unlawfully-collected Amestonian data and is otherwise likely to 
develop analogous programs.   
 
SECOND PLEADING 
Amestonia’s arrest and detention of VoR employees and seizure of 
VoR property did not violate the Broadcasting Treaty or Amestonia’s other 
international law obligations.  The immunities and privileges of the 
employees and premises terminated pursuant to Article 36 upon the 
station’s use as a pretext for the Carmen Program. Alternatively, the station 
ceased to function as envisaged when it was abandoned. In any event, 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus justifies Amestonia’s non-performance 
of its obligations. Furthermore, the treaty was suspended due to material 
breach or was invalid due to fraud. Riesland violated provisions of the 
Broadcasting Treaty essential to its object and purpose. Riesland had the 
intention to do so at the time the treaty was concluded and thereby induced 
Amestonia’s agreement. Finally, the Voice of Riesland was not entitled 
under international law to State immunity from domestic jurisdiction 
because international law does not require immunity for corporations, even 
if they are state-owned. Even if the VoR was entitled to immunity, it 
waived that immunity by opting into an alternate regime. 
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THIRD PLEADING 
Riesland’s detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism Act 
violated numerous provisions of the ICCPR. Riesland violated Article 9 by 
detaining Kafker without adequately informing him of the reasons for his 
detention, for impermissible reasons, unnecessarily, and without prompt 
appearance before a judge. Kafker was entitled to a fair hearing in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 14, which Riesland violated by 
depriving Kafker of his rights to counsel, equality of arms, review by a 
higher tribunal, and trial without undue delay. Riesland was not entitled to 
derogate from its obligations under Article 4 because it did not provide 
notification of the provisions from which it derogated, the circumstances 
did not justify derogation, the circumstances did not justify derogation, the 
rights in question are non-derogable, and the derogation was not strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation. The laws of armed conflict do 
not apply, and in any event would not absolve Riesland of its human rights 
obligations.  In addition to compensation, Amestonia is entitled to the 
release of Kafker and the disclosure of information relating to his 
apprehension, both of which remedies are within this Court’s power to 
order. 
 
FOURTH PLEADING 
The cyber-attacks against The Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham 
are attributable to Riesland and constitute an unlawful act for which 
Amestonia is entitled to compensation. The evidence indicates that the 
attacks were carried out by the government of Riesland or by a person or 
entity acting under its control. In any event, because Riesland had an 
obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing the attacks and failed to 
do so, it is responsible for a breach of its international obligations. The 
attacks constitute an unlawful use of force, a violation of the principle of 
non-intervention, a violation of the customary norm of good neighborliness, 
and a violation of Article 17 of the ICCPR. Furthermore, the attacks are not 
justifiable under international law because they were not a valid exercise of 
the right to self-defense and because they were not valid countermeasures. 
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PLEADINGS 
I. THE DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED ON THE WEBSITE OF 
THE AMES POST ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE 
BEFORE THE COURT; RIESLAND’S MASS ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS AGAINST AMESTONIAN 
PUBLIC FIGURES AND NATIONALS REVEALED IN 
THOSE DOCUMENTS VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW; 
AND AMESTONIA IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO AN 
ORDER DIRECTING THE IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF 
THOSE PROGRAMS WITH ASSURANCES OF NON-
REPETITION. 
A. The Frost Files are admissible before this Court. 
1. This Court’s rules of evidence do not provide 
for the exclusion of relevant leaked documents. 
This Court may exercise jurisdiction over “the existence of any fact 
which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation.”1 This Court frames its own procedural rules regarding matters 
under its jurisdiction.2 The ICJ Rules of Court and Practice Directions limit 
the admissibility of evidence only when evidence is untimely,3 irrelevant,4 
or submitted by certain non-parties.5 Accordingly, this Court has never 
excluded evidence on the grounds of unreliability6 or unlawful 
procurement.7 Instead, this Court has assigned evidence weight based on its 
reliability and probative value.8 Though international criminal courts may 
                                                        
1 Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945), 59 STAT. 1055, [hereinafter “I.C.J. Statute”], 
Art.36(2)(c). 
2 I.C.J. Statute, Art.30. 
3 I.C.J. Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts and Documents No. 6 (2007), [hereinafter “I.C.J. Rules”], 
Art.56; I.C.J. Practice Directions, I.C.J. Acts and Documents No. 6 (2007), Dir. IX. 
4 I.C.J. Rules, Arts.63, 79, 84. 
5 I.C.J. Practice Directions, Dir. XII. 
6 Markus Benzing, Evidentiary Issues in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY (Zimmermann et al., eds. 2012), 1254; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Fact-Finding in 
the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) in FACT-FINDING BY 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS (Lillich ed. 1991), 83. 
7 Hugh Thirlway, Dilemma or Chimera?—Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence in 
International Adjudication, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 624 (1984). 
8 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C./Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, 
¶59; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua/U.S.), Merits, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶¶60, 68, 84-85; Corfu Channel Case (U.K./Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 7. 
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exclude unreliable evidence, fact-finding before these courts entails 
substantially different procedures from fact-finding before this Court.9 
 
2. Even if reliability is a basis for exclusion, the 
Frost Files are sufficiently reliable. 
Some international courts find leaked documents unreliable and thus 
inadmissible when their content is contested or unverifiable.10 In contrast, 
courts find leaked documents reliable and admit them when their content is 
“susceptible of confirmation”11 and includes “detail that tallies perfectly 
with…the rest of the record.”12 The Frost Files bear “sufficient indicia of 
credibility,”13 as they are highly-detailed primary-source materials that 
include dates, include names, and are on official letterhead.14 They have 
been confirmed by third-party authentication and subsequent 
investigation.15 Riesland has implicitly admitted the Frost Files’ accuracy 
by charging Frost with theft.16 
 
3. The Frost Files’ history of procurement does 
not preclude admissibility. 
This Court17 and a majority of international courts18 have never 
excluded unlawfully-obtained evidence from the record. Even if this Court 
were to exclude unlawfully-obtained evidence, the illegality of the 
procurement of the Frost Files is a matter of Rieslandic domestic law, not 
international law, the subject of ICJ jurisdiction.19 
 
B. Riesland’s surveillance programs violated international 
                                                        
9 Rosalyn Higgins, Speech, G.A. Sixth Committee (2 November 2007). 
10 Ayyash et al., Decision on the Admissibility of Documents Published on the Wikileaks 
Website, STL-11-01, ¶¶40,42. 
11 Prosecutor/Taylor, Decision of 27 January 2011, SCSL-03-01-T-1171, 4-5. 
12 ConocoPhillips Company et al./Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela, Dissenting Opinion of Georges 
Abi-Saab, [ICSID] No.ARB/07/30, ¶59 (2013); Prosecutor/Gotovina and Markac, Decision of 2 
October 2012, [ICTY] IT-06-90-A, ¶26. 
13 Prosecutor/Gotovina and Markac, ¶26. 
14 Compromis, ¶23. 
15 Compromis, ¶¶22, 27; Clarifications, ¶2. 
16 Compromis, ¶¶24, 31. 
17 Thirlway, 624. 
18 William Worster, The Effect of Leaked Information on the Rules of International Law, 28 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 443, 456-463 (2013). 
19 I.C.J. Statute, Art.36. 
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law. 
1. Riesland’s surveillance programs breached its 
ICCPR obligations. 
The ICCPR, to which Riesland and Amestonia are parties, prohibits 
“arbitrary or unlawful interference” with individuals’ privacy and 
correspondence,20 and applies to mass surveillance, electronic interception 
of communications, and storage of personal data.21 
 
a. The ICCPR applies to Riesland’s surveillance 
programs. 
States must respect the rights of individuals “subject to [their] 
jurisdiction,”22 regardless of territorial borders.23 Jurisdiction is non-
spatial24 and may arise as a function of cyber-interferences.25 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction exists when a state’s actions “produce effects 
outside its territory.”26 Extraterritorial jurisdiction can arise from the 
confiscation of a passport,27 failure to provide state-owed pensions,28 or 
arrest of an individual.29 This Court has found that the ICCPR applies 
extraterritorially when a State’s security forces occupied an area.30 
                                                        
20 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
“I.C.C.P.R.”], Art.2(1). 
21 HRC General Comment No.16 (1988), U.N.Doc.HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, ¶¶8,10; The Right to 
Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N.Doc.A/RES/68/167 (2003), Preamble. 
22 I.C.C.P.R., Art.2(1). 
23 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶111; Armed Activities, ¶220; HRC General Comment No.31 
(2004), U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, ¶10; Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and 
Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, 56 HARV. INT’L L. REV. 81,109-110 (2015). 
24 Montero/Uruguay, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/OP/2, ¶5 (1990); Al-Skeini et al./U.K., [ECtHR] 53 
EHRR 589, ¶¶133-137 (2011).  
25 European Parliament Report on the ECHELON System, Gerhard Schmid, Special Rapporteur 
(2001), ¶8.3.2; TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 
(Schmitt, ed. 2013), [hereinafter “Tallinn Manual”], Rule 2. 
26 Drozd and Janousek/France and Spain, [ECHR]14 EHRR 445, ¶91 (1992); Salas and 
Others/U.S., [IACHR] No.10.573, ¶2 (1994). 
27 Montero/Uruguay, ¶5. 
28 Gueye et al./France, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985, ¶¶9.4-9.5 (1989). 
29 Lopez Burgos/Uruguay, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, ¶¶12.2-12.3 (1981). 
30 Wall Opinion, ¶111; Armed Activities, ¶220. 
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Riesland’s programs, by impacting millions of Amestonians,31 established a 
jurisdictional relationship between Riesland and surveilled Amestonians. 
Even if this Court finds that jurisdiction requires a spatial relationship, 
Riesland owned and operated VoR premises, was afforded territorial 
protections on VoR premises,32 and staffed the VoR with its agents. 
Riesland therefore exercised effective control over VoR premises,33 where 
the Carmen Program unlawfully collected and stored Amestonian data. 
 
b. Arbitrary or unlawful interferences violate 
ICCPR Article 17. 
In determining whether surveillance violates the ICCPR, courts 
frequently consider whether interferences pursue legitimate aims, are 
proportionate to those aims, and accord with sufficiently-limiting domestic 
law.34 
i. The interferences had no 
legitimate aim. 
Vague political and economic interests cannot justify interference.35 
National security concerns only justify interference when a State’s 
existence, territorial integrity, or political independence is threatened.36 The 
purpose of the Carmen Program was to protect political and economic 
interests,37 and the purpose of the Verismo Program was to promote 
Rieslandic national security.38 As Riesland faced no major security 
threats,39 neither program had legitimate aim. 
 
                                                        
31 Compromis, ¶2, 22. 
32 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.1(2), 14. 
33 See M./Denmark, No.17392/90, ¶1 (ECtHR 1992); Harold Koh, Memorandum Opinion on the 
Geographic Scope of the ICCPR, 7 (19 October 2010). 
34 HRC Gen. Comm. 16, ¶4; Lars Rehof, Article 12 in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY (Eide et al., eds. 1992), 189-190 (quoting New Zealand 
representative); MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 291 (2005); 
Toonen/Australia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, ¶6.4 (1994) 
35The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights [UNHCHR], U.N.Doc.A/HRC/27/37, ¶22 (2014). Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation Provisions in the I.C.C.P.R., [hereinafter “Siracusa Principles”], U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/1985/4 
(1985), Limitation Clauses; European Convention on Human Rights (2010), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Art.8. 
36 Siracusa Principles, Prins.29-32. 
37 Compromis, ¶26. 
38 Compromis, ¶¶31, 35. 
39 See infra §III.A.3.b. 
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ii. The interferences were 
disproportionate to legitimate 
aims. 
Neither surveillance program had a legitimate aim,40 rendering 
proportional surveillance impossible. Beyond this, the use of “mass 
interception capabilities” is per se disproportionate.41 The Verismo 
Program’s violation of millions of Amestonians’ rights was 
disproportionate to Riesland’s national security concerns, particularly as 
Amestonia is Riesland’s ally and the program predates Hive eco-activism.42 
 
iii. The SSBA provided insufficient 
limitations on interferences. 
Domestic laws governing interferences must: (1) narrowly tailor 
interferences to specific aims; (2) precisely dictate boundaries regarding 
permissible circumstances for interferences, authorization processes, 
categories of susceptible persons, and procedures for storing collected data; 
and (3) provide safeguards against abuse.43 The SSBA provides for broad, 
rather than tailored, programs, gives Rieslandic politicians discretion over 
where, how, and on whom data are collected and stored, and does not 
require notification of surveilled persons.44 The SSBA Tribunal and 
Committee were inadequate safeguards, lacking expert input and never 
challenging programs’ lawfulness.45 
 
2. Riesland’s Carmen Program violated the 
Broadcasting Treaty. 
Article 23(1) requires that VoR employees “respect the laws and 
regulations” of Amestonia.46 The Carmen Program, through which VoR 
employees conducted domestically-unlawful surveillance, contravenes this 
provision. Article 23(2) requires that VoR premises not be used in any 
                                                        
40 See supra §I.B.1.b.i. 
41 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, U.N.Doc.A/HRC/23/40, ¶¶37, 62 (2011). 
42 Compromis, ¶¶7, 13, 22. 
43 Right to Privacy in the Digital Age (UNHCHR), ¶28; Bakhtiyari/Australia, 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/79/D/1069/2002, ¶9.6 (2003); Weber and Saravia/Germany, 2006 ECHR 1173, ¶¶79, 
84, 93-95. 
44 Compromis, ¶5. 
45 Compromis, ¶23. 
46 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23(1). 
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manner “incompatible” with VoR functions “as envisaged in the treaty.”47 
Espionage is incompatible with the VoR’s functions as a vehicle for 
advancing inter-State friendship.48 Furthermore, the element of 
“incompatibility” in near-identical provisions in the VCDR49 and VCCR50 
refers to activity that violates the receiving State’s laws and to acts that fall 
outside the typical, designated functions of the mission.51 Both concerns are 
implicated here, as the Carmen Program violated Amestonian law and falls 
outside the designated functions of the premises as a broadcasting station. 
 
3. Riesland’s surveillance programs violated 
Amestonian territorial integrity. 
The sovereign equality of States, enshrined in U.N. Charter Article 
2(1),52 constitutes a basic international law principle. Sovereign States “may 
not exercise…power in any form” in the territory53—which encompasses 
cyber-infrastructure54—of another State. Peacetime espionage, including 
cyber-espionage targeting cyber-infrastructure,55 conducted within another 
State constitutes a violation of territorial integrity,56 as evidenced by State 
                                                        
47 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23(2). 
48 See infra §II.A.1. 
49 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1964), 500 U.N.T.S. 95, [hereinafter, 
“V.C.D.R.”], Art.41(1). 
50 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1967), 596 U.N.T.S. 261, [hereinafter, 
“V.C.C.R.”], Art.55(1). 
51 EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON 
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 471 (2008); B.S. MURTY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DIPLOMACY: THE 
DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENT AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, 417 (1989); Martin Den Heijer, Diplomatic 
Asylum and the Assange Case, 26 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L. L. 399, 413. 
52 Charter of the United Nations (1945), 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, Art.2. 
53 S.S. Lotus (Fr./Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No.10, 18. See also Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, U.N.Doc.A/Res/25/2625 (1970), Art.1. 
54 Tallinn Manual, Rule 1.  
55 Michael Schmitt, Cyber Activities and the Law of Countermeasures in Rights and Obligations 
of States in Cyberspace in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE (Ziolkowski, ed. 
2013), 665-666; Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 
291, 305 (2015); Wolff Heinegg, Legal Implications of Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT, 14-15 (Czosseck et al., 
eds. 2012). 
56 Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-
Leste/Australia), Memorial of Timor-Leste, ¶3.4 (2014); Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of 
Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Stranger ed. 
1962), 12; JOHN KISH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ESPIONAGE 83-84 (Turns, ed. 1995); Manuel Garcia-
Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offences Under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PITT. 
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condemnations of such espionage.57 Even if limited espionage is lawful, 
extensive espionage, such as that conducted by Riesland,58 is not.59  
 
4. Riesland’s Carmen Program violated the 
immunities afforded U.N. representatives. 
 U.N. representatives are entitled to “inviolability for all papers and 
documents,”60—including protection from cyber-operations61—and to 
secrecy in voting.62 Riesland’s surveillance of U.N. Ambassador Cornwall, 
which collected information regarding Amestonia’s General Assembly 
votes,63 was therefore unlawful. 
 
C. Amestonia is entitled to immediate cessation and a 
guarantee of non-repetition of Riesland’s surveillance 
programs. 
Because the storage of Amestonians’ personal data constitutes a 
continuing wrong,64 Amestonia is entitled to cessation of Riesland’s 
surveillance programs. A guarantee of non-repetition is necessary when risk 
of repetition is high.65 Given Riesland’s public support for its programs66 
and technological sophistication, indicating high likelihood of repetition, a 
guarantee of non-repetition is necessary.  
                                                                                                                                
L. REV. 65, 79-80 (1964). 
57 U.S.S.R. Draft Resolution, U.N.S.C., U.N.Doc.S/4321 (23 May 1960) (Condemning incursions 
by American surveillance U-2s), Art.1; Condemnation of U.S. Espionage in Mercosur States, 
MERCOSUR/PM/SO/DECL.07/2014 (10 November 2014). 
58 Compromis, ¶¶22, 25-26. 
59 See Terry Gill, Non-Intervention in the Cyber-Context in PEACETIME REGIME, 225-226. 
60 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (1946), 1 U.N.T.S. 15, 
Art.4. 
61 Tallinn Manual, Rule 84. 
62 G.A. Rules of Procedure, U.N.Doc.A/520/Rev.17 (2007), Rules 30, 88, 92, 103. 
63 Compromis, ¶26. 
64 Compromis, ¶36; See Rainbow Warrior Case (Fr./N.Z.), 82 I.L.C. 499, ¶114 (1990). 
65 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex./U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 121, ¶¶150-153. 
66 Compromis, ¶31. 
202 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 23:1 
 
 
 
II. THE DETENTION AND ARREST OF VOR EMPLOYEES, 
AND THE SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE OF THE VOR 
FACILITY AND EQUIPMENT, DID NOT VIOLATE THE 
BROADCASTING TREATY OR AMESTONIA’S OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.   
A. The privileges and immunities provided under the 
Broadcasting Treaty terminated pursuant to Article 36. 
1. The station ceased to function as envisaged in 
the treaty when it became the headquarters of 
the Carmen Program.   
Broadcasting Treaty Article 36 states, “[A]ll privileges and immunities 
provided for in this Treaty, save for those in Article 15(1)(c) above, shall 
cease to have effect upon the cessation of the station’s functions as 
envisaged in the Present Treaty.”67 The VCLT requires treaties to be 
“interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”68 
The context within which treaties are to be interpreted includes the treaty’s 
text (both the body and the preamble) and any other relevant, applicable 
rules of international law.69  
The Broadcasting Treaty’s object and purpose is the fortification and 
reinforcement of decades of friendly relations between Amestonia and 
Riesland through the operation of the broadcasting station.70 The preamble 
recognizes the parties’ “desir[e] to fortify the friendship between the two 
countries” and “recognit[ion of] the importance of understanding and 
cooperation between their peoples.”71 The treaty’s text also supports this 
reading, balancing the extension of privileges and immunities with the duty 
to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state.72  In interpreting 
object and purpose, this Court has recognized parties’ intent to promote 
friendship, cooperation, and mutual understanding achieved through the 
specific field the treaty addresses, and that the “friendship” provisions of a 
preamble should be “regarded as fixing an objective, in the light of which 
                                                        
67 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.36. 
68Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, [hereinafter 
“V.C.L.T.”], Art.31(1). 
69 V.C.L.T., Art.31. 
70 Compromis, ¶6; Broadcasting Treaty, Preamble. 
71 Broadcasting Treaty, Preamble. 
72 Broadcasting Treaty, Arts.14, 15, 23, 36.  
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the other Treaty provisions are to be interpreted and applied.”73  
The station’s functions are therefore best understood as broadcasting 
television in service of “fortify[ing] the friendship between the two 
countries.”74 Interpreting the station’s functions as synonymous with merely 
broadcasting would be wholly inconsistent with the treaty’s object and 
purpose. When the station began to function as a façade for a hostile and 
illegal espionage scheme against Amestonia, it ceased to “function as 
envisaged” as a vehicle promoting friendship and cooperation, and the 
privileges and immunities provided under the Broadcasting Treaty 
terminated pursuant to Article 36.  
 
2. Alternatively, the station’s functions ceased 
when its broadcasting was interrupted and its 
premises abandoned. 
Even if “cessation of the station’s functions” merely means “cessation 
of broadcasting,” the station ceased to function as envisaged when VoR 
staff cut the television broadcasting and abandoned the station.75 The 
attempt by VoR employees, including the station’s head, to flee 
Amestonian territory that night demonstrates that the employees did not 
intend to return and resume the broadcast.76 No warrant was provided for 
the seizure of VoR property until after the station had cut its broadcast,77 
and upon execution of the warrant Amestonian police confirmed that the 
premises had been abandoned by the staff.78 
 
3. Articles 14(1-3) and 15(1)(a-b) constitute 
“privileges and immunities” within the meaning 
of Article 36. 
The rights and privileges enumerated in Article 15 are explicitly 
labeled “immunities and privileges.” Further, Article 36’s explicit exception 
of Article 15(1)(c) illustrates that 15(1)(a) and (b) are clearly within Article 
36’s ambit. Though Article 14 does not explicitly use the label “privileges 
and immunities,” it uses the same language in Article 14—“shall be 
                                                        
73 Oil Platforms (Iran/U.S.), Preliminary Objection, 1996 I.C.J. 803, ¶28; Nicaragua, Merits, 
¶273. 
74 Broadcasting Treaty, Preamble. 
75 Compromis, ¶¶25-27. 
76 Compromis, ¶28. 
77 Compromis, ¶27. 
78 Compromis, ¶27. 
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inviolable”—as does Article 15.79 Article 14 also says VoR employees 
“shall be immune,” clearly indicating intent to confer an “immunity.”80 This 
reading comports with the ordinary meaning of “privileges and 
immunities.”81 
 
4. The former VoR employees do not retain 
functional immunity pursuant to Article 
15(1)(c) with respect to the acts at issue. 
VoR employees were not immune from arrest under the functional 
immunity extended under Article 15(1)(c), which provides, “In respect of 
acts performed by an employee of the station in the exercise of its 
functions, the immunities and privileges shall continue to subsist after the 
employee’s functions at the station have come to an end.”82 The unlawful 
actions for which the VoR staff members were detained and arrested—
initially failing to present travel document, and subsequently espionage83—
were plainly not “in the exercise of [the station’s] functions”84  
 
B. In any event, the treaty was not in effect at the time of 
the arrest of the VoR employees and the seizure and 
forfeiture of the VoR facility and its equipment. 
1. The Broadcasting Treaty was invalid due to 
fraud. 
The VCLT states, “A party which has been induced to conclude a 
treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another negotiating State may invoke 
the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty.”85 The term 
“fraud” includes “any false statements, misrepresentations or other deceitful 
proceedings”86 by a State meant to induce consent to a treaty. More 
                                                        
79 Edward Gordon, The World Court and the Interpretation of Constitutive Treaties, 59 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 794, 814 (1965)(A “rule of interpretation constantly mentioned by the Court is…that a treaty 
must be read as a whole…to avoid inconsistency.”). 
80For other treaties using the language “shall be immune” to confer an “immunity,” see, e.g., 
V.C.D.R., Art.22; V.C.C.R., Art.31; Convention on Special Missions (1985), 1400 U.N.T.S. 231, Art.4.  
81 "Immunity, n." O.E.D. ONLINE, December 2015, Oxford University Press (“Freedom from… 
jurisdiction, etc… esp. from prosecution or arrest.”). 
82 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.15.  
83 Compromis, ¶28. 
84 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.15; see supra §II.A.1. 
85 V.C.L.T., Art.49. 
86 Commentaries on the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook (1966-II), 
2016] Distinguished Brief 205 
 
 
 
succinctly, “[f]raud is the antithesis of good faith.” 87 
From its inception, the VoR station was used to “gain an advantage to 
the detriment of”88 Amestonia.89 Only seven months elapsed between the 
signing of the treaty and the first broadcast.90 During that period, Riesland 
built an extensive covert facility underneath the broadcasting station and 
installed and developed the necessary equipment to conduct surveillance on 
VoR guests.91 Planning for this elaborate operation certainly began before 
the time the treaty was concluded. The Court may draw adverse inferences 
from circumstantial evidence where direct evidence is in the exclusive 
control of the other party.92 Signing the treaty in bad faith constitutes a 
misrepresentation by Riesland that induced Amestonia to consent to its 
conclusion. 
 
2. Alternatively, Riesland’s violations of the 
Broadcasting Treaty constitute a material 
breach. 
VCLT Article 60 provides that “the violation of a provision essential 
to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty” constitutes 
grounds for its suspension.93 This requires inquiry into the character of the 
provision(s) breached and their relationship to the treaty’s object and 
purpose.94  Material breaches can result from violations of ancillary 
provisions considered by a party to be essential to the object and 
purpose.95Amestonia’s failure to initiate VCLT termination or suspension 
procedures before now does not preclude its claiming prior material breach 
in response to Riesland’s allegations.96 Further, having made notification 
through these proceedings, Amestonia need not continue performing its 
                                                                                                                                
[hereinafter “V.C.L.T. Commentaries”], Art.46 Cmt.3. 
87 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 839 (Dörr et al. eds., 
2012).  
88 Dörr, 839.  
89 Compromis, ¶25.  
90 Compromis, ¶¶7-8. 
91 Compromis, ¶¶25. 
92 Corfu Channel, 18.  
93 V.C.L.T., Art.60.  
94 Bruno Simma and Christian Tam, Reacting against Treaty Breaches in OXFORD GUIDE TO 
TREATIES (Hollis, ed. 2012), 582-583.  
95 V.C.L.T. Commentaries, Art.7 Cmt.9. 
96 V.C.L.T., Art.65(5); V.C.L.T. Commentaries, Art.62 Cmt.8.  
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obligations.97  
Riesland’s violations of Article 23(1) and 23(2) of the Broadcasting 
Treaty98 amount to material breaches. These provisions are essential to the 
object and purpose of the treaty because they represent reciprocal 
obligations due the receiving state.  
Riesland’s illegal espionage scheme, carried out by VoR employees 
over the course of more than two decades under the direction of the 
Bureau,99 demonstrates blatant and calculated disrespect and disregard for 
Amestonia’s laws in contravention of Article 23(1).100  Further, the use of 
the VoR premises as the headquarters of the Carmen Program, to 
Amestonia’s detriment,101 constitutes a significant breach of Article 
23(2).102    
 
3. Amestonia’s non-performance of the treaty was 
justified by exceptio non adimpleti contractus. 
Exceptio non adimpleti contractus dictates that “in an agreement 
creating reciprocal obligations, one Party cannot obtain from the other the 
execution of its obligation, if it does not respect its own commitment”103 
and follows from the contractual nature of treaties.104 Modern scholars 
regard exceptio as an “implied promise of reciprocity” contained within 
treaties imposing synallagmatic—or intertwined—obligations.105 Exceptio 
is a defense and requires no procedures or prior notifications to invoke it.106 
As argued above, Riesland violated its obligations under Article 23. 
This provision represents the mutual obligations of the parties governing 
                                                        
97 E.J. De Aréchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RCADI 59, 81 (1978). 
98 See supra §I.B.2. 
99 Compromis, ¶¶25-26.  
100 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23.  
101 Compromis, ¶¶25-26. 
102 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23. 
103 Joseph Nisot, L’exception ‘non adimpleti contractus’ en droit international, 74 RGDIP 668, 
668 (1970). See also, Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands/Belgium), Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Anzilotti, 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser.A/B) No.70, 49-50. 
104 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India/Pakistan), Separate Opinion of 
Judge De Castro, 1972 I.C.J. 46, ¶2 n.1.  
105 D.W. Greig, Reciprocity, Proportionality and the Law of Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 295, 400 
(1994); James Crawford and Simon Olleson, The Exception of Non-performance: Links between the 
Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 21 AUSTRALIAN YIL 55, 55-58 (2000). 
106 ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF 
COUNTERMEASURES 15 (1984); Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 
(Greece/FYROM), Counter-memorial of Greece ¶8.26 (2010).  
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appropriate uses of the station and is synallagmatic with the special status 
conferred to the premises. Therefore, Amestonia was justified in its non-
performance of Article 15. 
 
C. Amestonia’s actions concerning VoR property and 
personnel did not violate Amestonia’s other obligations 
under international law. 
1. The VoR is not entitled to State immunity under 
customary international law. 
Though States themselves enjoy immunity from other States’ domestic 
jurisdiction under customary international law,107 there is no customary 
international law obligating the extension of immunity to state-owned 
corporations and entities.108 The practice of treating state-owned 
corporations as “instrumentalities” of the state, subject to the presumption 
of sovereign immunity,109 is solely a feature of some States’ domestic laws, 
not a customary norm.110 Other States only grant immunity to state-owned 
entities for acta jure imperii,111 and others do not extend sovereign 
immunity at all to separate legal entities.112 During the drafting of the U.N. 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 
States expressed divergent views on whether state-owned corporations with 
separate legal personalities could avail themselves of State immunity, 
reflecting diverse domestic practices.113 
Therefore, as supported by scholarly opinion,114 insufficient State 
practice and opinio juris115 exists to indicate crystallization of a norm 
entitling state-owned corporations to immunity. Both approaches are 
                                                        
107 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 99-101 (2005).  
108 XIAODONG YANG, STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 278-279 (2015).  
109 E.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §1602–1611 (U.S.), §1603(b). 
110 See, e.g., OBB Personenverkehr AG/Sachs, 136 S.Ct. 390 (2015) (U.S.). 
111 State Immunities Act, 1978 c. 33, pt. I (U.K.), §14. 
112 See, e.g., Central Bank of Nigeria Case, 65 I.L.R. 131 (Germany, 1975) (“Separate legal 
entities of a foreign State enjoy no immunity.”). 
113 Report of the Working Group on Jurisdictional States and their Property, ILC Yearbook 
(1999-II), ¶¶61-83; United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property (2005), 44 I.L.M. 801 (U.N.Doc.A/59/22), Art.2. 
114 Yang, 279; HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 353 (2008); David 
Stewart, Current Developments: The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property, 99 AM. J. INT’L LAW 194, 199 (2005). 
115 North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany/Denmark, Germany/Netherlands), Merits, 1969 I.C.J. 
3, ¶77.  
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therefore in line with international law obligations, and a State is entitled to 
deny immunity to foreign State-owned corporations in accordance with its 
own domestic law.116 Riesland National Television is a State-owned 
corporation with a separate legal personality,117 and the VoR is a division of 
that corporation.118 Therefore, Amestonia is in observance of its 
international law obligations in denying jurisdictional immunity to the VoR. 
 
2. Alternatively, Riesland waived State immunity 
with respect to the VoR by opting into an 
alternate regime under the Broadcasting 
Treaty. 
A State entitled to immunity in a foreign court may waive that 
immunity, either explicitly or by implication.119 Once waived, immunity 
cannot be reasserted.120  Waiver, whether implicit or explicit, must clearly 
express an intention to waive, and that waiver must be specific to the 
litigation at issue.121  
The Broadcasting Treaty provided a detailed immunities regime,122 
including circumstances for termination of immunities.123 Opting into this 
regime evinces a clear intention to submit to the domestic jurisdiction of the 
receiving State if the circumstances provided are met.124 This interpretation 
comports with a well-recognized canon of treaty construction125 by 
preventing surplusage. If Article 36 did not express an intent to waive 
immunity, Articles 14 and 15 would be inoperative, as many of the 
immunities—extant under customary international law—provided therein 
would be redundant. Furthermore, Article 36 would be inoperative, as the 
termination of the treaty-provided immunities would have no practical 
effect on the VoR’s legal status. 
 
 
 
                                                        
116 Lotus Case, 18. 
117 Compromis, ¶40 
118 Compromis, ¶8. 
119 Yang, 316. 
120 Fox & Webb, 376-377. 
121 MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 740-741 (2008). 
122 Broadcasting Treaty, Arts.14, 15. 
123 Broadcasting Treaty, Arts.14, 15, 36. 
124 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.36.  
125 GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (2012).  
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III. THE DETENTION OF JOSEPH KAFKER UNDER THE 
TERRORISM ACT VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
AND AMESTONIA IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO HIS 
IMMEDIATE RELEASE, THE DISCLOSURE OF ALL 
INFORMATION WHICH FORMED THE BASIS OF HIS 
APPREHENSION, AND THE PAYMENT OF 
COMPENSATION FOR HIS DETENTION. 
A. Riesland’s detention of Kafker violated international 
law. 
Amestonia may bring a diplomatic protection claim on behalf of a 
national injured by an internationally wrongful act126 who has exhausted 
domestic remedies.127 Kafker, an Amestonian citizen, exhausted domestic 
remedies by appealing to Riesland’s highest court.128 In human rights cases 
relating to detention, “presumptions apply in favour of the ostensibly 
weaker party” and against the State possessing information about the 
detention.129 Because Riesland admits possession of “closed materials” on 
Kafker’s detention,130 it must affirmatively demonstrate the detention’s 
legality. 
 
1. The detention violated Article 9 of the ICCPR. 
Arbitrariness under Article 9(1) encompasses both violations of 
Article 9’s procedural guarantees and broader concepts like 
“inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of 
law…reasonableness, necessity and proportionality.”131 It applies to all 
deprivations of liberty,132 even those carried out in full compliance with 
domestic law.133 The court may consider procedural deficiencies 
cumulatively.134 
 
                                                        
126 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece/U.K.), Judgment No.2, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser.B) 
No.3, 12. 
127 See, e.g., Arhuacos/Colombia, UN.Doc.CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995, ¶8.2 (2003). 
128 Compromis, ¶33.  
129 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea/D.R.C.), Separate Opinion of Judge Trindade, 2010 I.C.J. 347, 
¶73. 
130 Compromis, ¶36. 
131 HRC General Comment No.35 (2014), U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/GC/35, ¶12. 
132 HRC General Comment No.8 (1982), U.N.Doc.HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6, ¶1. 
133 A./Australia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, ¶9.5 (1997). 
134 Diallo, Merits, 2010 I.C.J. 639, ¶82. 
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a. Riesland did not inform Kafker of the reasons 
for his detention. 
Section 3(a) of the Terrorism Act provides that suspected “terrorist 
act”135 involvement is grounds for detention up to 180 days. During that 
period, every 21 days a hearing must determine whether the conditions 
requiring detention—“reasons of national security and public safety,” 
including consideration of a non-exhaustive list of six factors in Section 
3(d)—have changed. After 180 days, however, Section 3(h) allows the 
detention to be extended to 540 total days “in appropriate circumstances.” 3 
September 2015 marked 180 days since Kafker’s arrest on 7 March 2015.136 
 Even if Kafker was informed that he was detained under the 
Terrorism Act, Riesland did not provide him any “factual specifics” of the 
basis for his detention, as Article 9(2) requires.137 Whether Kafker surmised 
the basis himself is irrelevant.138 Further, the Terrorism Act provides 
“vague and expansive” grounds for detention, contrary to Article 9.139  The 
HRC has previously noted the potential illegality of arrests under domestic 
laws for “extremist activity,”140 “terrorism,”141 and “national security.”142 
The exceedingly vague “appropriate circumstances” criterion under which 
Riesland has held Kafker since 3 September is manifestly unlawful. 
 
b. Riesland is detaining Kafker for impermissible 
reasons. 
Detentions are arbitrary when made for improper purposes,143 
including suppression of political expression,144 use of detainees as 
                                                        
135 As defined in the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (2000), 2178 
U.N.T.S. 197, [hereinafter “C.S.F.T.”], Art.2.1(b). 
136 Compromis, ¶32. 
137 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶25; Ilombe and Shandwe/D.R.C., U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/86/D/1177/2003, 
¶6.2 (2006). 
138 Akwanga/Cameroon, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/101/D/1813/2008, ¶7.4 (2011). 
139 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶38. 
140 HRC Concluding Observations: Russian Federation, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6, ¶24 
(2009). 
141 HRC Concluding Observations: Mauritius, U.N.Doc.CCPR/CO/83/MUS, ¶12 (2005). See also 
HRC Concluding Observations: Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/BIH/CO/1, ¶18 (2006) 
(“public security”). 
142 HRC Concluding Observations: Sudan, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/79/Add.85, ¶13 (1998). 
143 See, e.g., Hassan/United Kingdom, [ECtHR] No.20750/09, ¶85 (2014). 
144 Blanco/Nicaragua, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/51/D/328/1988, ¶10.3 (1994); Castells/Spain, [ECtHR] 
14 EHRR 445, No.11798/85, ¶48 (1992). 
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bargaining chips,145 and retribution for third-party actions.146 The 
circumstances of Kafker’s arrest—his speech on environmental law and 
online activism, his opposition to neonics,147 and Amestonia’s arrest of 
VoR employees less than three weeks before—strongly suggest that 
Riesland detained him to silence his advocacy and to retaliate for 
Amestonia’s VoR investigation.  
 
c. Kafker’s detention is not reasonably necessary. 
Even if Riesland did detain Kafker for legitimate security reasons, it 
must provide specific reasons for the measures.148 Riesland bears the 
burden—increasing with the length of detention—of proving a “present, 
direct, and imperative threat”149 that cannot be addressed by “less intrusive 
means,”150 such as regular court proceedings.151 Even States that permit 
preventive detention routinely handle eco-terrorism using standard criminal 
law.152 Riesland’s sole justification—the “integrity of particular intelligence 
sources”153—is vague, common to many criminal investigations, and 
unpersuasive in light of the subsequent revelation of the sources of 
intelligence on Kafker’s activities.154 Riesland offers no evidence that 
Kafker is likely to commit new crimes, destroy evidence, or receive 
amnesty in Amestonia. Finally, laws permitting detention for evidence-
gathering in relation to suspected terrorism typically limit the period of 
detention to a few days or weeks,155 which Riesland has not shown to be 
insufficient. 
 
                                                        
145 Anon./Minister of Defense, [S.C. Israel] 54(1) P.D. 721, 743 (2000). 
146 Yklymova/Turkmenistan, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/96/D/1460/2006, ¶7.2 (2009). 
147 Compromis, ¶¶32, 36. 
148 NOWAK, 382. 
149 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶15.  
150 C./Australia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999, ¶8.2 (2002). 
151 Benhadj/Algeria, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003, ¶8.8 (2007); Madani/Algeria, 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/89/D/1172/2003, ¶8.7 (2007). This requirement also stems from the rule that “similar 
cases be dealt with in similar proceedings” under Article 14(1) and 14(3). See HRC General Comment 
No.32 (2007), U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/GC/32, ¶14; Evelyne Schmid, A Few Comments on a Comment, 14 
INT’L J. HUM. RIGHTS 1058, 1062 (2010). 
152 See, e.g., Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. §43 (USA); Serious Organised Crime 
and Police Act of 2005 (U.K.). 
153 Compromis, ¶34. 
154 Compromis, ¶37. 
155 CLAIRE MACKEN, COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, 2-3 
(2011). 
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d. Kafker was not brought promptly before a 
judge. 
Article 9(3)’s requirement of prompt appearance in person156 before a 
judge protects those arrested but not yet charged.157 302 days after Kafker’s 
arrest (at time of writing), Riesland has not permitted him to appear in 
person before a court or to communicate to the court through his lawyer. 
Even if his lawyer’s appearance at the hearing on 10 March was an 
adequate substitute, delays of greater than 48 hours—including three-158 
and four-day159 delays—“are absolutely exceptional and must be justified 
under the circumstances.160 Riesland has given no justification for failing to 
bring Kafker before a judge on or before 9 March, when the 48-hour 
window expired. 
 
2. The detention violated Kafker’s fair trial rights 
under Article 14. 
Article 14 applies to the “determination of any criminal charge.” If the 
“purpose, character, or severity” of the sanction is penal in nature, domestic 
law cannot avoid Article 14’s procedural protections by characterizing a 
detention as non-criminal.161 Kafker’s arrest and detention on suspicion of 
“instigating, authorizing, planning, financing, carrying out, or aiding a 
Terrorist Act”162—which is a domestic criminal offense163—demonstrates 
the penal nature of the sanction. Violations of discrete provisions of Article 
14 may constitute violations of Kafker’s broader rights to a fair trial and 
presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 14(1).164 Furthermore, 
                                                        
156 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶42; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, U.N.Doc.A/RES/43/173 (1988), Prin.32(2). 
157 Schweizer/Uruguay, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/17/D/66/1980, ¶19 (1982); de Morais/Angola, 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002, ¶6.4 (2005). 
158 Hammel/Madagascar, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/29/D/155/1983, ¶19.4 (1990). 
159 Freemantle/Jamaica, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/68/D/625/1995, ¶7.4 (2000). 
160 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶33; Abramova/Belarus, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/107/D/1787/2008, ¶¶7.3–
7.5 (2013). 
161 Perterer/Austria, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/81/D/1015/2001, ¶9.2 (2004); Fardon/Australia, 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/98/D/1629/2007, ¶7.4 (2010). 
162 Terrorism Act, §3(a). 
163 Terrorism Act, §3(d)(4); C.S.F.T. Art.4(a). 
164 See Alegre/Peru, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/85/D/1126/2002, ¶7.5 (2005); Barney/Colombia, 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/87/D/1298/2004, ¶7.2 (2006); Roque/Peru, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/85/D/1125/2002, ¶7.3 
(2005); Kulov/Kyrgyzstan, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/99/D/1369/2005, ¶8.7 (2010). 
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detention following an unfair trial is arbitrary under Article 9.165 
 
a. Riesland deprived Kafker of his right to 
counsel. 
 Article 14(3)(b) entitled Kafker to communicate with counsel of his 
choosing during hearings before the Tribunal. Kafker’s counsel was not 
permitted to consult or otherwise share information with Kafker166 and was 
chosen from a list compiled by the very agency conducting the 
investigation.167 
 
b. Riesland deprived Kafker of his right to 
equality of arms. 
Kafker had the right to “adequate time and facilities for the preparation 
of his defense” under Article 14(3)(b), to present and examine evidence and 
witnesses under Article 14(3)(e), and to be tried in his presence under 
Article 14(3)(d). Article 14(3)(b) entitled Kafker’s special advocate to pre-
trial access to all government evidence and other information required for 
an effective defense.168 The defense must enjoy the “same legal powers” as 
the government in presenting evidence.169 Kafker and his counsel had only 
three days to prepare a defense prior to the initial hearing did not have 
access to his attorney or to the “closed material” that allegedly provided the 
basis for his detention,170 and did not enjoy the government’s rights to be 
present, to introduce secret evidence, or to offer anonymous testimony.171 
He therefore could not effectively challenge the grounds for his detention. 
 
c. Riesland deprived Kafker of his right to review 
by a higher tribunal. 
Article 14(5) establishes the right to review by a higher tribunal, 
requiring “full review of the legal and factual aspects” of the lower court’s 
decision.172 Section 3(b) provides that no court other than the Tribunal may 
                                                        
165 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶17. 
166 Compromis, ¶33. 
167 Terrorism Act, §3(i). 
168 Arutyunyan/Uzbekistan, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/80/D/917/2000, ¶6.3 (2004). 
169 HRC Gen. Comm. 32, ¶39. 
170 Compromis, ¶33. 
171 Terrorism Act, §§3(e), 3(f). 
172 Vázquez/Spain, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/69/D/701/1996, ¶8.6 (2000). 
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review the detention of an individual under the Terrorism Act. Accordingly, 
Kafker’s motion challenging the constitutionality of the proceedings was 
denied by the Supreme Court,173 seemingly without review of the evidence 
upon which Kafker was detained. 
 
3. Riesland was not entitled to derogate from its 
human rights obligations. 
The lawfulness of derogations from human rights obligations is 
judicially reviewable.174 Unlike derogations under ECHR Article 15, 
derogations under ICCPR Article 4 are entitled to little or no deference, or 
“margin of appreciation,” in judicial review of the stated basis for 
derogation.175 
 
a. Riesland did not provide adequate notification 
of derogation. 
On each of the three occasions Rieland issued Terrorism Alerts 
(October 2014, April 2014, and October 2015),176 it failed to inform the 
U.N. Secretary-General of the provisions from which it derogated and the 
reasons for derogation,177 as required by Article 4(3). These failures bar 
Riesland from asserting derogation ex post under Articles 9 and 14.178 
 
b. The circumstances did not justify derogation. 
According to Article 4, States claiming derogation have the burden of 
demonstrating a “public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation,”179 defined by the European Court as “actual or imminent”180 and 
“exceptional[,] affect[ing] the whole population and constitut[ing] a threat 
                                                        
173 Compromis, ¶33. 
174 See, e.g., Ireland/U.K., [ECtHR] (ser.A) No.25 (1978), ¶214. 
175 Sarah Joseph, Human Rights Committee: General Comment 29, 2 HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. 81, 
86 (2002); Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Derogations from 
Human Rights Treaties in Situations of Emergency, http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/RULAC/derogation_from_human_rights_treaties_in_situations_of_emergency.php. 
176 Compromis, ¶18; Clarifications, ¶7. 
177 Clarifications, ¶7. 
178 See Wall Opinion, ¶127; Weisz/Uruguay, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/11/D/28/1978, ¶14 (1984); 
Montejo/Colombia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/15/D/64/1979, ¶10.3 (1985); JAIME ORAÁ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (1992).  
179 Silva/Uruguay, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/23/D/34/1978, ¶8.3 (1981). 
180 Greek Case (Denmark/Greece), [ECHR] 12 Y.B. 1, ¶112 (1969). 
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to the organised life of the community.”181 This standard is higher than, and 
distinct from,182 exceptions in the ICCPR for reasons of “national 
security.”183 Amestonia’s claims do not implicate any rights subject to such 
exceptions. Large-scale massacres involving paramilitary groups,184 
frequent fatal bombings by separatist forces,185 countrywide strikes and 
protests,186 and violent seizures of hundreds of hostages from an embassy187 
have been found not to warrant Article 4 derogations.  
The planned contamination of honey by three college students on 
Amestonian soil—even if it had resulted in “serious bodily injury”188 to 
some consumers—would scarcely have affected the whole population and 
organized life of Riesland, a developed country of approximately 100 
million people.189 Riesland has made no showing of an actual or imminent 
emergency since the neutralization of that threat on October 21, 2014,190 
despite twice reissuing Terrorism Alerts. 
 
c. The rights in question are non-derogable. 
The rights not to be arbitrarily detained, to fair trial, and to be 
presumed innocent are non-derogable because they are fundamental 
rights191 and because they are essential to protect the ICCPR’s enumerated 
non-derogable rights.192 Thus, while Riesland may be permitted to derogate 
from certain procedural components of these rights, it cannot derogate from 
the rights themselves.193 
                                                        
181 Lawless/Ireland, [ECtHR] No.332/57 (A/3), ¶28 (1961). 
182 HRC General Comment No.29 (2001), U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, ¶4.2. 
183 See, e.g., I.C.C.P.R. Art.14(1)(third sentence) (permitting exclusion of the public from trials 
for “national security” and other reasons). 
184 HRC Concluding Observations: Colombia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/79/Add.76, ¶25 (1997). 
185 HRC Concluding Observations: United Kingdom, U.N.Doc.CCPR/CO/73/UK, ¶4 (2001). 
186 HRC Concluding Observations: Bolivia, U.N.DocCCPR/C/79/Add.74, ¶14 (1997). 
187 HRC Concluding Observations: Peru, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/79/Add.67, ¶11 (1996). 
188 Clarifications, ¶1. 
189 Compromis, ¶1.  
190 Compromis, ¶19. 
191 Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency, 79 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 1072, §§(C)(5)&(7) (1985); Universal Declaration on Human Rights, U.N.Doc.A/810 (1948), 
[hereinafter “UDHR”], arts. 9, 11; American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (1948), 
Arts.18, 25, 26. 
192 HRC Gen. Comm. 29, ¶15; Siracusa Principles, Prin.70; Concluding Observations: Israel, 
CCPR/C/79/Add.93, ¶21 (1998); Aksoy/Turkey, [ECHR] 23 EHRR 553, ¶76 (1996). 
193 Clémentine Olivier, Revisiting General Comment 29 of the UNHRC, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 
405, 414 (2004). 
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d. The derogation was not strictly required. 
Even if some of Riesland’s claimed derogations are lawful, they must 
comply with an objective standard of proportionality,194 which “varies in 
proportion to the seriousness of the terrorist threat.”195 If derogation 
continues for longer than necessary or actions taken under ordinary laws 
would adequately address the threat, derogation becomes unlawful,196 even 
in the wake of a catastrophic terrorist attack.197 In light of the low severity 
of any threats posed by eco-terrorism against Riesland198 and the 
importance of Kafker’s right to personal liberty, Kafker’s detention 
pursuant to unfair hearings was—or became, upon Riesland’s second and 
third derogations—disproportionate. 
 
e. Amestonia’s allegations are unaffected by any 
claims regarding the existence of an armed 
conflict. 
The ICCPR applies in times of war, subject to its usual derogation 
standards.199 In any event, an armed conflict, characterized by the existence 
of organized armed groups engaged in fighting of some intensity,200 is not 
in existence. Rieslandic police—if they were involved—are not an armed 
group201 and did not clash with the disorganized membership of the anti-
neonics movement. Opposition to neonics has consisted of “internal 
disturbances” that do not trigger the application of the Geneva 
Conventions.202 Furthermore, a 70-year-old retiree engaging in political 
activism, who has not taken up arms or engaged in violence, cannot be said 
to have “taken active part in hostilities.”203 
 
                                                        
194 Siracusa Principles, Prins.54, 57; Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, 
U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/55 (1990), Preamble; HRC Gen. Comm. 29, ¶6. 
195 ROSALYN HIGGINS & MAURICE FLORY, TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 229 (1997). 
196 Christopher Michaelsen, Derogating from International Human Rights Norms in the ‘War 
Against Terrorism’?, 17 TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 131, 141 (2007). 
197 A and Others/Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2004 UKHL 56, ¶43. 
198 See supra §III.A.3.b. 
199 Nuclear Weapons Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶25; HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶64. 
200 International Law Association, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in 
International Law 2 (2010). 
201 DIETRICH SCHINDLER, THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ARMED CONFLICTS ACCORDING TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS 147 (1979). 
202 Protocol II (1978), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, Art.1(2). 
203 Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), 75 U.N.T.S. 287, Art.3. 
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B. Amestonia is entitled to Kafker’s immediate release, 
disclosure of information which formed the basis of his 
apprehension, and compensation. 
1. Amestonia is entitled to Kafker’s immediate 
release. 
The obligation to provide an effective remedy under Article 2(3) is 
non-derogable.204 Reparation must restore the situation that would have 
existed but for the wrongful acts.205 Release of a detainee is required when 
no other remedy could cure the ongoing harm.206 Article 9(3) provides that 
detainees are entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. This 
Court has previously ordered the release of unlawfully detained persons.207 
Mere reconsideration would be inappropriate here, given that the detention 
itself—not a procedural error during an ongoing, lawful detention208—is 
unlawful. Kafker is therefore entitled to the “most important remedy” for 
victims of indefinite detention:209 restoration of the personal liberty he 
would have enjoyed had he not been arbitrarily detained without a fair 
hearing.  
 
2. Amestonia is entitled to disclosure of 
information which formed the basis of Kafker’s 
apprehension. 
An effective remedy for arbitrary detention includes the release of 
detailed information relating to the investigation of the detainee.210 When 
detaining individuals for terrorism offenses, Riesland has an additional 
obligation to inform interested States Parties of “the circumstances which 
warrant that person’s detention.”211 Amestonia is therefore entitled to any 
information justifying Kafker’s detention under the Terrorism Act. 
                                                        
204 HRC Gen. Comm. 29, ¶14. 
205 Factory at Chorzow (Ger./Pol.), Merits, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No.17, 47. 
206 Cagas/Philippines, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/73/D/788/1997, Individual Opinion of Quiroga and 
Posada, (c) (1996). 
207 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S./Iran), Provisional Measures 
Order of December 15, 1979 I.C.J. 7, ¶47. 
208 Cf. Avena, ¶123. 
209 Alfred de Zayas, Human Rights and Indefinite Detention, 87 IRRC 15, 34 (2005). 
210 Aboufaied/Libya, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/104/D/1782/2008, ¶9 (2012). 
211 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1998), 2149 U.N.T.S. 284, Art.9(6). 
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3. Amestonia is entitled to compensation. 
Article 9(5) entitles victims of unlawful detentions to compensation. 
Non-material injury, including mental suffering and reputational harm, is 
compensable under international law;212 it is an “inevitable consequence” of 
wrongful detention, specific proof of which is not required for the injured 
national’s State to receive compensation on his behalf.213 Amestonia is 
therefore entitled to receive compensation for the harm Kafker suffered 
from his unlawful detention. 
 
IV. THE CYBER-ATTACKS AGAINST THE COMPUTER 
SYSTEMS OF THE AMES POST AND CHESTER & 
WALSINGHAM ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO RIESLAND, 
AND CONSTITUTE AN INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL 
ACT FOR WHICH AMESTONIA IS ENTITLED TO 
COMPENSATION.  
A. The cyber-attacks against the computer systems of The 
Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham are attributable 
to Riesland. 
As President Hale commented in relation to the 22 March 2015 
attacks: “all of the evidence points back to the Bureau and to Riesland.”214 
To the extent that additional relevant evidence is under the exclusive 
control of Riesland, the Court may have “more liberal recourse to 
inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence.”215 The limited availability 
of evidence in cyber-attacks necessitates a particularly relaxed standard of 
proof.216 
 
1. The attacks were carried out by the Rieslandic 
governments. 
The conduct of State organs are attributable to that State.217 In the 
cyber context, an “identifying line of code” can serve the same evidentiary 
                                                        
212 Lusitania Cases, 7 R.I.A.A. 35, 40 (1923). 
213 Diallo, Merits, ¶21. 
214 Compromis, ¶39. 
215 Corfu Channel, 18. 
216 Nicholas Tsagourias, Cyber Attacks, Self-Defence, and the Problem of Attribution, 17 J. 
CONFLICT SEC. L. 229, 235 (2012). 
217 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts [ARSIWA], (I.L.C. 
Yearbook 2001-I) Pt. II, Art.4. 
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function as traditional markers of State authority.218 The origination of a 
cyber-operation from a government’s technology systems is “an indication 
that the State in question is associated with the operation.”219 Experts from 
the Amestonian Institute of Technology, a highly-regarded research 
institution specializing in computer science,220 found that “significant 
segments of code” in the malware that brought down the computer systems 
were identical to the codes used by the Bureau in the Blaster program,221 
traceable to Rieslandic governmental computer infrastructures,222 and 
unavailable to the general public,223 strongly suggesting that Rieslandic 
government used its “world-renowned” IT capabilities224 to carry out the 
attacks. 
The Bureau had a compelling motive to engage once again in covert 
action within Amestonia. Leading up to the cyber-attacks, Frost’s 
disclosures—facilitated and circulated by the victim companies—led to the 
exposure of confidential Bureau information, seizures of Bureau personnel 
and facilities, and Amestonia’s provision of sanctuary to Frost, a former 
Bureau employee whom Amestonia had declined to extradite a mere eight 
days before the attack.225 Rieslandic Attorney General Deloponte also 
pledged that Riesland would not “tolerate the publication of leaked 
confidential information, and that it [would] do whatever is in its power to 
disrupt any further threats to our national security.”226 
 
2. The attacks were carried out by a person or 
entity acting under the control of Riesland. 
Even if the above evidence does not establish that the Bureau carried 
out the attacks, it is sufficient to prove that Riesland exercised control over 
the person or entity carrying out the attacks.227 The standard of “overall 
control” articulated by the ICTY in the Tadić case would attribute a cyber-
attack carried out by private actors to Riesland if it supplied technical and 
                                                        
218 Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 525, 560 
(2012). 
219 Tallinn Manual, Rule 7. 
220 Clarifications, ¶8. 
221 Compromis, ¶38. 
222 Clarifications, ¶9. 
223 Compromis, ¶38. 
224 Compromis, ¶1. 
225 Compromis, ¶35. 
226 Id. 
227 ARSIWA, Art.8. 
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organizational support, “even if no specific involvement in the attack can be 
proven.”228 The Court should decline to follow the heightened “effective 
control” test articulated in the Genocide case,229 which is unduly restrictive 
and not reflective of custom.230  
 
B. Riesland’s attacks constitute an internationally 
wrongful act. 
1. The attacks constitute a violation of U.N. 
Charter Article 2(4). 
Whether an act—including a cyber-operation—amounts to an 
unlawful use of force depends on the act’s scale and effects.231 Destruction 
of life is not a prerequisite, provided that the computer-based operation 
results in damage that would be illegal if inflicted by military units.232  The 
loss of an object’s functionality constitutes damage if it requires 
replacement of physical components, and some scholars have observed that 
a “loss of usability” alone is sufficient.233 The 22 March attacks against 
Amestonian targets caused tremendous damage of €45-50 million, resulting 
in data loss, disabling of “communication switches,” and damage to 
“infrastructure,”234 suggesting damage to the hardware’s functionality235 
and other physical computing resources. Chester & Walsingham was unable 
to access its files for months and The Ames Post was non-operational for 
approximately three months.236 These large-scale and serious effects would 
constitute an unlawful use of force if caused by military forces and thus are 
equally prohibited in the cyber context.  
                                                        
228 Tsagourias, 237. 
229 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina/Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶401. 
230 Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on 
Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EJIL 649, 651 (2007) (collecting cases). 
231 Tallinn Manual, Rule 11. 
232 Steven Ratner, Self-Defense Against Terrorists: The Meaning of Armed Attack in COUNTER-
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eds. 2013), 18. 
233 Tallinn Manual, 108-09. 
234 Compromis, ¶38. 
235 Hardware is defined as “the physical components that comprise a computer system and cyber-
infrastructure.” Tallinn Manual, Glossary, 259. 
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2. The attacks constitute a violation of the 
principle of non-intervention. 
Customary international law prohibits coercive intervention in matters 
that the victim State is entitled to decide freely,237 including the use of 
certain coercive economic measures.238 International instruments,239 State 
practice,240 and scholarship241 indicate that cyber-operations—and the 
provision of tools for use in such operations242—may qualify as coercive. 
Riesland undertook or supported a cyber-operation against The Ames Post, 
Amestonia’s most widely-circulated newspaper,243 in order to coerce 
Amestonia to submit to Riesland’s demands in two matters Amestonia had 
decided—and was entitled to decide—freely: its refusal to extradite Frost 
under the political offense exception in the Extradition Treaty and its 
refusal to release documents held by The Ames Post.244 
 
3. The attacks constitute violations of Riesland’s 
human rights obligations. 
In addition to ICCPR Article 17’s protection against interference with 
correspondence, Article 19 recognizes the “freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds.” These rights apply to private 
businesses.245 Cyber-attacks against private networks constitute violations 
of these provisions,246 which States have a “positive obligation” to prevent, 
                                                        
237 Nicaragua, ¶205. 
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The Principle of Non-intervention, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L LAW 345, 371 (2009); Lori Damrosch, Politics 
Across Borders, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 31-32 (1989). 
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investigate, and punish.247 By interfering with—or failing to protect against 
interference with—the rights of Amestonian corporations to engage freely 
in both private and public correspondence, Riesland violated its obligations 
under the ICCPR.248 
 
C. In any event, the attacks violated Riesland’s obligation 
to prevent transboundary harm. 
States are obligated to prevent activities within their jurisdictions that 
adversely affect other States.249 Although the norm is applied primarily to 
tangible resources, sovereign jurisdiction includes computer infrastructures 
within a state’s territory,250 and the no-harm principle extends to adverse 
effects in the shared environment of cross-border computer networks.251 
Scholars have argued that Russia be held responsible for the 2007 cyber-
attacks against Estonia, given Russia’s tacit approval of the acts during an 
ongoing dispute with Estonia.252 Statements by State representatives 
regarding operations originating in the territories of Kyrgyzstan, Israel, and 
China show that cyber-attacks are internationally-wrongful acts.253 
Riesland’s refusal to respond to the attacks,254 technological sophistication, 
extensive control over the “primary backbone” Amestonian 
communications,255 and use of Rieslandic IP addresses and government 
                                                        
247 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, U.N.Doc.A/HRC/17/27 (2011), ¶52. 
248 Riesland was bound by the I.C.C.P.R. with respect to cyber-activity in Riesland affecting or 
involving communications within Amestonia. See supra §I.B.1.a. 
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software in the attacks show that Riesland failed to exercise due diligence 
in preventing or punishing operations launched from its soil. 
 
D. The attacks are not justifiable under international law. 
1. The attacks were not a valid exercise of the 
right to self-defense. 
a. Self-defense cannot be exercised against non-
State actors. 
This Court256 and scholars257 have found that non-State actors cannot 
commit “armed attacks” under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter; thus, they 
may be targeted without the territorial State’s consent only if their actions 
are attributable to that State. Even if an exception exists for self-defense 
within States “unable or unwilling” to prevent armed attacks,258 that test is 
not met here. Following the arson attacks, President Hale announced a 
police investigation and emphasized that Amestonia would “not tolerate 
such provocations;”259 Amestonian police later apprehended would-be 
attackers before they could cause any harm;260 finally, no attacks have 
occurred in Amestonia or Riesland since the release of the Frost Files. 
 
b. Riesland was not the victim of an armed attack. 
An armed attack, distinct from “less grave” uses of force,261 requires 
“infliction of substantial destruction upon important elements of the target 
State.”262 If non-State actors can commit armed attacks, a higher threshold 
for what constitutes an “armed attack” applies to them263—which does not 
                                                        
256 Nicaragua, ¶195; Wall Case, ¶139; DRC/Uganda, ¶¶146-47 (noting a possible exception for 
“large-scale attacks”). 
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include extraterritorial terrorist attacks against a State’s nationals.264 Arson 
committed on Amestonian soil, even if two Rieslandic nationals died from 
smoke inhalation, does not satisfy even the most expansive definition of an 
armed attack. Preventive self-defense is not recognized in international law, 
including against terrorist attacks.265 
 
2. The attacks were not valid countermeasures. 
 Countermeasures that violate fundamental human rights 
obligations266 and involve the use or threat of force267 are unlawful.268 
Countermeasures must be necessary “to safeguard an essential interest 
against a grave and imminent peril”269 and proportionate—including 
quantitatively equivalent270—in response to an internationally wrongful act. 
Amestonia’s seizures of VoR personnel and property were lawful.271 In any 
event, Riesland’s rights under the Broadcasting Treaty are not an essential 
interest and could have been asserted without recourse to unilateral action. 
Finally, Amestonia seized property worth only €20 million that has not yet 
been sold;272 by contrast, the Amestonian targets suffered €45-50 million in 
irreversible losses.  
 
E. Amestonia is entitled to compensation for the attacks. 
States are entitled to compensation for breaches of international law 
resulting in harm to property.273 Amestonia is entitled to €45-50 million for 
the harm caused to the two Amestonian companies.274 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
The State of Amestonia respectfully requests this Court to declare: 
I. 
 
The Ames Post documents are admissible, Riesland’s electronic 
surveillance programs violate international law, and Amestonia is entitled 
to their cessation and non-repetition; and 
 
II. 
Amestonia’s VoR seizures and arrests were lawful; and 
 
III. 
Riesland’s detention of Kafker violated international law, and 
Amestonia is entitled to his release, disclosure of relevant documents, and 
compensation; and 
 
IV. 
The cyber-attacks against Amestonian targets are attributable to 
Riesland and constitute a wrongful act for which Amestonia is entitled to 
compensation. 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
Agents of the Government of the State of Amestonia 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
BACKGROUND 
Riesland and Amestonia are neighboring States with a common 
language and similar ethnic composition. They enjoy healthy cross-border 
economic, cultural, and security ties. Riesland is the top importer of 
Amestonian agricultural products, which has contributed to Amestonia’s 
rapid GDP growth. The States have concluded a number of bilateral treaties 
on subjects such as tourism, extradition, and intelligence-sharing. 
 
THE BROADCASTING TREATY 
 One bilateral agreement between the States is the 1992 Treaty on the 
Establishment of Broadcasting Facilities (“the Broadcasting Treaty”). The 
Broadcasting Treaty entitles each state to furnish and operate a television 
station in the other’s territory. To accomplish this, the treaty provides 
certain protections from interference in the receiving State and extends 
privileges and immunities to the stations’ premises, property, and 
employees. Voice of Riesland (“VoR”), a division of Riesland’s state-
owned and -operated broadcasting corporation, Riesland National 
Television (“RNT”), operates Riesland’s station in Amestonia. Since its 
inaugural program in 1992, VoR has broadcasted a variety of award-
winning and highly acclaimed programs. 
 
THE FROST FILES 
In December 2014, Riesland national Frederico Frost, a former 
Riesland Secret Service Bureau (“the Bureau”)  intelligence analyst, gave a 
law firm in Amestonia a USB drive containing nearly 100,000 documents 
marked “top secret” (“the Frost Files”), which Frost claims were 
downloaded from Bureau computers. Frost also gave a copy of the USB to 
two reporters from The Ames Post, Amestonia’s most widely-circulated 
newspaper. In January and February 2015, The Ames Post gradually 
published thousands of these documents, unredacted, on its website. 
Riesland requested the documents’ return and Frost’s extradition under the 
States’ extradition treaty. Amestonia refused both requests. 
The Frost Files contained information indicating that beginning May 
2013, as part of a program called “Verismo,” the Bureau collected and 
stored telecommunications metadata from Amestonian citizens through a 
recording pod installed on an undersea fiber optic cable located in 
Riesland’s exclusive economic zone. The documents also discuss 
Riesland’s alleged operation of a program known as “Carmen.” This 
operation allegedly entailed the collection of data from the phones of 
Amestonian public and private leaders while those officials were guests on 
“Tea Time with Margaret.” Authorizations and safeguards for these 
intelligence operations were provided in the Secret Surveillance Bureau Act 
(“SSBA”).  
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VOR ARRESTS AND SEIZURES 
On 16 February 2015, the day The Ames Post published the Carmen 
documents, Amestonian police applied for and received a warrant to seize 
VoR’s assets and property, citing the documents as probable cause. Upon 
execution, the police seized the station’s property. At 3:15AM the 
following morning, Amestonian border patrol arrested three VoR 
employees, including Margaret Mayer, attempting to cross into Riesland by 
train. The three refused to produce travel documents upon request and were 
subsequently detained. Upon this development, the Amestonian police 
sought and obtained an arrest warrant for all three on suspicion of 
espionage. Amestonian investigators later determined that some confiscated 
VoR property was used for surveillance. The Amestonian Ministry of 
Justice obtained a forfeiture order against VoR’s real estate and property. 
Amestonia intends to sell the property at public auction, pending the 
resolution of this case. 
 
THE HIVE 
For several years, Rieslandic companies have supplied Amestonian 
farmers with insecticides known as neocontinoids, or “neonics,” which 
boost farmers’ yields. On 2 October 2012, the Institute for Land and 
Sustainable Agriculture (“ILSA”) published the results of a study 
identifying neonics’ negative effects on bees and other pollinators. ILSA 
called on Riesland and Amestonia to reevaluate the use of this insecticide. 
Sometime after 2 July 2013, an anonymous post appeared on 
www.longlivethehive.com. The post condemned politicians for failing to 
“respond to peaceful initiatives,” and called on the group to “command 
attention.” The post expressed a need to respond “effectively and in kind.” 
The website was primarily used by environmental activists to discuss ways 
to stop neonic use, including occasional calls for violent action, including 
sabotage and arson. 
On the night of 2 February 2014, seven Amestonian warehouses, 
which stored neonics, were simultaneously set on fire. The arson attacks 
killed 5 people, including two Rieslandic nationals, and injured many 
others. The attacks caused €75 million of damage, and are expected to have 
long-term adverse health consequences for the local population. Police 
found spray-painted images of a bee on the asphalt outside the warehouses. 
On 7 March 2014, 263 envelopes containing white powder and 
stamped with the image of a bee were sent to Ministries of Trade and 
Agriculture officials in Riesland and Amestonia, prominent Amestonian 
farmers, and board members of three Rieslandic neonic-producing 
corporations. That night, an anonymous online tweet warned that the “threat 
is real” and that “next time” the envelope recipients would “taste [their] 
own poison.” Following the attacks and subsequent threats, Riesland’s 
Prime Minister announced that she had ordered Riesland’s security and 
intelligence services to direct operations against the threat. 
On 16 October 2014, the Bureau Director informed the Amestonian 
Government that Bureau intelligence identified a plot to contaminate a large 
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shipment of honey bound for Riesland with toxic neonicontinoids. The next 
day, Riesland issued a Terrorism Alert pursuant to the Terrorism Act 2003 
(“Terrorism Act”). On 21 October 2014 Amestonian police arrested three 
members of a group calling itself “The Hive” in possession of toxic neonics 
and detailed maps of Amestonian honey extraction facilities. Riesland 
reissued Terrorism Alerts in April 2015 and October 2015. 
 
JOSEPH KAFKER 
Riesland’s Attorney General announced that Rieslandic intelligence 
linked Joseph Kafker, a vocal opponent of neonics, to the highest echelons 
of the Hive. Documents show he was a “high level suspect” in the 
attempted poisoning of honey bound for Riesland. On 7 March 2015, 
Riesland detained Joseph Kafker in Riesland’s territory, announcing the 
Terrorism Act as the basis for his detention. Kafker’s detention was 
reviewed in a closed hearing on 10 March 2015 by the National Security 
Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), comprising five Rieslandic judges. The Tribunal 
granted the petition to detain Kafker for national security reasons and ruled 
that evidence against Kafker was “closed material” pursuant to the 
Terrorism Act. Kafker was represented at this proceeding by a Special 
Advocate but was not able to attend, communicate with his lawyer, or 
access the evidence presented. Kafker’s detention has been reviewed and 
extended by the Tribunal every 21 days. Kafker was granted consular 
assistance, given access to his family, and allowed communication with the 
outside world throughout his detention. 
 
CYBER ATTACKS 
On 22 March 2015, malware similar to that used in the Carmen 
program and traceable to the computer infrastructures of the Rieslandic 
government was used to attack the networks and communication switches 
at Chester & Walsingham and The Ames Post. As a result of the attacks, the 
two targets suffered a combined €45-50 million in damages, The Ames Post 
shut down operations for two months, and a significant number of 
proceedings in Amestonian courts were delayed for months. 
 
APPLICATION TO THE COURT 
Amestonia and Riesland have agreed to refer this dispute to this Court 
by Special Agreement. Riesland, however, does not consent to the 
introduction of information derived from the Frost Files. The parties have 
stipulated in Article 2(b) of the Special Agreement that the issue of the 
admissibility of the documents is left for this Court to decide. 
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS 
FIRST PLEADING 
The illicitly-obtained documents published in The Ames Post 
(hereinafter “Frost Files”) are inadmissible before this Court. The Frost 
Files violate this Court’s standards of relevance and proof of authenticity. 
The documents do not derive from an independent body, result from 
personal and direct confirmation, or have multiple, impartial sources to 
verify their content. Because the documents are inadmissible, Amestonia 
cannot meet its burden to prove that Riesland’s intelligence programs 
violated international law. Even if this Court finds the documents to be 
admissible, they do not evidence any breach of an international obligation 
owed to Amestonia. Riesland’s intelligence programs did not violate its 
treaty obligations under the ICCPR because the programs were not under 
Riesland’s effective control, and in any event, did not constitute arbitrary 
interference into Amestonians’ right to privacy. Riesland’s intelligence 
programs also did not violate customary law because state practice and 
opinio juris support states’ right to engage in intelligence collection. 
 
SECOND PLEADING 
By entering Riesland’s broadcasting station without permission, 
ordering the forfeiture of its premises and property, and arresting and 
detaining the station’s employees, Amestonia violated Articles 1, 14, and 
15 of the Treaty on the Establishment of Broadcasting Facilities Between 
the State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland (hereinafter 
“Broadcasting Treaty”). The treaty’s privileges and immunities remained in 
effect at the time of Amestonia’s breach because the station never ceased to 
function as envisaged by the Treaty, and in any event, any cessation of 
functions only impacted Article 15. Amestonia cannot declare the Treaty 
invalid under a fraud defense because Amestonia was not induced to 
conclude the treaty based on fraudulent conduct. Amestonia also cannot 
declare the Treaty suspended or terminated under a material breach defense 
because Riesland never acted to frustrate the Treaty’s object and purpose. 
In any event, Amestonia’s expropriation of Rieslandic property violated the 
customary norm of sovereign immunity because the station was a State 
instrumentality engaged in sovereign acts, and Riesland never explicitly 
waived its right to such immunity. As a result, Riesland is entitled to the 
release of its nationals and compensation for the value of its expropriated 
property, both of which are remedies within this Court’s power to order. 
 
THIRD PLEADING 
The detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism Act  is consistent 
with international law. Riesland’s preventive detention of Kafker complied 
with its obligations under ICCPR Article 9. Kafker’s detention was not 
arbitrary and was reviewed by an independent and impartial tribunal, and 
Riesland provided sufficient notice of the reasons for Kafker’s arrest. Even 
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if this Court finds that Kafker’s detention violated Article 9, Riesland 
lawfully derogated from the relevant Article 9 obligations. A state of 
emergency was justified under ICCPR Article 4 due to the actual and 
imminent threat to Riesland posed by Hive terrorists. Riesland’s derogation 
was necessary and proportional to the harm averted, concerned provisions 
that were lawfully derogable and followed proper procedure. ICCPR Article 
14, concerning criminal trials, does not apply to Kafker’s detention. This 
Court also has no authority to order Kafker’s release or disclosure of 
information about his detention, as the detaining state has the choice of 
means for compliance with this Court’s judgment, and in any event, the 
disclosure of confidential information poses a threat to national security.  
 
FOURTH PLEADING 
The cyber-attacks against the Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham 
computer systems cannot be attributed to Riesland. Circumstantial evidence 
of Riesland’s involvement in these operations cannot be linked to an organ 
of Riesland. Riesland also did not have effective control over the 
perpetrators and cannot be held liable for knowingly or negligently 
allowing the cyber-attacks. In any event, the cyber-attacks do not constitute 
an internationally wrongful act. The cyber-attacks were not an unlawful use 
of force because they did not meet the threshold of physical damage, and in 
any event, the attacks constituted a legitimate exercise of Riesland’s right to 
self-defense. The cyber-attacks also did not violate the norm of non-
intervention because they were not coercive. The cyber-attacks were also a 
valid countermeasure because Amestonia previously violated international 
law by allowing confidential data to be disseminated on its territory, and 
Riesland’s response was proportional to that violation.  
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PLEADINGS 
I. THE ILLICITLY-OBTAINED DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED 
ON THE WEBSITE OF THE AMES POST ARE 
INADMISSIBLE BEFORE THE COURT, BUT IN THE 
EVENT THAT THE COURT DOES FIND THEM TO BE 
ADMISSIBLE, THEY DO NOT EVIDENCE ANY BREACH 
BY RIESLAND OF AN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION 
OWED TO AMESTONIA. 
A. The Frost Files are inadmissible. 
1. Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible before this 
Court.  
Only relevant evidence is admissible before this Court, and the 
“burden of evidence” lies upon the party seeking to prove a claim.1 The ICJ 
Statute requires relevance in requests for production of documents,2 and the 
Court’s Rules extend this requirement to evidentiary submissions.3 This 
Court, relying on practice from its Nicaragua4 and Tehran5 decisions, stated 
in Armed Activities that it would “examine the facts relevant to each of the 
component elements of the claims advanced by the Parties,” and “explain 
what items it should eliminate from further consideration.”6 The practice of 
requiring relevance is reflected in other international tribunals.7 
 
                                                          
1 Robert Kolb, General Principles of Procedural Law in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 818 (Zimmermann et al., eds. 2006). 
2 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 STAT. 1055 (1945), [hereinafter “I.C.J. Statute”], 
Art.34. 
3 I.C.J. Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts and Documents No. 6 (2007), Art.49(1)(memorials), 
Art.50(1)&(2)(pleadings), Art.63(1) (testimony), Art.71(translations), Art.76(provisional measures 
submissions). 
4 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua/U.S.), Merits, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶¶85-91.  
5 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S./Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3, 
¶13. 
6 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C./Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, 
¶59. 
7 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Regarding the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Analytical 
Index (2011), Art.XI(B)(3)(b)(ii)(599); Statute of the STL, Annex, U.N.Doc.S/RES/1757 (2007), 
Art.16(5); ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N.Doc.IT/32/Rev.50 (2015), Rule 89(C). 
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2. Documents are irrelevant if they cannot be 
authenticated. 
International tribunals such as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,8 
International Criminal Court,9 and International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia10 note that a document's prima facie reliability is essential in 
determining whether the prerequisite of relevance is met. Regional11 and 
State12 courts have similarly found that documents with questionable 
authenticity lack the reliability required for admission. 
This Court’s recent Genocide decision specifically noted the 
importance of authenticity in determining relevance and admissibility.13 
Although parties before the Court rarely question documents’ authenticity, 
in its determination of relevance, the Court looks at factors such as whether 
evidence stems from personal and direct confirmation,14 derives from 
official, independent bodies;15
 
and emanates from identified,16
 
multiple 
sources,17
 
demonstrating contemporaneous and direct knowledge.18 The 
Court also examines the manner in which statements were made public19 
and whether parties’ statements constitute acknowledgement of facts.20 This 
acknowledgement must be explicit when the subject matter is classified.21  
                                                          
8 Ayyash et al., Decision on the Admissibility of Documents Published on the Wikileaks Website, 
STL-11-01, ¶40. 
9 Prosecutor/Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/07, ¶75. 
10 Prosecutor/Prlic et al., Interlocutory Appeal Decision, IT-04-74, ¶33. 
11 Prosecutor/Sary, Request Regarding Admission of Newly-Available U.S. Diplomatic Cables, 
[Extraordinary Chambers, Courts of Cambodia] 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, ¶¶7, 11 (2013). 
12 Am. Civil Liberties Union/Dep't of State, [U.S. District Court] 878 F. Supp. 2d 215, 221 
(2012); Bancoult/Sec’y of State for Foreign &Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2), UKSC 2015/0021, ¶¶89, 
93 (2015). 
13 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina/Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶225-227. 
14 Corfu Channel Case (U.K./Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 16-17 (regarding witness testimony).  
15 Genocide Case, ¶227; Nicaragua, ¶¶65, 68. 
16 Genocide Case, ¶227.  
17 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran/U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶60; Armed Activities, 
¶61.  
18 Nicaragua, ¶¶62, 65. 
19 Nicaragua, ¶65. 
20 I.C.J. Rules of Court, Art 26(i).  
21 Nicaragua, ¶74.  
250 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 23:1 
 
3. The Frost Files cannot be authenticated, and are 
therefore irrelevant.  
The Frost Files do not derive from personal and direct confirmation 
from the purported author, from an official, independent body, or from 
multiple sources. Frost did not allege to have sent or received the original 
documents himself, and the source of each document was never disclosed.22 
No statements by Riesland could be interpreted as explicitly acknowledging 
the classified documents’ veracity. Although reporters and lawyers 
employed by The Ames Post reviewed these documents,23 they were not 
sufficiently impartial to review authentication, as the corporation 
employing them has a vested commercial interest in publishing the 
documents.24 State alleging a violation of international law has the burden 
to prove the existence and violation of that obligation;25 without the Frost 
Files, Amestonia lacks competent evidence to prove that Riesland’s 
intelligence programs violated international law.  
 
B. Even if the Court finds the documents to be admissible, 
they do not evidence any breach of an international 
obligation owed to Amestonia.26 
1. Riesland’s intelligence programs do not violate 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).  
The ICCPR, to which Riesland and Amestonia are parties,27 protects 
individuals from “arbitrary or unlawful interference” with “privacy, family, 
home or correspondence.”28  
 
                                                          
22 Clarifications, ¶3. 
23 Compromis, ¶22. 
24 William Worster, The Effect of Leaked Information on the Rules of International Law, 28 
AM.U.INT’L.L.R. 443, 445 (2013) (newspapers have a commercial interest in publishing documents). 
25 Corfu Channel, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ečer,119-120, 129; GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 396 (1945); Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 
¶79; See S.S. Lotus (Fr./Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), 18. 
26 Riesland’s discussion hereinafter of evidence originating from the Frost Files does not indicate 
acceptance of the documents’ authenticity.  
27 Compromis, ¶43. 
28 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
“ICCPR”], Art.17(1). 
2016] Distinguished Brief 251 
 
 
 
a. Surveillance did not occur in an area under 
Riesland’s effective control. 
The ICCPR requires states to respect and ensure the rights recognized 
in the Covenant “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction.”29 Although some argue for a strictly territorial application of 
the ICCPR,30 State practice indicates that the ICCPR applies, at most, only 
to areas under a state’s effective control.31 Scholars generally agree that the 
locus for determining effective control is the location of the interference 
itself.32 
Physical or legal control over a person or area is required to establish 
effective control. This Court has only found that ICCPR applied 
extraterritorially where a State’s security forces physically occupied the 
relevant territory for an extended period.33 Instances in which other courts 
have found extraterritorial application include the physical arrest of a 
person,34 confiscation of property at a consulate,35 and failure to provide 
state-owed pensions.36 The European Court of Human Rights similarly 
outlined three exhaustive examples of extraterritorial jurisdiction: the use of 
force by State agents, military action, and military occupation.37 
The statute authorizing Rieslandic intelligence permits only the 
collection of “foreign intelligence,” defined as “any information located or 
emanating from outside Riesland’s territory.”38 Applicant has provided no 
evidence that those surveilled under either program had any legal 
relationship with Riesland or that the programs physically injured any 
Amestonian citizens. Located in Riesland’s EEZ,39 the Verismo program’s 
interception of communications occurred outside of any State’s territory. 
                                                          
29 ICCPR, Art.2(1). 
30 Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA.  J.  INT’L L. 291, 
307-8 (2015) (discussing statements of Israel, Australia, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom).  
31 Bankovic et al./17 NATO Member States, [ECtHR] No. 52207/99, ¶71 (2001); Issa v Turkey, 
[ECtHR] No. 31821/96, ¶58 (2004); Al-Skeini et al./U.K., [ECtHR] 53 EHRR 589, ¶¶133-137 (2011); 
Harold Koh, Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the ICCPR, 4 (19 October 2010).  
32 Deeks, 300. 
33 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 110-111; Armed Activities, ¶59. 
34 Lopez Burgos/Uruguay, CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, ¶¶12.2-12.3 (1981). 
35 Montero/Uruguay, CCPR/C/OP/2, 136 (1990). 
36 Gueye et al./France, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985, ¶¶9.4-9.5 (1989). 
37 Al-Skeini, 27-32. 
38 Compromis, ¶4. 
39 Compromis, ¶22. 
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Under UNCLOS Article 58, broadly considered custom,40 states may 
engage in intelligence collection in any EEZ without other States’ notice or 
consent.41 The Carmen program was located in Amestonia’s territory under 
Amestonian control. No use of force, military action, or military occupation 
occurred at the broadcasting station.42 Thus, the ICCPR cannot apply to 
these programs.  
 
b. In any event, Riesland’s actions did not violate 
the ICCPR. 
Courts frequently use a four-part test to determine whether 
surveillance programs violate the ICCPR: whether there was an interference 
with privacy or correspondence, whether the interference was in accordance 
with the law, whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim, and 
whether it was proportionate to that aim.43  
 
i. Verismo and Carmen did not 
arbitrarily interfere with privacy. 
Verismo only collected metadata of Amestonian citizens, filtering out 
irrelevant results.44 Carmen surveilled only high-level public and private 
officials.45 Monitoring electronic data of a large group of citizens is too 
broadly directed and superficial to constitute arbitrary interference,46 and 
targeted surveillance on high-level officials is too particularized to 
constitute arbitrary interference because it does not implicate average 
citizens.47  
                                                          
40 UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE LAW OF THE 
SEA: PRACTICE OF STATES AT THE TIME OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF UNCLOS 133 (UN Sales 
No.E.94.V.13, 1994); NATALIE KLEIN, MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 45 (2011). 
41 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S 3 (1982), Art.58(1); Raul 
Pedrozo, Responding to Ms. Zhang’s Talking Points on the EEZ, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 207, 223 
(2011) (noting activities of NATO, China, Japan, Australia, Russia, and South Africa). 
42 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23(1). 
43 Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.R. 
81, 112 (2015); Gerhard Schmid, Special Rapporteur, Report on the Existence of a Global System for 
the Interception of Private and Commercial Communications (ECHELON Interception System) 
(2001/2098(INI), ¶7.2.1.  
44 Compromis, ¶¶22, 23. 
45 Compromis, ¶25. 
46 Milanovic, 120. 
47 Paul Stephan, The New International Law — Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and 
Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1563 (1999); Milanovic, 319. 
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ii. Any interference was in accordance 
with law. 
The Human Rights Committee notes that interference must “take place 
on the basis of law, which itself must comply with the provisions, aims and 
objectives of the Covenant.”48 Any interference was in accordance with 
Rieslandic law, explicitly outlined in the SSBA.49 Structural safeguards, 
similar to those frequently used by States,50 limited Riesland’s 
surveillance,51 including a “necessity” requirement, capacity for 
independent investigations, judicial review, issuance of limiting regulations, 
and a ban on surveillance implicating Rieslandic nationals. Riesland’s 
surveillance programs were regularly reviewed.52  
 
iii. Any interference pursued a legitimate 
aim. 
States regularly use surveillance both to advance their foreign policy 
interests53 and promote national security efforts.54 Rieslandic law limits 
intelligence collection to the pursuit of these aims.55 The Verismo program 
targeted potential threats to Riesland’s national security,56 and the Carmen 
program advanced Riesland’s foreign policy interests.57  
 
iv. Any interference was proportionate to 
its aim. 
Both programs abided by the SSBA limitations, which prevented them 
from exceeding the scope required by their objective. The Verismo program 
relied on specifically tailored search terms to track potential ecoterrorists58 
                                                          
48 HRC, General Comment No.16, U.N.Doc.HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, ¶3 (1988). 
49 Compromis, ¶4. 
50 Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act, 2008 CF 301, ¶24. 
51 Compromis, ¶5. 
52 Compromis, ¶23; Clarifications, ¶5. 
53 See infra §I(B)(2). 
54 See infra §I(B)(2); The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N.Doc.A/RES/68/167 (2003), 
Preamble. 
55 Compromis, ¶4.  
56 Compromis, ¶25. 
57 Compromis, ¶26. 
58 Compromis, ¶22. 
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and only stored information for a maximum of two years.59 The Carmen 
program only surveilled approximately 100 individuals, all of whom were 
high-ranking Amestonian leaders.60  
 
2. Riesland’s intelligence programs are consistent 
with customary international law. 
No customary restrictions on surveillance exist in international law,61 
based either on a right to territorial sovereignty or privacy.62 The 
widespread and long-standing practice of surveillance,63 the statements of 
States about surveillance,64 and arrangements between States to limit 
surveillance65 support the permissiveness of surveillance. Many scholars 
interpret this widespread practice as an indication that states affirmatively 
recognize a right to engage in such conduct66 because spying is an integral 
part of a State’s right to protect itself.67 Neither specific type of intelligence 
program undertaken by Riesland is customarily prohibited; this includes 
                                                          
59 Compromis, ¶23.  
60 Compromis, ¶¶25, 26. 
61 See Office of Gen. Counsel, U.S Dep’t of Def., An Assessment of International Legal Issues in 
Information Operations, 29 (May 1999); Daniel Silver, Intelligence and Counterintelligence in 
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 965 (Moore et al., eds. 2005); W. Hays Parks, The International Law of 
Intelligence Collection in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 433–434 (Moore et al., eds. 1990); Geoffrey 
Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321, 321 (1996); Afsheen 
Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 595, 596 
(2007); Roger Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. L. 
REV. 217, 217 (1999). 
62 Julius Stone, Legal Problems of Espionage in Conditions of Modern Conflict in ESSAYS ON 
ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 36 (Stranger et al., eds. 1962); Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who 
Came in from the Cold War, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1098 (2007); Weber & Saravia/Germany, 2006 
ECHR 1173, ¶81.  
63 Deeks, 305. 
64 Embassy Espionage: The NSA’s Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, DER SPIEGEL, (27 October 2013); 
Tony Abbott, Comments Before Australian Parliament, 18 Nov. 2013. 
65 See Paul Farrell, History of 5-Eyes, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2013); W. Michael Reisman, Covert 
Action, 20 YALE J.INT’L.L. 419, 421 n.3 (1995). 
66 See, e.g. McDougal et al., The Intelligence Function and World Public Order, 46 TEMPLE L.Q. 
365, 394 (1973); See David Sanger, In Spy Uproar, ‘Everyone Does It’ Just Won’t Do, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 25, 2013 (Modern examples of state spying). 
67 See Craig Forcese, Spies without Borders: International Law and Intelligence Collection, 5 J. 
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y, 179, 198–99 (2011); Christopher Baker, Tolerance of International 
Espionage, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2004).  
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tapping communications of diplomats,68 which no State or diplomat has 
ever asserted was illegal,69 and mass telecommunications surveillance,70 a 
practice engaged in by many States.71  
 
II. THE ARREST OF MARGARET MAYER AND THE OTHER 
VOR EMPLOYEES, AND THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE 
VOR FACILITY AND ITS EQUIPMENT, VIOLATED THE 
BROADCASTING TREATY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
GENERALLY, AND RIESLAND IS THEREFORE 
ENTITLED TO THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF ITS 
NATIONALS AND COMPENSATION FOR THE VALUE OF 
THE CONFISCATED PROPERTY. 
A. The Broadcasting Treaty was in effect at the time of 
Amestonia’s breach. 
1. Riesland did not breach any VCLT provision 
justifying invocation of invalidity, suspension, 
or termination. 
a. The Broadcasting Treaty is not invalidated by 
fraud. 
 The VCLT, to which both States are parties,72 represents an 
exhaustive list of methods for invalidating, suspending, or terminating a 
treaty.73 Article 49 allows invalidation of a treaty if a State is “induced to 
give consent to a treaty which it would not otherwise have given” due to the 
other party’s fraudulent conduct.74 The term fraud includes “deceit or 
willful misrepresentation”75 “in the formation of an international 
                                                          
68 Chesterman, 1086 (discussing U.S. and British intelligence services tapping communications 
of UNSC members). 
69 Id. 
70 Milanovic, 82; Chesterman, 1081. 
71 Deeks, 297. 
72 Compromis, ¶43. 
73 VCLT, Art.42 
74 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter “VCLT”], 
Art.49; Commentaries on the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook, [hereinafter 
“VCLT Commentaries”], (1966-II), 245. 
75 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 839 (Dorr et al, eds. 2012).  
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agreement,”76 with the intention of “lead[ing] the other party into error.”77 
A treaty between States has never been declared invalid due to fraud.78  
There is no evidence that fraudulent conduct was used in the formation 
of the Broadcasting Treaty. Unlike in the Timor-Leste arbitration, the only 
currently pending case involving a fraud accusation,79 Applicant has 
presented no evidence that espionage occurred during the Treaty 
negotiation; in fact, the Frost Files suggest otherwise; the execution of the 
Broadcasting Treaty predated the Carmen and Verismo programs by at least 
seven months, when the Broadcasting station first operated.80 Additionally, 
Applicant has presented no evidence that any statements made by Riesland 
in treaty negotiation “induced” Amestonia to conclude the Treaty. 
 
b. The treaty is not suspended or terminated due 
to material breach. 
The standard for material breach under VCLT Article 60 is objective, 
independent of the determination by the party invoking the claim.81  For a 
breach to be material, it must involve a provision essential to accomplishing 
the treaty’s object and purpose82 and must be deliberate and persistent.83 
The object and purpose can be determined by looking at the treaty’s text 
and preamble.84  
Riesland did not violate a principle essential to the object and purpose 
of the Treaty. References to “friendship” and “cooperation” in the preamble 
illustrate that the object and purpose is to promote friendship through the 
broadcasting of television. The preamble directs the parties to “offer their 
                                                          
76 PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 137-38 (1989); Donald Anton, The 
Timor Sea Treaty Arbitration: Timor-Lester Challenges Australian Espionage and Seizure of 
Documents, 18 AM. SOC. INT’L L. BLOG 6 (26 February 2014).  
77 Contract Principles, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law Principles, Art 
3.2.5,cmt. 2 (2010).  
78 Anton, 6; ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 254-55 (2000); Kate 
Mitchell et al., Espionage & Good Faith in Treaty Negotiations: East Timor v. Australia, J. EUR. L. 
BLOG (20 January 2014). 
79 Anton, 6. 
80 Compromis, ¶8. 
81 SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES,1945–1986, 38 (1989); Tacna-
Arica Question (Chile/Peru), 2 R.I.A.A. 921, 945–944 (1922). 
82 VCLT Commentaries, 245; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶95; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, 
¶109. 
83 Namibia, ¶95. 
84 VCLT, Art.31(2). 
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citizens television channels,”85 the title refers only to the “establishment of 
broadcasting facilities,” and Articles I and II, outlining the stations’ 
functions, refer only to actions required for broadcasting. In Nicaragua, this 
Court noted, “There must be a distinction, even in the case of a treaty of 
friendship, between the broad category of unfriendly acts, and the narrower 
category of acts tending to defeat the object and purpose of a Treaty.”86 In 
that case, the Court found that certain unfriendly acts, such as cutting off 
economic aid, did not breach a “friendship” treaty between states which 
pertained to maritime commerce.87  
Riesland broadcasted award-winning programs for 22 years and 
continued to broadcast diverse content until Amestonia’s expropriation of 
property and arrest of VoR employees.88 Even if this Court finds that the 
intelligence program did not further friendship, such action, at the very 
least, does not harm friendship between States. States commonly use their 
property on foreign soil to conduct espionage,89 often with implicit 
acceptance of host states.90 Although spies have sometimes been declared 
persona non grata and expelled,91 in no instances has the operating treaty 
for a mission, consulate, or other special entity, which commonly contain 
“friendship” provisions,92 been resultantly declared invalid.93 Amestonia’s 
acceptance of intelligence from Riesland’s intelligence programs on over 
50 occasions,94 including intelligence on a terrorist plot to poison a large 
shipment of honey95 supports the compatibility of Carmen and Verismo 
with the Broadcasting Treaty. 
                                                          
85 Broadcasting Treaty, Preamble. 
86 Nicaragua, ¶137 
87 Nicaragua, ¶276.  
88 Compromis, ¶8. 
89 Jens Glüsing et al., Fresh Leak on US Spying: NSA Accessed Mexican President’s Email, DER 
SPIEGEL (20 October 2013) (describing spying from U.S. Embassies in Mexico City and Brasilia); 
George Roberts, Indonesia Summons Australian Ambassador to Jakarta Greg Moriarty over Spying 
Reports, AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORP. (1 November 2013).  
90 Deeks, 312; Radsan, 621–622. 
91 Deeks, 312; Radsan, 621–622. 
92 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (1964) Preamble; Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (1967) Preamble; Convention on Special Missions 
(1985), 1400 U.N.T.S. 231, Preamble. 
93 Radsan, 622. 
94 Compromis, ¶23. 
95 Compromis, ¶18.  
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B. Amestonia violated the Broadcasting Treaty. 
1. Broadcasting Treaty Article 36 does not 
invalidate Riesland’s privileges and immunities.   
Article 36 outlines the only method in which privileges and 
immunities can be suspended, stating: “All privileges and immunities 
provided for in this Treaty, save for those in Article 15(1)(c) above, shall 
cease to have effect upon the cessation of the station’s functions as 
envisaged in the Present Treaty.”96 Article 36 does not apply because the 
station in Amestonia never ceased to function as envisaged in the Treaty.97 
Articles 1 and 2 outline the planned functions of the broadcasting stations, 
including the process for establishing stations, how they would be 
established and managed, and how programming would commence. The 
station continued to perform all of these functions until Amestonia’s 
violation.98 Riesland’s only potential violation involves “respecting the laws 
of the host state;” however, this Treaty provision specifically states that 
such violations are “without prejudice to their privileges and immunities.”99  
Even if privileges and immunities are invalidated under Article 36, this 
provision cannot nullify any Treaty provision other than Article 15. Under 
the treaty-interpretation principle of expressio unius, the specification of 
one issue implies the exclusion of all others.100 Since the Treaty included 
“immunities and privileges” language only in Article 15, the parties are 
presumed to have intended only Article 15 to be subject to termination 
under Article 36. Thus, even if the station ceases to function as envisaged, 
Riesland can claim relief for Applicant’s other Treaty violations. 
 
2. Amestonia’s arrest of VoR employees and 
seizure of VoR property violated the 
Broadcasting Treaty. 
A treaty is interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms in their context and in light of the treaty’s 
object and purpose.101 Interpretation begins by examining the treaty’s text, 
both the body and preamble.102  
The text of the Broadcasting Treaty states that the station’s land is 
                                                          
96 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.36. 
97 See supra §II(A)(1)(b). 
98 See infra §II(B)(2). 
99 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23. 
100 MARK VILLIGER, II CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 160 (1997). 
101 VCLT, Art.31(1-2). 
102 VCLT, Art.31(2-3). 
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procured and held in the operating state’s name,103 that the station’s 
premises104 and documents105 are inviolable, and that agents of the host 
state cannot enter the station without consent.106 The station’s premises and 
property are immune from “search, requisition, attachment, expropriation, 
or execution.”107 Similarly, station employees are immune from arrest, 
attachment, and the receiving state’s criminal jurisdiction.108 The Treaty 
also imposes a “special duty” on the host state to protect the station from 
intrusion or damage, prevent impairment of the premises’ dignity,109 treat 
the station’s employees “with due respect,” and prevent attack on 
employees’ freedom or dignity.110  
Based on the ordinary meaning given to these terms, Amestonia 
breached each of these provisions. Amestonia entered the broadcasting 
station without permission, catalogued and removed equipment and 
documents,111 arrested and detained employees for criminal charges,112 
ordered forfeiture of the premises and property,113 and attempted to auction 
off the station’s real estate and property.114  
 
C. The expropriation of VoR property violated Riesland’s 
sovereign immunity. 
1. State entities are entitled to a presumption of 
State immunity. 
The universally recognized principle of foreign sovereign immunity115 
creates a presumption of immunity for both States and state 
                                                          
103 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.1(2). 
104 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.14(1). 
105 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.14(4). 
106 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.14(1). 
107 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.14(2). 
108 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.15(1)(b). 
109 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.14(3). 
110 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.15(1)(a). 
111 Compromis, ¶27. 
112 Compromis, ¶28. 
113 Compromis, ¶40. 
114 Compromis, ¶40. 
115 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 326 (2003); ANTONIO CASSESE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (2005); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 697, 701 (2008). 
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instrumentalities.116 Unless Amestonia can demonstrate the applicability of 
an exemption,117 its exercise of jurisdiction through enforcement against a 
Rieslandic instrumentality violates Riesland’s sovereign rights.118 
 
2. The Voice of Riesland is a state instrumentality. 
To determine whether an entity is a state instrumentality, courts 
consider whether the entity is indistinct or distinct from the State,119 or 
“performing acts in the exercise of sovereign authority of the State.”120 
Courts examine factors such as ownership and control of the entity; 
appointment and dismissal of administrative personnel; degree and nature 
of government control; constitution of the entity; and relationship between 
the entity and government.121  
VoR is a division of RNT, a state-owned and -operated corporation.122 
VoR was created specifically by a treaty between States designed to 
promote friendship through public broadcasting.123 The Rieslandic 
government was responsible for “staffing, running, and funding the 
station,” “procur[ing] at its own expense and in its own name” the station’s 
equipment, and “establishing and operating” the station.124 The government, 
through the Bureau, also provided direct oversight over VoR’s intelligence 
activities and served as a conduit for interpreting the station’s intelligence.  
 
3. The commercial activity exemption does not 
apply. 
Only a state instrumentality’s commercial acts are subject to foreign 
                                                          
116 See United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 
(2005), 44 I.L.M. 801, [hereinafter “Immunities Convention”], Arts. 10–11, 13–17; European 
Convention on State Immunity (1972), C.E.T.S. No. 074, Arts. 4–12; Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(1985), [Austl.] No. 196, §§11–12, 14–20; Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, [U.S.] 28 U.S.C. 
1602–1611, Art.1605(a)(2)–(4), (6); State Immunities Act, [Can.] R.S.C., 1985, c. S-18, §§5, 7–8; State 
Immunities Act, [U.K] 1978 c. 33, pt. I, §§2–4, 6–11. 
117 Nicaragua, ¶101. 
118 See BROWNLIE, 323, 325-26; CASSESE, 100, 102; SHAW, 697, 701; Prosecutor/Blaskic, 
Judgment of 18 July 1997, [ICTY] IT-95-14, ¶72 (1997). 
119 XIAODONG YANG, STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 (2015) (citing cases in 
England, Singapore, Germany, France, South Africa, and the U.S). 
120 Immunities Convention, Art.2(1)(b)(iii).  
121 Yang, 297. 
122 Compromis, ¶8.   
123 See supra §II(A)(1)(b). 
124 Broadcasting Treaty, Arts. 1, 2. 
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jurisdiction; all other acts are immune.125  To determine whether an act is 
commercial, both its nature and purpose are considered.126 In Jurisdictional 
Immunities, this Court ruled that the commercial activities exemption did 
not apply to property serving as an Italian-German cultural exchange 
center127 because it was “intended to promote cultural exchanges,” was 
“organized and administered on the basis of an agreement between the two 
Governments,” and involved State oversight in its “managing 
structure.”128As in Jurisdictional Immunities, the broadcasting station 
intended to promote cultural exchanges, was organized and administered 
under an agreement between States, and was managed by Riesland 
government agents. Additionally, the facility engaged in public 
broadcasting, which, by its definition, serves to broadcast content without 
making a profit. Riesland’s intelligence activities also did not intend to 
procure any commercial value from Amestonian citizens, and the 
information collected was not used for any commercial benefit to Riesland.  
 
4. Riesland did not waive immunity. 
Although States may waive immunity,129 States’ intention to waive 
must be clearly expressed and specific to the litigation at issue.130  Riesland 
never explicitly or implicitly waived its right to privileges and immunities 
for the VoR premises or property, and the only privileges and immunities 
mentioned in the Broadcasting Treaty concern employees. 
 
D. Riesland is entitled to the immediate release of its 
nationals and compensation for the value of the 
confiscated property. 
1. Riesland is entitled to immediate release of its 
nationals. 
In circumstances where ceasing the wrongful act and restoring it to its 
prior situation is possible, this Court131 and its predecessor132 have 
                                                          
125 CASSESE, 100; SHAW, 708. 
126 Immunities Convention, Art.2(2); CASSESE, 101. 
127 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany/Italy), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99, ¶120. 
128 Jurisdictional Immunities, ¶119. 
129 Yang, 316. 
130 Immunities Convention, Art.7. 
131 Nicaragua, p.145 ¶12; Tehran, p.45, ¶5.  
132 Mavromatis Jerusalem Concessions, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 5, 51; Factory at Chorzów 
(Ger./Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 9, 541. 
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recognized restitution as a remedy in international law; reparations should 
“re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if 
that act had not been committed.”133 Although the remedy for wrongful 
deprivations of liberty is typically “review and reconsideration,”134 
immediate release of nationals is the proper remedy when State immunity is 
violated, either by treaty or custom.135 
 
2. Riesland is entitled to compensation for the 
value of its property. 
A State may not expropriate foreign-owned property without 
providing full compensation.136 Opinio juris evidenced in General 
Assembly Resolution 1803137 illustrates this standard, and modern courts 
reaffirm it.138 When Amestonia expropriated VoR property, Riesland 
became entitled to full compensation for such property.  
 
III. THE DETENTION OF JOSEPH KAFKER UNDER THE 
TERRORISM ACT IS CONSISTENT WITH 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE COURT HAS NO 
AUTHORITY TO ORDER KAFKER’S RELEASE OR 
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION RELATED TO HIS 
DETENTION. 
A. Riesland’s preventive detention of Joseph Kafker 
complied with the ICCPR and customary law. 
ICCPR Article 9 protects individuals from arbitrary detention.139 
States can lawfully detain individuals preventively, without criminal 
charges, in a manner fully consistent with the ICCPR.140 The practice of 
                                                          
133 Chorzow Factory, 541. 
134 See infra §III(D). 
135 See Tehran, ¶¶84-87, 91-92. 
136 Chorzow Factory, 30; BROWNLIE, 54; BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED 
TO INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 39 (1953); SAMMY FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (1953). 
137 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, U.N.Doc.A/Res/1803, ¶4 (2008).  
138 Christina Binder et al., Unjust Enrichment in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2007); Patrick Norton, A Law of the Future of the Future or of the Past? 
Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 474, 476-477 (1991). 
139 ICCPR, Art.9(1). 
140 Louis Joinet, Special Rapporteur, Report on the Practice of Administrative Detention, 
U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990, [hereinafter “Joinet Report”], 29 (1990); CLAIRE MACKEN, COUNTER-
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ICCPR Parties, which this Court must consider,141 confirms this 
interpretation.142 Though ICCPR substantive protections from deprivation 
of liberty are coextensive with customary law, ICCPR procedural 
protections are stricter than custom.143   
 
1. Kafker’s detention was not arbitrary. 
a. Kafker’s detention accorded with procedures 
established by law. 
Preventive detention is arbitrary when it is not conducted according to 
clear procedures established by domestic law.144 Specific authorization and 
circumscribed procedure are required safeguards against arbitrariness.145 
Kafker was detained pursuant to the Terrorism Act, which allows detention 
only when it is “required for reasons of national security or public 
safety,”146 and his detention was reviewed by the NST.147  
 
b. Kafker’s preventive detention was necessary 
and proportional to the threat he posed. 
Preventive detention must be necessary and proportional to the threat 
posed by the individual,148 such that the deprivation of liberty is not 
                                                                                                                                      
TERRORISM AND THE DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 95 (2011); Schweizer/Uruguay, 
CCPR/C/17/D/66/1980, ¶18.1 (1980); See HRC, General Comment No.29, 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, ¶15 (2001). 
141 VCLT Art.31(3)(b). 
142 PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND SECURITY LAW: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY (Harding et al., eds. 
1993) (examining preventive detention in 17 African, Asian, and European States); S.B. Elias, 
Rethinking “Preventive Detention” from a Comparative Perspective, 41 COL. H.R.L.R. 130 
(2009)(citing preventive detention frameworks in 11 European and South American States). 
143 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N.Doc.A/HRC/22/44, [hereinafter 
“Working Group Report”], ¶¶42-51 (2012); Joinet Report, 7. 
144 HRC, General Comment No.35, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/GC/35, ¶¶22, 23 (2014); ICCPR, Art.9. 
145 See SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY, 211 (2000). 
146Terrorism Act, §3(d). 
147 Compromis, ¶33. 
148 Arbitrary Detention, U.N.Doc.A/HRC/Res/6/4, ¶5(e) (2007); HRC, General Comment No.31, 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, ¶6 (2004); A./Australia, CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, ¶9.2 (1997); 
C./Australia, CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999, ¶14 (2002); See, e.g. Criminal Code Act 1995, [Austl.] No. 1995, 
§105.4(5)(b-c). 
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inappropriate, unpredictable, or substantively unjust.149 Courts require that 
detention be reasonable under the circumstances150 and that no alternative 
means could accomplish the objective.151 International152 and national153 
courts grant significant deference to State authorities’ judgments on the 
necessity and proportionality of detentions for security reasons. 
 
i. Kafker’s detention was reasonable 
because he posed an imminent and 
severe threat. 
Preventive detention is an exceptional step,154 reasonable when the 
detainee poses an imminent and severe threat to State security.155 Such a 
threat exists when reasonable grounds156 indicate that an individual will 
assist in preparation or planning for a terrorist act.157 Rieslandic intelligence 
linked Kafker to the “senior echelons” of a terrorist group that had killed 
Rieslandic citizens and threatened Reislandic officials.158 Furthermore, 
Kafker was a “high-level” suspect in the plot to poison a large shipment of 
honey.159 These ties justified his detention. 
 
                                                          
149 Van Alphen/Netherlands, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988, ¶5.8 (1989); Report of the Third 
Committee on the ICCPR, U.N.Doc.A/4045, Annexes Agenda Item 32, ¶7 (1958) 
150 Shafiq/Australia, CCPR/C/88/D/1324/2004, ¶4.10 (2004); Morais/Angola, 
CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002, ¶6.1, (2005). 
151 D. & E./Australia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/87/D/1050/2002, ¶ 7.2 (2006); MACKEN, 50; Principles 
and Best Practices on the Protections of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, OAS 
OEA/Ser/L/V/II 131 Doc.26, [hereinafter “IACHR Detention Principles”], Prin. III.2 (2008). 
152 See Y. ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR, 180(2002); Greece/U.K. (Cyprus Case), 2 
Y.B.E.C.H.R. (1959-1960), 176. 
153 Elias, 130 (referring to 13 State courts). 
154 Mukong/Cameroon, CCPR/C/45/D/458/1991, ¶9.8 (1991);  
155 General Comment No.35, ¶15; Schweizer/Uruguay, ¶114; Report on Terrorism and Human 
Rights, [Inter-Am. Commission on Human Rights], OAS OEA/Ser.L/V/VII 116 Doc. 5, rev. 1, corr. 22, 
[hereinafter “Terrorism Report”], ¶124 (2002). 
156 Venice Commission Report on Counter-Terrorism Measures and Human Rights, CDL-
AD(2010)022, §D(50) (2010); See, e.g. Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, [Can.] Bill-36, §86.3. 
157 See, e.g. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) Sub-S 105.4 (Australia); See also Martin Scheinin, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, UN.Doc.A/HRC/14/46 (2010), ¶42. 
158 Compromis, ¶16,18. 
159 Compromis, ¶36; See supra n.26. 
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ii. No alternative means existed to 
mitigate the threat Kafker posed. 
The HRC has observed that detention is necessary when a subject may 
flee160 or could thwart an ongoing investigation.161 Detention was the only 
means to monitor Kafker, eliminate his ability to coordinate with the Hive, 
and prevent him from absconding to assist in an act of terrorism. 
 
c. The length of Kafker’s detention was not 
arbitrary. 
The HRC has found a detention lasting 14 months not to violate 
Article 9(4),162 and has only found violations where detentions persisted for 
several years without trial.163 By comparison, Riesland has only detained 
Kafker for 10 months, and the maximum allowed by the Terrorism Act is 
only 540 days.164 
2. The National Security Tribunal satisfies 
Kafker’s right to judicial review. 
a. The NST is independent and impartial. 
Prompt review of a detention by an independent tribunal–which enjoys 
judicial independence from other branches to decide legal matters in 
proceedings that are judicial in nature165–is necessary in all circumstances 
to satisfy Article 9(4).166 Valid national security concerns justify holding a 
review hearing without the detainee present,167 as in Kafker’s case. The 
NST is independent from the executive and comprised of judges. 
                                                          
160 A./Australia, CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, ¶9.5 (1997). 
161 Jalloh/Netherlands, CCPR/C/74/D/794/1998, ¶8.2 (2002) 
162 Thomas/Jamaica, CCPR/C/65/D/614/1995, ¶9.6 (1999). 
163 See Press Release, 26-01-2012, ECHR 032 (2012): Berasategi/France (29095/09), Esparza 
Luri/France (29119/09), Guimon Esparza/France (29116/09), Sagarzazu/France (29109/09), Soria 
Valderrama/France, 29101/09; See also Report of the Third Committee on the ICCPR, A/4045, 13 
GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 32, 7 (1958-1959). 
164 Terrorism Act, §3(h). 
165 Vuolanne/Finland, 265/1987, U.N.Doc.Supp.No.40 A/44/40, ¶9.6 (1989); UN Basic 
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1, Prin. 2(1985); 
Torres/Finland¸ CCPR/C/38/D/291/1988, ¶7.2(1990). 
166 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶¶39-41,46; Gavrilin/Belarus, CCPR/C/D/1342/2005¶7.4(2007); 
Mulezi/DRC, CCPR/C/81/D/962/2001, ¶5.2(2004); Fjalkowska/Poland, CCPR/C/84/D/1061/2002, 
¶8.4(2005). 
167 See Ahani/Canada, UN.Doc.CCPR/C/1051/2002, ¶2.3 (2002). 
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Specialized courts created by legislation, like the NST, satisfy Article 9 if 
they meet the Article’s other criteria.168 
 
b. Kafker’s detention was promptly reviewed. 
The HRC and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention state that 
prompt review of a detention must occur within “a few days.”169 The 
Terrorism Act requires review within three days of arrest,170 and Kafker’s 
detention complied.171  
 
c. Kafker’s detention was adequately reviewed. 
The essential components of review are: (1) that the reviewing court 
have the power to order release if the detention is unlawful,172 and (2) that it 
re-review regularly.173 The NST has the power to order release if evidence 
is insufficient to support detention and reviews detention every 21 days.174 
 
d. Kafker’s representation by a Special Advocate 
satisfies Article 9. 
Article 9 does not expressly confer a right to counsel outside of 
criminal trials.175 ICCPR States Parties interpret Article 9 to allow 
suspension of access to counsel if “it is deemed indispensable…to maintain 
security and good order.”176 Though the HRC recognizes an absolute right 
to counsel,177 the aforementioned interpretation of the parties and 
                                                          
168 HRC Gen Comm. 35, ¶¶18-22; Rameka/New Zealand, CCPR/C/79/D/1090/2002, ¶7.4 (2003); 
Torres/Finland, ¶7.2, 9.6. 
169 HRC Gen. Comm 35, ¶33; Working Group Report, ¶52; See Freemantle/Jamaica, 
CCPR/C/68/D/625/1995 ¶7.4 (2000). 
170 Terrorism Act §3(b). 
171 Compromis, ¶. 
172 ICCPR Art.9(4); See Cases of De Wilde, Ooms & Versyp/Belgium (2832/66) 1970 ECHR 2, 
¶76 (1970); A./Australia, ¶9.5; Shafiq/Australia, ¶7.4 (2004). 
173 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶15. 
174 Terrorism Act, §3(d),(g); Compromis, ¶33. 
175 ICCPR, Art.9. 
176 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, GA Res. 43/173 (1988), Prin.18(3); See Bin Nasir/Kerajean Malaysia & Others, 2002-4 
M.L.J. 617 [Malaysia][2002]; Report of the Committee Against Torture, 
G.A.O.R.Supp.No.44(A/67/44)(2012), 63-64,¶8(Morocco). 
177 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶15 
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international tribunals contradict this view.178 
 
3. Kafker was sufficiently notified of the reasons of 
his arrest. 
Article 9(1) requires a State to promptly notify the detainee of the 
reasons for his arrest.179 Oral notification satisfies this requirement180 if it is 
precise enough to allow the grounds for detention to be challenged.181 The 
Terrorism Act, stated as the authorization for Kafker’s arrest, includes a 
specific definition of the suspected conduct, accompanied by relevant 
factors for consideration.182 The purpose of Article 9’s notification 
requirement was satisfied by Kafker’s Special Advocate, who did have 
access to the “closed materials” forming the basis of his detention and 
challenged detention on Kafker’s behalf.183 
 
B. If Kafker’s detention did violate Article 9, Riesland 
lawfully derogated from the relevant obligations. 
1. The Hive posed a threat to the life and health of 
the nation, justifying derogation during a state 
of emergency. 
International courts grant a measure of discretion to State authorities in 
declaring states of emergency and determining how to respond.184 Threats 
to state security from terrorism can be legitimate grounds for derogation,185 
                                                          
178 See, e.g., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, Advisory Opinion, 1990 
IACtHR (Ser. A) No. 11, ¶28 (1990); Ocalan/Turkey (No. 2), ECtHR Nos. 24069/03, 197/04, 6201/06, 
and 10464/07 (2014). 
179 ICCPR, Art.9(1); See HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶25-30. 
180 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶¶24-27 
181 Caldas/Uruguay, UN.Doc.CCPR/C/19/D/43/1979, ¶13.2(1983); Campbell/Jamaica, 
UN.Doc.CCPR/C/47/D/307/1988, ¶6.3(1993); NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS 174(2005) 
182 Terrorism Act, §3(a),(d). 
183 Compromis, ¶33. 
184 J.F. Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies, 22 HARVARD 
INT’L L. J. 25, 27 (1981); See Lawless/Ireland, [ECtHR] No. 332/57 (A/3), 15,28 (1961); Klass & 
Others/Germany, 2 E.H.R.R. 214, ¶¶48-49(1979); Ireland/U.K., (5310/71)ECHR 1, ¶207 (1978); See 
also ROZA PATI, DUE PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 20, n.69 (2009). 
185 Case of Durand and Ugarte, I.A.Ct.H.R. Series C, No. 68, ¶99 (2000); Brannigan & 
McBride/United Kingdom,  ECHR Series A No. 258-B, ¶59(1993); IACHR Terrorism Report, 
Executive Summary, ¶8. 
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provided the threat is imminent186 and affects the “organized life of the 
State” as a whole.187  
Threats must be more concrete than “general terrorist activity” in a 
region,188 which could otherwise be used to justify derogation in 
perpetuity.189 Riesland derogated during a Terrorism Alert, which could 
only be issued when the government of Riesland learned of a “credible 
danger of an imminent terrorist act.”190  
Threats must pertain to the entire populace.191 The Hive had already 
killed two Rieslandic citizens and attempted to poison a large shipment of a 
Riesland household good.192 Threats which harm the functioning of public 
institutions, in particular, are threats to “organized life.”193 The Hive 
threatened mass harm to Rieslandic government officials through mailing 
letters filled with imitation poison.194 
 
2. Riesland derogated only to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation. 
Derogations must be limited “to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation.”195 The existence of a state of emergency is also 
considered in the necessity analysis for individual detainees.196 Following 
ex ante procedures is the chief safeguard against disproportionality.197 
                                                          
186 See A. SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATES OF 
EXCEPTION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE IN THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES AND CASE-LAW OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONITORING ORGANS 292 (1992). 
187 The Greek Case, 3321/67, 3322/67; 3323/67, 3344/67 [E.Comm.H.R.] ¶ 153 (1969); 
Lawless/Ireland¸ ¶28; See HRC Gen Comm 29, ¶4. 
188 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Opinion 1/2002 (Comm. DH (2002) 7, 
28 August 2002), ¶33. 
189 JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY 22 (1992); MACKEN 84. 
190 Terrorism Act, §2. 
191 Lawless/Ireland, ¶90; ORAA 29; See Askoy/Turkey, E.C.H.R. 21987/93, ¶70(1996). 
192 Compromis, ¶14,18. 
193 Lawless/Ireland, ¶29: SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, 294; Hartman, 16. 
194 Compromis, ¶16. 
195 ICCPR Art.4(1); HRC Gen Comm 29, ¶4; Working Group Report, ¶50-51; See A/Secretary of 
State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, ¶¶39, 46.  
196 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶66. 
197 See Concluding Observations: Phillipines (CCPR/CO.PHL.2003), ¶14, Mauritius 
(CCPR/CO/83/MUS, 2005), ¶12, Russian Federation (CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6.2009), ¶24, Honduras 
(CCPR/C/HND/CO/1/2006), ¶13. 
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Riesland has adhered to the Terrorism Act during Kafker’s detention and 
periodically reviewed that detention.198 
 
3. Riesland followed sufficient procedure for 
derogation. 
States wishing to derogate must announce that intention by declaring a 
state of emergency.199 Riesland has notified the Secretary-General of each 
Terrorism Alert, 200 which effectively declares a state of emergency in 
Riesland. This notification comports with the practice of States Parties,201 
despite the HRC’s stricter interpretation.202 In any event, failure to follow 
proper notification does not preclude derogations from taking effect.203 
 
4. The relevant provisions are lawfully derogable. 
The provisions of Article 9 are not listed as non-derogable in the 
ICCPR204 and thus almost all can be lawfully derogated from during public 
emergencies.205 The right to prompt judicial review, which is non-derogable 
under any circumstances,206 was granted to Kafker.207  
 
C. Article 14 does not apply to Kafker’s detention. 
Article 14 expressly refers to criminal proceedings.208 Preventive 
detentions are not carried out in order to pursue criminal sanctions on the 
                                                          
198 Compromis, ¶33; See Campbell/Jamaica, ¶6.4. 
199 Wall Opinion, ¶127. 
200 Clarifications, ¶7. 
201 JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS 3-5(1994); See, e.g. Concluding Observations: 
Peru, CCPR/C/79/Add.8, ¶10(1992); Ireland, CCPR/C/79/Add.21, ¶11(1993); Cameroon, 
CCPR/C/79/Add.33, ¶7(1994). 
202 Gen. Comm. 29, ¶17. 
203Nabil Sayadi & Patricia Vinck v. Belgium, CCPR/C/78/933/2000, Concurring Op., Nigel 
Rodley (2008); SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, 226. 
204 ICCPR, Art.4(2). 
205 MACKEN 90. 
206 HRC Gen. Comm. 29, ¶¶16,31; Concluding Observations: Israel, CCPR/C/79/Add.93, 
¶21(1998).  
207 See supra §3(A)(2). 
208 ICCPR, Art.14. 
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basis of guilt,209 but rather are precautionary measures to mitigate a threat to 
society.210 The HRC generally does not apply Article 14 to detentions that 
are not preceding criminal charge.211 Scholars suggest indefinite detention 
without criminal trial can violate Article 14,212 but Kafker’s detention is 
limited to 540 days by law.213  
D. If Kafker’s detention is unlawful, Amestonia’s remedy 
is “review and reconsideration,” not release. 
This Court has stated that the choice of the specific method of 
compliance with its judgments is for parties before the court, not the court 
itself.214 Outside the context of a violation of State immunity,215 the Court 
has noted that the proper remedy for wrongful detention is “review and 
reconsideration” of the action, and that the choice of means should be left to 
the detaining state.216 In Avena, the Court reaffirmed the appropriateness of 
allowing the detaining state to choose the means of compliance.217 Thus, the 
appropriate remedy for a violation of Article 9 would be for Riesland to 
review and reconsider Kafker’s detention, considering what response would 
adequately address the violation of rights alleged.218  
 
E. The Court cannot compel Riesland to disclose the 
confidential information forming the basis of Kafker’s 
arrest. 
The Court does not have authority to compel States to disclose 
                                                          
209 H. Cook, Preventive Detention – International Standards on Protection of the Individual, in 
PREVENTIVE DETENTION: A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW Perspective 1 (Frankowski & 
Shelton, eds. 1992); See also International Committee of Jurists, States of Emergency: Their Impact on 
Human Rights (Geneva 1983), 394. 
210 R/Halliday (1917) AC 216 [Canada]; International Committee of Jurists, 394; Union of 
India/Paul Nanicakn & Anr, Appeal(Crl)[India] 21 of 2002(2003). 
211 Ahani/Canada, ¶¶4.15, 4.16. 
212 See Alfred de Zayas, Human Rights and Indefinite Detention, 87 INT’L R. RED CROSS 15, 19 
(2005); See also Perterer/Austria, CCPR/C/81/D/1015/2001, ¶9.2(2004). 
213 Terrorism Act, §3(h). 
214 Haya de la Torre Case,  1951 I.C.J. REP. 71,  p.79; Northern Cameroons Case, Preliminary 
Objections, 1963 I.C.J. REP. 15, p.37. 
215 See Tehran, ¶84-87, 91-92; See also supra §I(D)(1). 
216 LaGrand, 2000 ICJ Rep. 4, ¶125. 
217 Case Concerning Avena & Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶120, ¶127-132. 
218 See Avena ¶¶138-143; LaGrand, ¶128. 
2016] Distinguished Brief 271 
 
 
 
confidential information threatening national security.219 Such disclosure 
risks irreparable injury to States.220 Furthermore, though the Court can 
request evidence from parties in evidentiary proceedings,221 it cannot 
compel that production, given that “the parties are sovereign states.”222 This 
limitation also applies to remedial production of documents implicating 
State security.223 The evidence for Kafker’s arrest was “closed material” 
from confidential sources in the intelligence community,224 which justifies 
maintaining its confidentiality. 
 
IV. THE CYBER-ATTACKS AGAINST THE COMPUTER 
SYSTEMS OF THE AMES POST AND THE LAW FIRM 
CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO RIESLAND, AND, IN ANY 
EVENT, THE CYBER-ATTACKS DO NOT CONSTITUTE 
AN INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT. 
A. Circumstantial evidence of Rieslandic involvement in 
the cyber-activities must meet a heightened burden of 
proof. 
This court’s jurisprudence has consistently reflected a heightened 
degree of proof for claims based primarily on circumstantial evidence 
without direct evidence.225 This Court in Corfu Channel distinguished 
“indirect evidence” from direct evidence, requiring that inferences of fact 
from indirect evidence “leave no room for reasonable doubt.”226 In 
Cameroon v. Nigeria  ¸ this Court rejected a claim when the indirect 
evidence did not provide a “clear and precise picture” of the facts.227 The 
                                                          
219 See Genocide Case ¶¶44, 205-206., Corfu Channel, p. 32. 
220 See Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-
Leste/Australia), Provisional Measures, 2014 I.C.J. 147, ¶¶46-49. 
221ICJ Statute, Art.49. 
222 Michael Scharf & Margeaux Day, The International Court of Justice’s Treatment of 
Circumstantial Evidence, 13 CHICAGO J. INT’L LAW 123, 127 (2012). 
223 See Timor-Leste, Provisional Measures, Memorial of Australia, ¶75(c). 
224 Compromis, ¶33-34. 
225 Scharf & Day, 149; See Nicaragua, ¶¶109-16; Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadon Islands, 2002 
I.C.J 666, ¶¶85, 90; Oil Platforms, ¶60; See also Brownlie, State Responsibility and the International 
Court of Justice, in ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 
13, 17 (Fitzmaurice & Sarooshi, eds. 2004).  
226 Corfu Channel, p.18. 
227 Cameroon/Nigeria, ¶¶232, 234; Rosalyn Higgins, Issues of State Responsibility before the 
International Court of Justice, in STATE RESPONSIBILITY 1, 9. 
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more serious the charges, the higher the degree of proof of attribution 
required from circumstantial evidence.228 Applicant’s evidence of 
Rieslandic involvement in the cyberattacks rests entirely on circumstantial 
evidence, comprising an academic report and general facts about Riesland’s 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
 
B. The cyber-attacks cannot be linked to an organ of 
Riesland. 
Acts of an organ of a state are attributable to that state.229 Even if the 
AIT report is correct,230 cyber-activity originating from or transmitted 
through Riesland’s cyber infrastructure is not sufficient to prove 
attribution.231 Modern cyber-attackers are able to use proxy servers and 
virtual private networks to mask their true origin.232 Cyber-attackers can 
assume the identity of another by infiltrating and controlling computers 
through “zombie” networks.233 Once these computers are infected, a cyber-
attacker can control the zombies while masking the perpetrator’s true 
identity.234 Even without directly utilizing another’s hardware, sophisticated 
cyber-attackers can feign the identity of an individual or organization using 
proxy servers, virtual private networks, or by electronically falsifying 
data.235 Cyber-attackers in 1998 successfully misdirected the United States 
by creating the impression that an attack launched on the Department of 
Defense from California and Israel originated in countries from 5 different 
time zones.236 Given these various methods of obscuring an attacker’s 
identity in cyberspace, the circumstantial evidence in the Compromis237 is 
insufficient to prove attribution through a Rieslandic government organ. 
                                                          
228 Genocide Case, ¶¶209-210, 373; See Island of Palmas Case (US/Neth.), 2. R.I.A.A. 829, 852 
(P.C.A. 1928); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 567 (2014). 
229 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts [ARSIWA], (I.L.C. 
Yearbook 2001-I)Pt. II, Art.4(1); TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
CYBER WARFARE, Rule 6, ¶6 (M.Scmhitt, ed. 2013). 
230 Compromis 
231 See TALLINN MANUAL, Rule 7, 8. 
232 See Mauno Pihelgas, Back-Tracing in Cyberspace, in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE 
ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE 42-46 (Katharina Ziolkowski, ed., 2013). 
233Pihelgas, 46-47. 
234 TALLINN MANUAL, Rule 6, ¶11; See also Evan Cooke, The Zombie Roundup: Understanding, 
Detecting, and Disrupting Botnets, SRUTI 05 Technical Paper, Univ. of Mich. (2005). 
235 TALLINN MANUAL, Rule 7, ¶4. See Christopher C. Joyner & Catherine Lotrionte, Information 
Warfare as International Coercion, 12 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 825, 839 (2001); Pihelgas, 42-49. 
236 JONATHON ZITRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 37-45 (2008). 
237 Compromis, ¶38; Clarifications, ¶8.¶ 
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C. Riesland did not have effective control over the cyber-
attackers. 
a. Effective control is the appropriate standard. 
Attribution of an act taken by non-state actors to a state requires 
“instruction,” “direction,” or “control” over the acts.238 This Court interprets 
customary law to require that a State had “effective control” over the actors 
at the time of the allegedly wrongful act.239 NATO’s committee of experts 
convened to summarize customary cyber-law decided that, in the electronic 
realm, “the State needs to have issued specific instructions or directed or 
controlled a particular operation to engage State responsibility.”240 The 
“overall control” test for attribution, adopted by the majority in the Tadic 
case,241 is not the appropriate standard. Tadic addressed individual criminal 
responsibility under international humanitarian law rather than State 
responsibility under customary law of attribution.242 This Court 
distinguished Tadic in the Genocide judgment.243 
 
b. There is insufficient evidence of effective 
control. 
Applicant can provide no evidence that Riesland provided instruction 
or direction to the perpetrators of the Amestonian attacks. In Nicaragua, 
this Court held that the indirect evidence of U.S. involvement in Contra 
activities was insufficient to prove attribution absent direct evidence,244 in 
spite of evidence that every Contra offensive had been preceded by an 
infusion of United States funding245 and reports of CIA training for 
paramilitary operatives.246 Evidence of origination in Riesland of an attack 
by unknown actors, with no direct evidence of support from Rieslandic 
                                                          
238 ARSIWA, Art.8; GEORG KERSCHENSCHNIG, CYBERTHREATS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 149-
151 (2012). 
239 Nicaragua ¶¶109, 115; Nicaragua, Sep. Op. Judge Ago, ¶17. 
240 TALLINN MANUAL, Rule 6, ¶11. 
241 Prosecutor/Dusko Tadic¸I.C.T.Y., Case IT-94-1-A (1999), 38 ILM 1518, ¶1117 (November 
1999). 
242 See Commentaries to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility (I.L.C. Yearbook 2001-II) Pt. 
II, Art.8, p.72. 
243 Genocide Case, ¶¶403-405. 
244 Nicaragua, ¶111. 
245 Nicaragua, ¶¶109-111. 
246 Nicaragua, ¶¶103-04, 110. 
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officials, provides even less proof than the facts of Nicaragua. 
 
D. Riesland cannot be held liable merely because the 
cyber-attacks originated from its territory. 
No evidence exists that Riesland failed to exercise due diligence to 
prevent the cyber-attacks.247 To hold Riesland strictly liable without such 
evidence would flagrantly contravene customary law. Strict liability has 
been consistently rejected in the law of State responsibility outside of 
“ultra-hazardous activities.”248 
 
E. In any event, the cyber-operations were not an 
internationally wrongful act. 
1. The cyber-operations were not an unlawful use 
of force. 
Cyber-attacks do not violate Article 2(4) unless their scale and effects 
are comparable to traditional uses of force,249 which generally requires 
physical damage.250 This flows from the Court’s focus on scale and effects 
to determine whether force had been used in its Nicaragua judgment.251  
The scale of the attacks was too small to be classified as a use of force, 
only affecting computers at two Amestonian organizations.252 The 
disruption in Amestonia was far less severe than in Estonia in 2008, and the 
attack on Estonia was not condemned by the international community as a 
use of force.253  
The effects of the cyber-attacks on Amestonia were not comparable to 
traditional uses of force. The attacks exclusively targeted computer 
systems, and resulted merely in the elimination of data at private 
                                                          
247 See TALLINN MANUAL, Rule 8, ¶2; Michael Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in 
Cyberspace, YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM 68, 73 (2015). 
248 Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, (I.L.C. 
Yearbook 2010-II) Pt.2, Art.3 & Cmt.3; See Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resource Activities, 27 I.L.M. 868 (1988) Art.8. 
249 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 88 (2010); TALLINN MANUAL, 
Rule 11. 
250 Michael Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law, 37 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 917 (1999).  
251 Nicaragua, ¶195. 
252 Compromis, ¶37,38. 
253 See Scott Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 209-10 
(2009). 
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organizations and disruption of electronic infrastructure.254 The 
international community does not regard mere economic loss as a violation 
of Article 2(4).255 
 
2. If the cyber-operations were a use of force, they 
were justified under Riesland’s right to self-
defense. 
States have the right to use force in self-defense to repel an imminent 
armed attack,256 which can include an ongoing threat from a pattern of 
terrorist activity.257 Customary law supports the existence of such a right,258 
evidenced by the lack of condemnation, and even support, from the 
international community for uses of force against alleged terrorist groups,259 
and other non-state actors.260 The Armed Activities Court explicitly left 
open the question of whether the right exists.261 The right can also justify 
force affecting States harboring non-state actors.262 Uses of force in self-
defense must be both necessary to prevent further damage and proportional 
to harm averted.263 Riesland’s cyber-attacks were necessary to prevent the 
Hive’s use of confidential information, such as the kind of information that 
prevented the honey attack, which Amestonia refused to confiscate.264 The 
cyber-attacks were proportionate to the threat of harm from large-scale 
                                                          
254Compromis,¶37,38. 
255Tom Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law, 79 
AM.J.INT’L.L. 405, 411 (1985). 
256 Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, Art.51 (1945). 
257 Daniel Bethlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right of Self-Defense Against 
an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM.J.INT’L.L. 1,6 (Prin. 4&5) (2012). 
258 See Armed Activities, Sep. Ops., Simma, ¶12, Koojimans, ¶30; Wall Opinion, Decl., Judge 
Buergenthal, ¶30. 
259 See Thomas Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 A.J.I.L 839 (2001); See, e.g. 
Yihdego, Ethiopia’s Military Action Against the Union of Islamic Courts and Others in Somalia, 56 
I.C.L.Q. 666, 673 (2007); Ruys, Quo Vadit Jus ad Bellum? A Legal Analysis of Turkey’s Military 
Operations against the PKK in Northern Iraq, 12 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 334, 354 (2008). 
260 Tams, 381 (cross-border anti-terrorism operations by Rwanda, Tajikstan, and Burma). 
261 Armed Activities, ¶147; See Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 
E.J.INT’L L. 359, 385(2009). 
262 Ruys & Verhoeven, Attacks by Private Actors and the Right of Self-Defence, 10 CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 285, 315 (2005); UNSC Res. 1373, U.N.Doc.S/Res/1373 (2001). 
263 Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, Eighth Report on State Responsibility, 
U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7, ¶120(1979); DINSTEIN, 184. 
264 Compromis, ¶35. 
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terrorist attacks from the Hive following a pattern of activity.  
 
3. The cyber-operations were not an unlawful 
intervention. 
States violate the norm of non-intervention when they interfere in 
other States’ internal affairs using coercion.265 That interference must be of 
a level that “subordinates the sovereign will” of the target state over a 
matter that the victim state is rightfully entitled to decide.266 The vast 
majority of State action within another State’s territory does not violate this 
norm.267 The attacks on Amestonia temporarily disrupted the activities of a 
law firm and removed stolen information from a private newspaper.268 The 
scale of these effects is not sufficient to amount to coercion. 
 
4. Alternatively, the cyber-attacks were lawful 
countermeasures. 
States injured by internationally wrongful acts may resort to 
proportional269 cyber countermeasures.270 States must notify the violating 
State of intent to pursue countermeasures,271 though this requirement is 
flexible when a state must act urgently to prevent injury.272  
 
a. Amestonia violated international law by 
allowing Riesland’s confidential data to be 
disseminated on its territory. 
The Security Council identified acts of international terrorism as 
threats to international peace and security,273 and declared that all states are 
obliged to prevent the use of their territory for planning or facilitating 
                                                          
265 Nicaragua, ¶205; H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (1952). 
266 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, UN Doc. A/Res/20/2131 (1965) ¶2; Maziar 
Jamnejad & Michael Wood, The Principle of Non-Intervention, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 345, 348 (2009). 
267 Lori F. Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over 
Domestic Affairs, 83 AM.J.INTL.L. 1 (1989) 14-17. 
268 Compromis, ¶37-38. 
269 ARSIWA, Art.51; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, ¶¶85, 87. 
270 TALLINN MANUAL, Rule 9; See ARSIWA, Art.49(1). 
271 ARSIWA Art.52(1). 
272 ARSIWA Art.52(2). 
273 UNSC Res.1373, U.N.Doc.S/Res/1373(2001). 
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terrorist acts.274 Furthermore, Amestonia violated the object and purpose of 
two anti-terrorism treaties obliging Amestonia’s cooperation to prevent 
terrorist attacks.275  
Riesland called on Amestonia to cease allowing Amestonian entities to 
possess and publish Riesland’s stolen, confidential, documents, which 
contained information that the Hive could use to counter Riesland’s 
intelligence operations.276 Riesland notified Amestonia it would take 
measures to prevent the leaked documents from causing harm.277 
b. The countermeasures were proportional. 
Countermeasures must be “directed against”278 the violating state and 
“equivalent with the alleged breach,”279 and must be temporary and 
reversible.280  The attacks on Amestonia targeted exclusively the data that 
was the cause of Amestonia’s breach.281 The damage caused by the breach, 
which was entirely non-physical, was reversed in months. 
  
                                                          
274 Resolution 1373, ¶2(d). 
275 See Terrorist Bombings Convention, 149 U.N.T.S. 284 (1998) Preamble; Terrorism Financing 
Convention, T.I.A.S.No. 13075 (2000) Preamble. 
276 Compromis, ¶¶22-27,35. 
277 Compromis, ¶35. 
278 Gabcikovo, ¶83; ARSIWA Cmt 22,n.5. 
279 See Air Services Agreement, 18 R.I.A.A. 416, ¶83(1946). 
280 ARSIWA, Art.49, n.7. 
281 Compromis, ¶37. 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
 
The Federal Republic of Riesland respectfully requests this Court to 
adjudge and declare: 
I. 
The illicitly-obtained documents published on the Ames Post are not 
admissible evidence, and, if the Court does find them admissible, they do 
not evidence a breach of international law; and 
 
II. 
The arrest of VoR employees and expropriation of VoR property 
violated the Broadcasting Treaty and international law generally, and 
therefore Riesland is entitled to the release of its nationals and 
compensation for its confiscated property; and 
 
III. 
Riesland’s detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism Act is 
consistent with international law, and the Court has no authority to order his 
release or disclosure of information relating to his apprehension; and 
 
IV. 
The cyber attacks against the computer systems of Amestonian 
corporations cannot be attributed to Riesland, and in any event, were not an 
internationally wrongful act.  
Respectfully Submitted, 
Agents of the Government of the Federal Republic of Riesland 
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